This case arises from a failed construction project. Petitioners Minnesota Medical University (“MMU”) and its Chief Financial Officer, Philip Keithahn, were found liable for negligent misrepresentation based on representations concerning their expectation that “upon closing of the loan, the project would be funded” and that “there would be $7,000,000 of money for construction after the close.” A claim for negligent misrepresentation must be based on a misrepresentation of past or existing material fact— not expectations and predictions for the future. The questions presented are as follows:

1. Whether a _ corporation and its _ officer, personally, may be found lable for negligent misrepresentation based on _ representations concerning their expectation that funding would become available in the future.

2. Whether the courts below erred in refusing to erant a new trial based on numerous improper and prejudicial references to MMU’s financial condition, where such references constitute “prejudicial error’ as a matter of law and where such references were not necessarily involved in determining damages.

After Jeffrey Moats served as a CEO for a small credit union for 25 years, he found himself subject to an investigation by the National Credit Union Admin- istration Board (NCUA). Faced with the prospect of litigating not only before an administrative law judge insulated by an unconstitutional for-cause removal re- striction, but also without the jury trial the Constitu- tion guarantees for claims seeking civil penalties, he filed suit in district court seeking to enjoin the uncon- stitutional NCUA proceedings. Relying on this Court’s decision in Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175 (2023), Moats’s lawsuit focused on constitu- tional issues collateral to the underlying issues and asserted a “here-and-now injury’ from being subjected to an illegitimate proceeding, led by an illegitimate de- cislonmaker. But the district court nonetheless dis- missed Moats’s lawsuit for want of jurisdiction, read- ing the Federal Credit Union Act to explicitly preclude district court jurisdiction, so Axon did not apply. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Federal Credit Union Act strips federal district courts of jurisdiction over constitu- tional challenges to a federal agency’s structure, pro- cedures, and existence.

2. Whether Congress may, consistent with Article III, strip federal district courts of jurisdiction over structural constitutional challenges to a federal agency’s authority to proceed at all.

In Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, 146 S. Ct. 1358 (2026), this Court held that a worker who transports goods on a purely intrastate leg of an interstate jour- ney “sometimes” may be “engaged in interstate com- merce” for purposes of the transportation-worker ex- emption of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1. Brock, 146 8. Ct. at 1863. The Court rejected a “pright-line rule” that such a worker could never be exempt and took equal care to explain that the exemp- tion applies only “in certain circumstances,” depend- ing on the specific facts of the intrastate transit the worker performs. Jd. at 1365-1366.

Acting before Brock, the California Court of Ap- peal exempted a class of local delivery drivers from the FAA for one reason alone: that “many” of the goods they picked up within California “originated outside [the State] and crossed state lines” at some earlier point. App., infra, 8a. The court denied any legal rel- evance to the evidence demonstrating that the goods came to rest in California warehouses for weeks on av- erage before customers ordered them and that an out- sized share of the delivered items were groceries and similar locally stocked goods. Id. at 12a-13a.

The question presented is whether a local delivery driver is engaged in interstate commerce under Sec- tion 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act solely because some of the delivered goods previously crossed state lines, without regard to a break in the goods’ transit or their local character.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment.

2. Whether Congress may criminalize intrastate firearm possession based solely on the firearm crossing state lines at some point before the defendant came to possess it.

3. Whether, under abuse-of-discretion review and absent a finding of harm- lessness, a court of appeals must vacate and remand when the sentencing record sug- gests the district court impermissibly weighed a sentencing factor.

1

: oe 2. Whether due process permits a court to compel arbitration and stay a civil action without findings resolving preserved disputes concerning electronic assent, authentication, the identity of the operative agreement, delegation, public injunctive relief, and disability- related objections.

…. - 3, Whether due process and the Federal Arbitration Act require judicial resolution, before So | arbitration may be compelled, of preserved threshold objections that mandatory biometric , , verification and the refusal of reasonable alternative verification create an access barrier to custodial digital assets, and that the asserted arbitration agreement would waive or _ preclude public injunctive relief, including public-facing relief directed at that same - : biometric-access barrier. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Page 2 of 34 :

1. When a defendant raises a challenge during jury selection, under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), 1s the trial court required to apply Batson’s three-step analysis sequentially?

2. Is the admission of a substitute medical examiner’s expert opinion, based in part on an autopsy report prepared by a non-testifying medical examiner, contrary to this Court’s decision in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024)?

Whether a criminal defendant’s offer to stipulate to the child-pornographic nature of charged images requires the exclusion of the images themselves under Rule 403 and Old Chief.

2. In Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition, 535 US 234 (2002), this Court held that the First Amendment requires the Government to prove that a proscribed image depicts a real, rather than a virtual, child. The question presented 1s:

Whether, in light of the proliferation of computer-generated and artificial- intelligence imagery, the Government must affirmatively prove—and a sentencing court must expressly find—that an image relied upon to impose the four-level enhancement under USSG §2G2.2(b)(4)(A) depicts a real, prepubescent minor.

T