The Constitution’s Venue Clause provides that “the Trial of all Crimes * * * shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.” U.S. Const. art. IIT, § 2, cl. 3. The Vicinage Clause like- wise guarantees criminal defendants the right to trial “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” Jd. amend. VI.

In this case, petitioner was convicted of conspiracy in the Western District of North Carolina though his own actions had no nexus to that State. Venue rested entirely on acts petitioner did not know about, under- taken by a co-conspirator he did not know existed. The only connection between petitioner and his purported co-conspirator was a shared “hub” who directed mul- tiple parallel but otherwise unconnected scams.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether—as the Second Circuit holds but the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits deny—for a co-conspirator’s act to justify criminal venue, it must have been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the act would occur in the district where venue is sought.

2. Whether proving a single hub-and-spoke con- spiracy requires proof of a connection between the spokes beyond shared methods of criminality and in- volvement with the hub—as this Court held in the seminal case of Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)—or whether, as the court below deter- mined, a single conspiracy can be proved through “overlap of the key actors [i.e., the hub individuals] and the same methods, goals, nature, and results in each * * * scheme[].” App., infra, 6a.

A “Yates” error occurs when a general verdict is supportable on one theory of liability but not on an- other, and it is impossible to tell which theory the jury used to convict. Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465, 470 (2010) (quoting Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957)); see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 858, 414 (2010) (reasoning that Yates errors are reviewed for harmlessness). While Petitioner’s case was pending on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) decided that multiple statutory theories of liability for sexual assault were legally dis- tinct. United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213, 218-20 (C.A.A.F. 2024); United States v. Moore, 86 M.J. 308, 312 (C.A.A.F. 2026). In those cases, the holdings rested on how the Government could not charge one theory and then argue another without violating a de- fendant’s right to fair notice. Jd. But by addressing one due process issue, the CAAF created another: a Yates error.

The question presented is:

Were the factfinders able to convict Petitioner on an invalid alternate theory of liability after being in- structed on the statutory definition of consent?

1. Whether a federal court of appeals may, consistent with the First Amendment right to petition and the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process, effectively bar an indigent, disabled litigant from all appellate review of substantial constitutional claims by denying in forma pauperis status and requiring full prepayment of fees—where the litigant cannot pay without sacrificing basic necessities including food, housing, utilities, transportation to chemotherapy, and prescription medications—and in conflict with this Court’s decisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), and M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). |

2. Whether Indiana may, consistent with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, impose lifetime registration as a “serious sex offender” based on a Texas conviction under Tex. Penal Code § 22.011(a)(1)—an adult-only offense without age-based elements or SVP designation—when Indiana’s “serious sex offender” classification under Ind. Code § 35-42-4-14 requires either age- based elements or SVP status, thereby altering the fundamental nature of the Texas conviction.

3. Whether Indiana may, consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause and Due Process Clause, impose lifetime registration requirements when: (a) Indiana’s own statutory scheme under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(a) establishes a default ten-year registration period; (b) the Indiana Supreme Court in Peters v. Quakenbush, __ N.E.3d __, 2025 WL 3087540 (ind. June 19, 2025) held that registration obligations apply only when a person “is”——present tense—required to register in another jurisdiction; and (c) both the convicting state (Texas) and the state of last residence — (Alaska) have determined Petitioner has no current registration duty.

4. Whether Indiana may, consistent with the constitutional right to travel, create a “registration orphan” status by imposing lifetime burdens based on a conviction for which no current registration duty exists in any jurisdiction—where Texas (convicting state) imposes no duty because Petitioner does not reside there, and Alaska (state of last residence) affirmatively | removed Petitioner’s registration duty on January 18, 2023 review.

; 5. Whether Indiana courts may violate the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act by: (a) refusing disability accommodations for Petitioner’s neurological voice disorder; (b) characterizing Petitioner as “alleging to be disabled” despite possessing official Social Security Administration disability records; and (c) using Petitioner’s disability status to justify mistreatment and denial of meaningful access to the courts.

