1. Whether a court may grant summary judgment based on qualified immunity by rejecting the plaintiff’s account based on the court’s own interpretation of video evidence and thereby resolving disputed facts in favor of officers contrary to VJolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014).

2. Whether a constitutional violation is “clearly established” only when existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue, or whether general Fourth Amendment principles can clearly establish that significant force during a minor encounter is unlawful, even absent a case involving materially identical facts.

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| QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state

administrative agency resolves a case on a dispositive factual premise not developed through an evidentiary process, rejects contrary evidence without a hearing, and denies a party a meaningful opportunity to be heard. | 2. Whether due process is violated when a state | appellate court affirms on a ground not raised or litigated by the parties, without notice or an

. opportunity to be heard. 3. Whether due process is violated when a state agency alters its position on appeal and prevails on shifting and inconsistent grounds not subject to : adversarial testing. , i

Whether a plaintiff alleging that a school district implemented facially-neutral admissions criteria for a racially discriminatory purpose must show that the criteria produced a disparate impact on the targeted racial group before a court may consider evidence of discriminatory intent.

Gary Perez and Matilde Torres are ceremonial leaders of the Lipan Native American Church. Like their ancestors before them, they perform religious ceremonies at a specific bend of the San Antonio River now located within a municipal public park.

The City of San Antonio nevertheless plans to cut down the trees around the riverbend and to drive off cormorants nesting there—permanently destroying necessary components of Petitioners’ religious services. Joining the wrong side of two circuit splits, the Fifth Circuit held that this would not “substantially burden” Petitioners’ religious exercise, despite Judge Oldham’s retort that the “burdens on plaintiffs’ religious freedoms are undeniable.” App.54a (Oldham, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Although Petitioners explained that other locations are “not religiously effective,” the panel found no burden because Petitioners retain “virtually unlimited access” to other parts of the Park. And although Petitioners testified that the nesting of cormorants at the riverbend is religiously necessary, the panel brushed that aside because cormorants can still “nest nearby or elsewhere in the 343-acre Park.”

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment permit courts, when deciding whether government action burdens religious exercise, to override a claimant’s sincere theological judgment of what the religious exercise requires.

2. Whether the government can satisfy its burden to prove that its action is the least religiously restrictive means available when, after notice that its

1. Whether due process is violated when a public employee is terminated based on hearsay, misattribution, and later recanted testimony, and the courts treat these substantive factual reversals as clerical errors rather than a constitutional defects. | ,

2. Whether summary judgment is improper under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , (1986), where the record contains sworn recantations, contradictory testimony, credibility disputes subject to Rule 806 impeachment, and no signed or corroborated statements supporting the employer’s justification.

3. Whether claim preclusion may be applied to a non-adversarial grievance process that lacked discovery, cross-examination, neutral adjudication, and meaningful representation, contrary to Rue v. K Mart Corp., 552 Pa. 13, 713 A.2d 82 (1998); Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008); and Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc., 590 U.S.__, 140 S. Ct. 1589 (2020). ,

1. WHETHER SUBSTANTIVE STATUTORY-INTERPRETATION DECISIONS SUCH AS BAILEY V. UNITED STATES, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), BOUSLEY V. UNITED

: STATES, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), REHAIF V. UNITED STATES, 588 U.S.

225 (2019), AND RUAN V. UNITED STATES, 597 U.S. 450 (2022), APPLY

RETROACTIVELY ON COLLATERAL REVIEW WHERE THOSE DECISIONS DEFINE

THE SUBSTANTIVE MEANING OF A- FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTE AND

DEMONSTRATE THAT THE -PETITIONER WAS: CONVICTED WITHOUT PROOF OF , ESSENTIAL STATUTORY ELEMENTS. :

2. WHETHER 28 U.S.C… § 2255(h)(2), AS APPLIED TO A PRISONER

ASSERTING LEGAL INNOCENCE BASED UPON AN INTERVENING SUBSTANTIVE : INTERPRETATION OF A FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTE, VIOLATES THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR FORECLOSING ANY JUDICIAL FORUM IN WHICH TO PRESENT SUCH INNOCENCE CLAIMS. - | . 3. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION PERMITS CONTINUED IMPRISONMENT UNDER 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) AND 841(b) WHERE THE JURY NEVER FOUND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THE DRUG TYPE AND DRUG QUANTITY, AND MENS REA FLEMENTS NECESSARY TO AUTHORIZE THE SENTENCE. IMPOSED. : |

• 4, WHETHER ACTUAL INNOCENCE UNDER BOUSLEY V. UNITED STATES, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) OVERRIDES PROCEDURAL BARRIERS WHERE INTERVENING DECISIONS ESTABLISH THAT THE PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED WITHOUT . FINDINGS ON ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE. .

