Argentine holders of defaulted Argentine bonds, in suing to enforce their bonds in federal court in New York, invoked the sovereign issuer’s normal waiver of immunity and consent to jurisdiction contained in its Fiscal Agency Agreement (FAA) used in issuing the bonds. The holders’ bonds had been placed in an Argentine trust. Their original enforcement action was dismissed for lack of standing under an Argentine statute requiring judicial approval for actions brought by trust beneficiaries instead of their trustee. The holders immediately obtained judicial approval and sued again. By that time, the limitation period on most of their bond claims had run. The court of appeals held that New York’s “saving” statute did not extend limitations for these holders on the ground that, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), the holders’ lack of standing retroactively voided their invocation, in their original complaint, of the jurisdictional consent and waivers contained in the FAA, meaning jurisdiction had never existed.

1. Whether a plaintiff bondholder’s later-cured lack of standing under foreign trust law may retroactively negate a foreign sovereign’s contractual waiver of immunity and consent to jurisdiction under the FSIA, thereby extinguishing claims that were timely filed and continuously litigated under New York law?

2. Whether a federal court of appeals may resolve an outcome-determinative and unsettled question concerning the scope of New York’s remedial limitation saving statute by applying a novel FSIA-based jurisdictional theory without first obtaining guidance from New York’s highest court through its available certification procedure?

GARY M. Fox

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP

7 World Trade Center

250 Greenwich Street

New York, NY 10007

JANE E. KESSNER

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Attorneys for Intel

Corporation

Whether a federal court sitting in diversity

violates Hrie and 28 U.S.C. § 1652 by allowing an

insurer to defeat coverage under an annual policy

based on events occurring after that policy expired

and bearing no causal connection to the policy’s

insured risk, notwithstanding governing state statutory and common law. 1

Under a Florida law enacted in 2023, a judge may impose the death penalty only if the jury first “determine|[s| that the defendant should be sentenced to death.” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2)(c).

The question presented is whether the Sixth or Eighth Amendment requires that jury determination to be unanimous, or whether it suffices—as provided in the statute—for only eight of the twelve jurors to vote for death.

Under a Florida law enacted in 2023, a judge may impose the death penalty only if the jury first “determine|[s| that the defendant should be sentenced to death.” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2)(c). The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Sixth or Eighth Amendment requires that jury determination to be unanimous, or whether it suffices—as provided in the statute—for only eight of the twelve jurors to vote for death.

2. Whether the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids applying Florida’s nonunanimity rule retroactively to individuals whose crimes were committed when state law required such jury determinations to be unanimous.

The government prosecuted Pedro Gomez under a statute with undisputed racist origins. Congress criminalized illegal reentry into the United States in 1929 at the urging of “proud” white supremacists, nativists, and eugenicists to keep the American bloodline “white and purely Caucasian.” The core focus of the illegal reentry provision has remained substantively the same since 1929. Section 1326 continues to be wielded as a discriminatory tool driving the mass incarceration of Latino people, with 99% of statutory prosecutions involving Latin-American defendants. But the Ninth Circuit upheld the law based on a reenactment in 1952 and amendments in the 1980s and 1990s, none of which grappled with the law’s racist past.

This case poses important questions about the role of appellate courts in applying the framework from Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), to a federal law used for nearly 20% of all federal criminal prosecutions, along with countless civil rights cases.

The question presented is:

Whether a legislature can cleanse the taint of a racially discriminatory law by silent reenactment or amendment when the law was originally adopted for an impermissible discriminatory purpose.

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change—of—plea proceeding, that the Petitioner reserved the right to

appeal a sentence that was not in compliance with the United States

Sentencing Guidelines permit an appeal based on an asserted

misapplication of the Guidelines by the district court, despite the

express sentence appeal waiver language in the written plea

agreement?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

All parties to the proceedings are listed in the caption. The petitioner is not a corporation. The petitioner is Noe De Jesus Arce-Hernandez. The Respondent is the United States of America.

1

I. WHETHER THE STATE COURT, RELYING ON STATE LAWS AND STATUTES, VIOLATED THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY DENYING THE ACCUSED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO CONFRONT THE WITNESS AGAINST HIM AND FAIR TRIAL?

ll

This case presents the following questions for review:

1. To accept a waiver of counsel on direct appeal of a criminal case, must a state court at least obtain some evidence of a knowing waiver, as the state courts of Arizona, Georgia, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Texas have held or is a mere request to proceed pro se on appeal sufficient, as the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held?

2. Consistent with 28 U.S.C §2254(b)(1)(B)G) which excuses exhaustion requirements when “there is an absence of available State corrective process,’ and consistent with Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000), and Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), may a federal habeas petitioner develop the factual basis of a claim through an evidentiary hearing when the state court lacks a corrective procedure, or does §2254(e)(2)(A)’s “fails to develop” language prohibit it?