QUESTIONS PRESENTED
18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) prohibits a person “who has

been convicted in any court, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” from possessing a firearm or ammunition. Petitioner was convicted for violating this prohibition; but all his past convictions satisfying the criterion of being “punisha- ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” were for nonviolent crimes. Indeed his only conviction in the decade proceeding the charged events was for a misdemeanor traffic offense. The questions presented are: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) is consistent with the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in all cases, or rather is susceptible to as-applied chal- lenges under the Second Amendment; and (2) Whether the Second Amendment prohibits the conviction of, and judgment against, petitioner for vi- olating 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) given the nonviolent char- acter of his prior predicate convictions.

        QUESTIONS PRESENTED
    In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, this Court

addressed the minimum due process that is owed to absent members of a plaintiff class who stood to lose through the class action the right to sue for modest money damages but expressly left open what due process requires when absent class members face more serious property deprivations or liability. The Court did not address the issue because such facts were not before it. This case has those facts. The first question presented is: What minimum due process protections are required before absent class members may be bound by a class judgment that substantially impairs their real-property rights and exposes them to monetary liability, rather than merely extinguishing claims for money damages? A related yet unsettled question on which the circuits and states are split is: Does due process require that class members be afforded the right to opt out of the class action where the action does not predominantly concern monetary claims but nonetheless adjudicates monetary claims against class members who are subject to the forum court’s personal jurisdiction?

         QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioners manufacture critical life-saving nutrition products for preterm infants in neonatal intensive care units. The Respondents that are the subject of this Petition are 51 plaintiffs who reside in 22 different States. Although none of them resides in or was allegedly injured in Illinois, they are among thousands of plaintiffs from around the country who have filed claims in St. Clair and Madison Counties (adjacent counties in southwestern Illinois widely perceived to be plaintiff-friendly), alleging that Petitioners’ essential nutrition products are unreasonably dangerous and require a warning. Although Petitioners (companies incorporated and organized in Delaware) moved their principal place of business out of Illinois years before any of Respondents’ suits was filed, and although none of the plaintiffs or the claims at issue in this petition has any connection to Illinois, the state court held that it has general and specific jurisdiction over claims by these out-of-state plaintiffs against these out-of-state Petitioners, alleging out-of-state injuries. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the state court erred in asserting general jurisdiction over defendant companies for claims filed years after they removed their principal place of business from the State.
2. Whether the state court erred in asserting specific jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants where the State has no connection to any plaintiff or to any plaintiff’s alleged injury.

        QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) permits affir- mance of a litigation ending dismissal where the rec- ord reflects substantial prosecution of the case, rather than abandonment or contumacious delay, and when lesser sanctions were available.
2. Whether a federal court must meaningfully consider and explain non-use of lesser sanctions be- fore imposing a litigation ending Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) dismissal where the alleged default is principally at- tributable to counsel and the plaintiff has not person- ally engaged in intentional delay or bad-faith disobe- dience.
3. Whether affirmance of a Rule 41(b) dismissal on a record characterized as showing “no significant discovery or case development” conflicts with this Court’s due process principles and the decisions of other circuits requiring calibrated sanctions and preservation of merits adjudication where less drastic alternatives are available.
4. Whether a court of appeals may avoid the heightened standard applicable to litigation ending sanctions by first affirming exclusion of all evidence under ordinary evidentiary discovery factors, and then affirming Rule 41(b) dismissal as inevitable be- cause no evidence remains.

1. Whether credible allegations that government agents fabricated and planted evidence in a criminal prosecution—conduct that, in civil proceedings, con- stitutes “fraud on the court” exempt from any time limitation under Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford- Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3)—may be denied judicial re- view based on procedural timeliness requirements when the government actively concealed its own fraudulent scheme.
2. Whether due process and fundamental fairness permits a court to deny post-conviction relief based on untested government declarations from witnesses who never testified in the case, without affording the defendant any opportunity for adversarial testing of their assertions, thereby reducing post-conviction re- view to a non-adversarial proceeding.

1. WHETHER THE THIRD CIRCUIT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPLICATION NOTE 3 OF U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 DOES NOT IMPROPERLY EXPAND THE GUIDELINE BEYOND THE OUTER BOUNDS OF PERMISSIBLE INTERPRETATION BY DIRECTING COURTS TO COUNT UNKNOWING OUTSIDERS AND NON-PARTICIPANTS WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WAS “OTHERWISE EXTENSIVE” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE GUIDELINE?

                         ii
   

  The question presented is:

  Must a jury find a supervised release violation beyond a reasonable doubt before a

judge can revoke release and impose punishment?

                                       i

  Whether Amendment 591 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines violates

the Due Process Clause by requiring the application of Guidelines sections to factual

situations (and crimes) inconsistent with the cross-referenced Guideline? Doing so

violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by inserting an arbitrary

and non-discretionary (i.e., required) element into the calculation of the “starting

point” under the Guidelines, which is inconsistent with this Court’s Opinions in

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), and Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S.

256, 263 (2017), even in an otherwise discretionary sentencing scheme.

                                      i

  1. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated

when a state court system creates a complete procedural void by: (a) the state

supreme court transferring a case raising substantial constitutional questions to an

intermediate appellate court; (b) the intermediate appellate court failing to docket

the transferred case; and (c) the state supreme court thereafter refusing to accept

filings in the case, declaring that the petitioner has “no case pending before this

Court” — thereby denying the petitioner access to any appellate forum for the

adjudication of preserved constitutional claims in pending criminal cases.

  2.   Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), and Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S.

, 137 S. Ct. 905 (2017) (per curiam), require disqualification of a trial judge when

the cumulative pattern of conduct demonstrates an unconstitutional probability of

bias, including: (a) allowing courtroom personnel to silence a pro se defendant during

proceedings; (b) directing staff to inscribe “refused to sign” on a Faretta waiver the

defendant never received; (c) denying the defendant access to courtroom technology

while permitting the prosecution such access; (d) refusing to compel constitutionally

mandated discovery; and (e) refusing to rule on multiple properly filed pretrial

motions.

DID THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND ERR BY FAILING        TO GRANT SHAE-VON

EDWARDS PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FOR HIS CONSTITUTIONAL SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL BEING VIOLATED WHEN THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS DENIED APPELLATE RELIEF DUE TO THE FACT THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT WANT TO OVER RULE THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND AS THEY WERE THE COURT WHO ORDERED COURTS TO BE CLOSED DUE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC?

                              LIST OF PARTIES

• PETITIONER - SHAE-VON EDWARDS
• RESPONDENTS: STAE OF MARYLAND (NO STOCK TICKER SYMBOL)