A seizure of property occurs when there is “some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118 (1984). And because the Fourth Amendment “protects property as well as privacy, a seizure implicates the owner’s Fourth Amendment rights whether or not any privacy interest is at stake. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 62-64 (1992).

Police officers seized and towed petitioner’s car—indisputably his own “effect”’—from a carport within the fenced backyard of his sister’s home. The district court assumed petitioner could contest the seizure and denied suppression on other erounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed solely on the ground that petitioner lacked Fourth Amendment standing. According to the panel, petitioner could not challenge the seizure of his own car without first proving a reasonable expectation of privacy 1n his sister’s residence. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the owner of a vehicle has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a seizure based on a possessory interest in the vehicle itself, or whether he must instead establish a legitimate expectation of privacy 1n the premises from which the vehicle was seized.

2. Whether a court of appeals may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on a fact-intensive ground the district court expressly declined to decide, resolving the record against the defendant in the first instance on appeal.

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Whether a defendant challenging a prior state conviction under the controlled substances definitions must produce actual state court decisions (i.e., show reasonable probability of prosecution) showing non-generic application of a facially overbroad statute—as the Fifth Circuit alone requires—or whether the statutory text suffices to demonstrate overbreadth—as every other circuit holds?

LIST OF PARTIES PURSUANT TO RULE 14.1(b) Petitioner: Kenric W. Young Respondent: United States of America 2