1. Is the constitutional right to a fair trial, which necessarily includes accurate instructions on the elements of the charged offense and_ correct definitions, so fundamental that it cannot be waived without an affirmative response from the accused on the record?

2. What is the definition of “unwelcome” as this term relates to sexual harassment?

This Court has held that a threatened injury must be “certainly impending” to satisfy Article III’s injury-in- fact requirement, expressly rejecting a more forgiving “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401, 410 (2013). The courts of appeals are divided over whether the demanding “certainly impending” standard, or the more forgiving objective-reasonableness standard Clapper rejected, governs First Amendment claims of “chilled” or “compelled” speech.

The question presented is:

Whether a plaintiff alleging chilled or compelled speech establishes Article III injury-in-fact by showing that her self-censorship or compliance was “objectively reasonable,” or whether, consistent with Clapper, the plaintiff must show that a threatened governmental consequence was “certainly impending.”

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The church-autonomy doctrine shields religious in- stitutions from civil-court interference in matters of 1n- ternal governance, including church hierarchy and polity. This Court has recognized one caveat: Civil courts may still resolve disputes over the ownership of church property using secular, “neutral principles” of law, “developed for use in all property disputes.” See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979). Though this Court has never extended the neutral- principles approach beyond the property-ownership context, lower courts are split on whether to do so. Be- low, the Nevada Supreme Court expanded the doctrine beyond its property-law context, allowing a state court to adjudicate a dispute among members of the North- ern Nevada Sikh Society over the Society’s member- ship and management. The question presented 1s:

Whether the church-autonomy doctrine allows a civil court to invoke “neutral principles” beyond the property-ownership context, and thus to decide a rel1- cious institution’s internal governance dispute under organizational documents that define membership and authority in religious terms.

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Petitioner, a state-appointed receiver, objected to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over Respondent’s Chapter 11 case: relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Petitioner argued that Respondent (the state-court loser) complains of injuries from a state- court order appointing Petitioner as receiver and invokes federal bankruptcy jurisdiction to overturn the receivership order. The Third Circuit rejected Petitioner’s objection, relying on circuit precedent that limits the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only to state-court orders that are either final or effectively final. Subsequently, in 7.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 608 U.S. —, 146 8. Ct. 1739 (June 18, 2026), this Court held that the Rooker- Feldman doctrine bars district courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of state-court judgments, “regardless of whether those judgments are final _ trial-court judgments or those of a State’s highest court.”

The question presented is whether the Court should grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in light of 7.M.

Petitioner’s extensive criminal history — which the district court cited in

imposing its sentence — was fueled by his equally extensive history of substance

abuse — which the district court did not address, in spite of Petitioner’s arguments.

The issue is whether such a sentence, where the district court fails to address a

defendant’s non-frivolous argument for a reduced sentence, is “unreasonable” under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). _l-

On the same day that Stacey Ian Humphreys’s death warrant was signed, the Governor appointed Kimberly McCoy to the vacant fifth seat on the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (“the Board’). The Board is the only Georgia entity empowered to grant executive clemency. Ms. McCoy had just completed a 25-year career as Director of the Victim-Witness Unit for the Cobb County District Attorney’s office, the very office that obtained Mr. Humphreys’s death sentence. In that role, she advocated for the family members of the victims in his case and formed a “close bond” with them.

A Georgia Superior Court ruled that Ms. McCoy labored under a conflict of interest and ordered that she recuse herself from the clemency proceedings. While the lower court’s order acknowledged that a favorable vote from at least three Board members was required for a death- sentenced applicant to obtain a commutation, it also held— contrary to the unbroken historical practice in Georgia and the Board’s own understanding—that the Board could consider Mr. Humphreys’s application with only four members. Every other Georgia capital prisoner has had the opportunity to convince three of five Board members to extend mercy. Mr. Humphreys must convince three of four.

The questions presented are: When the state departs from its own long-standing practice and procedures and arbitrarily burdens a capital clemency applicant’s likelihood of success in obtaining a commutation, does it (1) deprive him of due process and (2) violate the Equal Protection Clause?

When Petitioner Patrick McHenry robbed a motel suest, his shotgun stayed 1n a car parked outside. Mr. McHenry’s girlfriend later drove away from the motel in that car, while Mr. McHenry left in a different vehi- cle. Mr. McHenry was charged with carrying a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At trial, the government argued only that he personally carried the firearm before and after the takings— when he drove it to the motel and after he had already left. Neither the government’s arguments nor the jury instructions suggested that flight from the scene can be part of a robbery for § 924(c) purposes, or that Mr. McHenry violated § 924(c) when he told his girlfriend to drive away in the car with the shotgun.

The Tenth Circuit nonetheless affirmed, holding that a robbery continues at least through any immed1- ate post-taking flight—even though the offense-ele- ment conduct is already over—so Mr. McHenry con- structively carried the shotgun “during” the robbery by having his girlfriend drive away with it after the tak- ings. The court acknowledged that the government did not make this argument at trial, but 1t concluded (in the two-judge concurrence’s words) that the jury had enough “puzzle pieces” to convict on this theory.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the decision below should be summarily reversed for affirming a conviction on a theory that “the Government|] fail[ed] to argue,” App. 23a, and the court never submitted to the jury.

2. Whether a defendant violates § 924(c) by carrying a firearm “during” a crime of violence if he does not carry the firearm while committing the offense’s con- duct elements—only after the elements are complete.

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