6. Whether Indiana courts may retaliate against a litigant’s First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances by labeling protected constitutional litigation as “frivolous,” “abusive,” _ and “vexatious” solely because the litigant exercises the right to challenge ongoing constitutional violations. |

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Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides: “The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: … (4) Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. A statement that: (A) 1s made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(4).

The question presented is: Do “statement[s]” “made for” the purpose of obtaining a “medical diagnosis” still satisfy Rule 803(4) when they are made to an expert witness retained to testify at trial?

Whether defense counsel’s decision to object to the removal of a sleeping juror solely because that juror was the only black juror on the panel can constitute a reasonable strategic decision under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); and whether Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and its progeny — particularly Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) — prohibit defense counsel from making race-based juror retention decisions.

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QURSTION No. 1 WHETHER THE COURT GF 42PPEALS SHGULD HAVE [SSUED OF CRANTED A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY TC APPYAL THE PISTE(CE COURT’S FROGENURAL RULING THAT THE PETITIONER’S INEFFECTIVE ASS LSTANCE UE SOUNSEL CLAIM REGARSING TRIAL CQUNSEL’S FAILURE T3 GONVEY THE STATE’S:PLE4 OFPER WAS BROCZDUR&ALLY DEFAULPED AND UREZHAUSTED CECSUSE TRE CLAIM ®AS NOT EASED ON APPEAL OR IN A POST-CONVICTIOM COLLZECTERAL PROCHEDING WHEN THERE WAS CAUSE FOR TSE FEQCEDURAL VEPAULT UNDER MARTINEZ v. BRYAN, 132 §.Ce. 1309 (2012) AND TREVINO ¥. THALER, i3§% S.ct. i944 (2013). IURISTS 3F REASON WOULD FIND It DEBATAELE WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS ORCCEDURAL RULING UNDER SLAC% v.MeDANIFL. 120 S.ct. 2595 (2000).

QUESTION No. 2 WRETHER THF COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE ISSURD OR CERAMTED A CERTIFICATE CF APFEALABILITY TO APPEAL THE DISTRICT cours ASSESSMENT OF THE PETITIONER’S INFPEFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL SLAIM REGARDING TRIAL COUNSEL’S FAILURE POG CONVEY THE SPATE’S PLEA ORFER WAS WITHOUT MERITS WEEN THE PETIPIONER’S SUPPLEMENTAL SETVTTICN CONTAITNEDUUNCONTBOVERTED SWORN FACTS CONSISTULPING SOME GBJESTIVE EVIDENCE THAT HE WKCLELE HAVE ACCEPTED TEE PLEA OFFER THAT SUPPORTED A FINDINGS OF PREJUDICE AND THAT TRIAL COUMSEL PERFORMED DEPICLTANILY BY FATLING TO INFORM HIM OF THE STATE’S PLEA OFFER UNDER STRICKLAND ¥. WASHINGTON. 104 S.ct. 2052 (1934) AND MISSOURI VY. FRYE, 132 S.ce. 2399 (2612). REASONABLE JURISIS WOULD FIND THE DESTRICT- CCURT’S ASSESSMENT OF THE CLAIM DEBATAELE OR WRONG UNDER SLACK v. MCDANTEL, 120 S.ct. 1595 (2066).

GCUESTION Ne. 3 WHETHER THE CGURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE ISSUED OR GRANTED A SERTITLCATE OF AFFEALABILITY TO APPEAL THF DISTRICT COURT’S PAILUURE T@ CONSIDER AND ADDRESS PHE PETITIONER’S INEFTECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM REGARDING TRIAL CCOUNSEL”S FAILURE TO CONVEY THE STATE’S PLEA OFFER UNDER MARTINEZ v. RFAN, 132 S.ct. 1309 (2012) ANY TREVING v. THALER, 1233 S.ct. 1911 (2013). REASONABLE JURISTS wCULD FIND THE DISTRICT COURT’S JUDICIAL FAILURE TC CUNSTDER AND ADDRESS THE CLAIM UNDER MARTINEZ /TREVING DEBAPTABLE OR WRONG UNDER SLACK v. MeDANIEL, 120 3.ce. 1595 €206C).

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I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1) comports with the Second Amendment?

Ill. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional?

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