1. Should Defendant United States be liable for Takings Violations as provided by the United

States Constitution Fifth Amendment having

| methodically and repeatedly taken plaintiff Arthur Lopez’s property without Just

| Compensation?

2. Should Federal Judges within the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit be held to uphold

) United States 28 U.S. Code § 455 and United States Code of Conduct For Federal Judges to ensure Unbiased Judges are seated on the Bench for Criminal and Civil Case Litigation?

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In panicked flight from a suspect who was neither chasing nor threatening him, Respondent Officer Bai- ley Gannon recklessly fired his gun without looking, let alone aiming. Instead of hitting the suspect, he shot his partner, Petitioner Officer Jennifer Kilnapp. Kilnapp sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Gannon used excessive force. The Sixth Circuit held that Gannon was entitled to qualified immunity re- gardless of whether his conduct was objectively un- reasonable. It reasoned that even if it was clearly established that the shooting was unreasonable, it was not “clearly established” at the time of the shoot- ing that Kilnapp, as an unintended target, could file a Fourth Amendment claim against Gannon.

The question presented 1s:

Did the Court of Appeals err in granting qualified immunity based on facts that the officer could not have known at the time of the conduct and that re- lated only to whether the eventual plaintiff could as- sert a specific cause of action, not whether the officer’s own conduct was objectively unreasonable?

Similarly to the question presented in Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014), Petitioner is asking this Court to intervene because the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reflects a clear misapprehension of summary judgment standards. Petitioner’s competent evidence 1n opposition to a summary judgment was ignored, and further, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals failed to draw reasonable factual inferences in favor of Petitioner.

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MOoLOLAMKEN LLP MOoLOLAMKEN LLP

300 North LaSalle St. 430 Park Avenue

Chicago, IL 60654 New York, NY 10022

(312) 450-6700 (212) 607-8160 Counsel for Petitioners

Whether the Monetary Control Act, which states that the Federal Reserve “shall” provide its services to legally eligible nonmember depository institutions, 12 U.S.C. 248a(c)(2), gives presidents of regional Federal Reserve Banks discretionary authority to deny master accounts to such institutions.

(I)

Based on his agreement to sell face masks that had been designated as scarce materials at the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic, petitioner Kent Bulloch was convicted of conspiracy to “accumulate” such materials for the purpose of resale at prices in excess of prevailing market prices, in violation of the section of the Defense Production Act of 1950 entitled “Hoarding of designated scarce materials.” Review of his conviction required the Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression, to determine the meaning of “accumulate” in that section, which provides that:

In order to prevent hoarding, no person shall accumulate (1) in excess of the reasonable demands of business, personal, or home consumption, or (2) for the purpose of resale at prices in excess of prevailing market prices, materials which have been designated by the President as scarce materials or materials the supply of which would be threatened by such accumulation. [50 U.S.C. § 4512]

Bulloch, whose agreement contemplated delivering masks to a buyer as soon as he obtained them, contended that, when read naturally in the context of the phrase that precedes it (“In order to prevent hoarding’), it is plain that “accumulate” is used as a synonym for “hoard.” The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that, unless the meaning of the word “accumulate” standing alone was ambiguous, looking to the opening phrase to determine its meaning would contravene the holding of District of Columbia v. Heller that, while a prefatory clause may “resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause,” it does not otherwise “limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.”

The questions presented are:

1. Whether Hel/er’s limitation on the effect of prefatory clauses displaces the canons teaching that the meaning of a word in a statute cannot be interpreted in isolation, but must be informed by the “neighboring words” with which it is associated; and

2. Whether, viewed in the context of the words with which it 1s associated in 50 U.S.C. § 4512, “accumulate” either (a) signifies conduct that constitutes “hoarding” or (b) does not unambiguously signify conduct other than “hoarding” and therefore requires consideration of legislative history to determine its meaning and calls into play the rule of lenity.

It is well-established that lesser included offense instructions should be given when there is a rational basis for the jury to acquit of the charged offense and convict of the lesser. Did the courts below err when they focused on the government’s theory of prosecution, rather than the elements of the charged and lesser included offenses in making this determination?

Was it error for the court of appeals to affirm the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault on Count Two (assault with serious bodily injury) and Count Four (assault with a deadly weapon)?