subsection miscitation, where the court understood

the substance of the federal claim and the application | of the state rule is not strictly or regularly followed | but is instead unexpectedly strict and outcome-deter- | minative (thus not an adequate and independent state | ground). | 2. Whether the Due Process Clause permits a state a court to bypass a meaningful prejudice analysis and deem harmless—by labeling “technical’—a defect af- | fecting notice and the opportunity to be heard (includ- | . ing notice/service and subpoena routing), without ,

• identifying the operative order governing notice/rout- : ing; and without making any prejudice findings. | : 3. Whether due process is satisfied when the State . : creates a procedural “catch-22” by denying a party’s. | request for record completion/correction before merits - : oo briefing, and the appellate court later applies missing- record presumptions to reject those same record-de- | | pendent federal due process claims.

The Fourth Amendment permits a search warrant only on probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found at the place to be searched, and this Court has held that the warrant’s supporting affidavit must give the magistrate judge facts from which to make that determination, not merely restate the officer’s own conclusions. In other words, the supporting affidavit must set forth sufficient factual material to establish a probable-cause nexus between the evidence sought and the location to be searched.

This case presents a recurring factual scenario: where police have probable cause to believe that a suspect used a gun to commit a crime, and seek a warrant to search his residence for that firearm. The courts of appeals are deeply divided over what is needed to meet the nexus requirement in such circumstances: some hold that it is sufficient, without more, that police have probable cause to believe that the suspect used a gun— on the premise that such weapons are presumptively stored at home; whereas others hold that the supporting affidavit must instead tie the weapon sought to the home to be searched with case-specific facts.

As such, the question presented here is:

Whether a search warrant’s supporting affidavit establishes probable cause to

search a suspect’s home for a firearm used in a crime based solely on the

inference that firearms are generally kept at home, or whether the Fourth

Amendment requires case-specific facts linking the weapon sought to the

residence to be searched.

1

Should the Court should grant the petition 1n order to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals and among the panels of the Second Circuit as to whether under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act “MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 8663A et seq., a district court is authorized to include in a restitution award the value of services received by the victims, for which the victims would have been required to pay had there been no fraud?

1

The government prosecuted Pedro Gomez under a statute with undisputed racist origins. Congress criminalized illegal reentry into the United States in 1929 at the urging of “proud” white supremacists, nativists, and eugenicists to keep the American bloodline “white and purely Caucasian.” The core focus of the illegal reentry provision has remained substantively the same since 1929. Section 1326 continues to be wielded as a discriminatory tool driving the mass incarceration of Latino people, with 99% of statutory prosecutions involving Latin-American defendants. But the Ninth Circuit upheld the law based on a reenactment in 1952 and amendments in the 1980s and 1990s, none of which grappled with the law’s racist past.

This case poses important questions about the role of appellate courts in applying the framework from Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), to a federal law used for nearly 20% of all federal criminal prosecutions, along with countless civil rights cases.

The question presented is:

Whether a legislature can cleanse the taint of a racially discriminatory law by silent reenactment or amendment when the law was originally adopted for an impermissible discriminatory purpose.

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1. Whether the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are violated when a State’s appellate structure forecloses all meaningful review of preserved federal constitutional claims through the combined

‘use of unexplained Per Cunam affirmances and transcript requirements that indigent litigants cannot satisfy.

2. Whether conditioning appellate review on a litigant’s ability to purchase transcripts—where facial legal and constitutional errors were preserved by timely :

: trial-court motions—constitutes wealth-based discrimination barred by Griffin v. WHinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), and M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 US. 102 (1996).

3. Whether substantive and procedural due process are violated when a state trial court deprives a fit parent of all parenting time while suppressing material child-safety evidence, denying a continuance during an active child-abuse investigation, ignoring a controlling oral pronouncement restoring parenting time, and enforcing a conflicting written order drafted by opposing counsel. :

4. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state court enforces incarceration and coercive financial sanctions for alleged noncompliance with family-court orders without notice of possible incarceration, without counsel for an indigent litigant, without findings of present ability to pay as required by Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011), and while relying on knowing]ly false or unchallenged financial affidavits. :

5. Whether a State violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses when fraud on the court—through false financial affidavits, fabricated agreements, and material misrepresentations—is compounded by judicial enforcement of fraud-tainted

| orders and by appellate practices that insulate those orders from any merits review, including review by the State’s court of last resort. | i

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