5. WHETHER THE COURTS BELOW ERRED IN REJECTING PETITIONER’S LONG- STANDING MENS REA CLAIM WHERE PETITIONER ARGUED SINCE DIRECT APPEAL, RELYING UPON FEOLA V. UNITED STATES, 420 U.S. 671 (1975), |

THAT HE LACKED THE CRIMINAL INTENT NECESSARY FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE . NARCOTICS OFFENSE, AND SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS INCLUDING UNITED : STATES V. HERAS, 609 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2010), UNITED STATES V. COLLAZO, 984 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 2021), AND UNITED STATES V. COLSTON, 4 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2021), CONFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF

• PROVING THE REQUISITE MENS REA FOR DRUG: CONSPIRACIES AND RELATED | OFFENSES. ,

1. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a state court to dismiss an expedited ballot-access proceeding based on an alleged failure to serve documents that were not specifically identified in the signed Order to Show Cause as jurisdictionally required service papers.

2. Whether due process permits a state court to treat the phrase “papers upon which the Order to Show Cause was granted” as a jurisdictional trap where | the court never identified which papers it relied upon, never identified the alleged missing email, and never warned that failure to serve that document would require dismissal.

| 3. Whether a verified petition and supporting affirmation containing the operative sworn facts, together with service of the Notice of Electronic Filing, Petition, and Order to Show Cause, satisfy due process notice where the Notice of Electronic Filing provided the case number and gave Respondents immediate access to the NYSCEF docket. |

4. Whether due process permits dismissal where Respondent-Candidate | appeared, filed a detailed Verified Answer, raised jurisdictional defenses, standing arguments, service arguments, timeliness arguments, verification

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1. Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit a candidate to be removed from the ballot where the Board of Elections processed specifications of objections that the candidate did not receive, where the proof of service was internally inconsistent, and where the Board refused to provide the specifications or allow examination of the original proof of service before acting.

2. Whether due process is violated when a Board of Elections treats service of specifications as valid solely because an objector used an overnight delivery

| method, even where the delivery service failed to actually deliver the , specifications to the candidate and the candidate was denied access to the specifications before the Board acted.

3. Whether strict service requirements in emergency Election Law proceedings, as applied to a pro se indigent candidate who cannot afford a process server, impose an unconstitutional burden on ballot access and court access.

4. Whether New York City process-server regulations, including licensing and repeated-service restrictions, compound the unconstitutional burden on pro se indigent candidates in expedited Election Law proceedings.

1. Whether the Fifth Circuit violated the Due Process and Equal Protection principles articulated in Swenson v. Bosler, Griffin v. Illinois, and Mayer v. Chicago by affirming summary judgment while Petitioner—an indigent, pro se litigant—was denied access to the transcript and record necessary for meaningful appellate review.

2. Whether a federal judgment may stand when it was procured through admitted false sworn statements, including a fabricated termination date and an impossible lawsuit filing date, in violation of Rule 11(b)(3), Rule 56(c)(4), and the Due Process Clause.

3. Whether the district court erred by refusing to consider a final Texas Workforce Commission Appeal Tribunal decision finding no misconduct—evidence that Fifth Circuit precedent requires courts to treat as probative of pretext under McInnis v. Alamo Community College District. |

4. Whether fraud on the court under Rule 60(d)(3) requires relief where the record contains perjury, fabricated dates, hearsay, double hearsay, and declarations lacking personal knowledge, contrary to this Court’s decisions in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. and Rozier v. Ford Motor Co.. Jurisdictional basis: This petition invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) because the Fifth Circuit’s March 25, 2026 judgment (Appendix A-1) affirms a federal-question dismissal that raises recurring constitutional and procedural issues of national importance.

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The government prosecuted Freddy Daniel Muoz-Perez under a statute with undisputed racist origins. Congress criminalized illegal entry, as well as illegal reentry, into the United States in 1929 at the urging of “proud” white supremacists, nativists, and eugenicists to keep the American bloodline “white and purely Caucasian.” The core focus of these provisions has remained substantively the same since 1929. But the Ninth Circuit upheld the law based on a reenactment in 1952 and amendments in the 1980s and 1990s, none of which grappled with the law’s racist past.

This case poses important questions about the role of appellate courts in applying the framework from Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), to a federal law used for a large swath of federal criminal prosecutions, along with countless civil rights cases.

The question presented is:

Whether a legislature can cleanse the taint of a racially discriminatory law by silent reenactment or amendment when the law was originally adopted for an impermissible discriminatory purpose.

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I. Whether AEDPA deference defeats an obvious Napue claim despite this Court’s holding in Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226 (2025).

II. Given that “AEDPA … deference does not mean abdication,” whether AEDPA deference was a proper basis to condone racist appeals to “that thirteenth juror, prejudice” despite this Court’s “unceasing efforts” to eradicate exactly that.

Ill. Whether federal courts err in denying a certificate of appealability for a Confrontation Clause / Crawford claim where the state introduced a plethora of out-of-court, testimonial, self-exculpating statements from an alternate suspect and the state’s justification for circumventing Crawford was transparently pretextual.

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Does 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), which criminalizes the transportation of a person who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent that the individual engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, require that the government charge and prove that the intended sexual activity would violate a particular predicate offense as an element, or is the specific predicate offense merely a means of satisfying the § 2423(a) charge?

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