Petitioner, a state-appointed receiver, objected to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over Respondent’s Chapter 11 case: relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Petitioner argued that Respondent (the state-court loser) complains of injuries from a state- court order appointing Petitioner as receiver and invokes federal bankruptcy jurisdiction to overturn the receivership order. The Third Circuit rejected Petitioner’s objection, relying on circuit precedent that limits the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only to state-court orders that are either final or effectively final. Subsequently, in 7.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 608 U.S. —, 146 8. Ct. 1739 (June 18, 2026), this Court held that the Rooker- Feldman doctrine bars district courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of state-court judgments, “regardless of whether those judgments are final _ trial-court judgments or those of a State’s highest court.”

The question presented is whether the Court should grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in light of 7.M.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) author- izes the United States, the States, and Indian tribes to recover damages for “injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C), (f)(1). Those damages may be recovered for “use only to re- store, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources.” Id. § 9607(£)(1).

The question presented is whether CERCLA au- thorizes damages for the felt loss of a cultural connec- tion to natural resources.

(I)

Every American prosecuted in state or federal civilian court has the constitutional protection of a unanimous verdict before being convicted of a serious crime. One class of defendants, however, does not receive that protection: those prosecuted before a court-martial. Under Article 52 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the federal government may convict a service member of murder, rape, or another serious offense—even one punishable by life imprisonment—based on the votes of only three- fourths of a panel of lay members. This petition asks whether that practice survives this Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana.

Service members charged with ordinary criminal offenses that have long been tried before civilian juries may be convicted by a non-unanimous military panel, as courts-martial no longer require a military nexus. For many defendants charged with ordinary criminal offenses, including the four Petitioners, the only distinction between receiving the protections of a unanimous verdict and conviction by a= non- unanimous vote is the government’s decision to prosecute before a court-martial rather than an Article III court. That choice alone determines whether an accused enjoys the _ constitutional protection of a unanimous verdict.

The Question Presented 1s:

Does the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause permit conviction in a court-martial by the non- unanimous vote of a panel of lay members?

evidentiary grounds. In a state marital dissolution proceeding, the trial

| court entered a massive community asset “waste” finding and a dependent monetary judgment against | : Petitioner. The record demonstrates that this financial hability was manufactured by

: systematically double-, triple-, and

quadruple-counting single cash flows (such as counting a single separate-property transfer four distinct times as a transfer, tuition, housing, and maternal support), penalizing legally non-existent transactions that were fully reversed on the banking record, and inventing decades of fictitious collegiate housing costs. The state appellate courts acknowledged independent property errors but affirmed this specific financial penalty in full. The question presented is: Whether a state court’s judicial imposition and subsequent appellate affirmation of a substantial

Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), under Section 6807 (also known as the “savings clause’), allows for states to create legislation that provide greater privacy protections for consumers in controlling what Congress has defined as “non-public personal information.” The state of California, in enacting their own legislative version titled California Financial Information Privacy Act (“SB 1”), extends this definition of “non-public personal information” to include any information contained about a person in a “consumer report”. (See Cal. Fin. Code § 4052(b)(7)). Previously, the Ninth Circuit remanded and | upheld a district court ruling that pre-empts the Fair Credit Reporting Act (““FCRA”) definition of “consumer reports’, from the affiliate sharing provision pursuant to § 4053(b)(1) | of California SB 1. See American Bankers Ass‘ns v. Lockyer, | 541, 1214 (9th Cir. 2008). Judicial opinion on a constitutional . privacy claim made in connection with § 4053(b)(4) of SB 1 and the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act (““ECOA”), currently does not exist in the state or federal courts. Therefore, the questions presented ask:

1. Whether “consumer credit reports” as defined by the

FCRA, holds deference to apply to § 4053(b)(4) of

California’s SB 1, when a creditor has failed to comply

with the notice requirements relating to § 1691(d)(1)-

. (3) of the federal ECOA. 2. Whether a state “right to privacy” under Cal. Const. Art. 1 § 1 and California SB 1, is an adequate post- deprivation due process claim per 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen- alty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), when a habeas corpus peti- tioner seeks to initiate an appeal of the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, the right to appeal is governed by the certificate of appealability (COA) requirements found at 28 U.S.C. §2253(c). In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), this Court held: “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy §2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id., at 484.

The principal question presented is whether the Seventh Circuit has so far departed from the rule of law established in Slack, and/or sanctioned such a de- parture from this rule of law by the Southern District of Illinois, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s su- pervisory power, per 8. Ct. R. 10(a).

When determining whether to impose supervised release and the length of that term, a district court may not consider the retributive factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 8553(a)(2)(A) and Esteras v. United States, 145 $8.Ct. 2031 (2025).

The question presented is as follows:

Whether a district court actually relies on § 3558(a)(2)(A), at least by unmistakable implication, when it expressly invokes those factors in an undifferentiated explanation immediately before imposing imprisonment and supervised release, without limiting the factors to imprisonment?

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1. Whether the District Court erred in denying Mr. Rowe’s motion under Rule 29, Fed. R. Crim. P. to dismiss the bribery and bribery conspiracy charges against him when the prosecution failed to show a quid pro quo.

2. Whether the Court should require organizer-leader enhancements to be calculated in such broadly-based prosecutions by evaluating each participant’s significance to the overall scheme to avoid artificially inflating Petitioner’s federal sentencing guidelines offense level by looking to his actions at the local level in the underlying nationwide drug conspiracy.

3. Whether the motion for a second remand to the District Court presents an extraordinary circumstance such that waiver should not apply when, although the issue was not raised in the opening brief, (1) the remand relates to a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights, (2) the Government had a full and fair opportunity to respond to the motion before briefing commenced, (8) no party moved to preclude the court’s consideration of the request, (4) appellate counsel misread, rather than deliberately disregarded, the court’s order, and (5) no alternative procedural vehicle exists through which the issue could be raised.

4, Whether it was error for the appellate court not to order a remand sua sponte where the evidentiary record is undeveloped and serious concerns regarding the effectiveness of counsel have arisen.

1. Whether Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), should be overturned and the right to a twelve-person jury restored. Because the Court has granted certiorari in a case that raises the same question presented here, see Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623, 2026 WL 1718018 (U.S. June 15, 2026), the Court should stay proceedings in this case until it issues its decision in Kian.

2. Whether a recidivism statute authorizing a sentencing enhancement based on nonjury findings of facts not alleged in the charging document violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

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