The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act directs that a district court reviewing a state hearing officer’s decision “shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings” and “shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415@)(2)(C)G)—-G1). From the first command, this Court inferred a requirement that the court give “due weight” to the administrative proceedings. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).

The question presented here is whether the statutory language requiring a court to “hear additional evidence at the request of a party” permits a district court to set aside the required deference to the administrative decision by receiving evidence of events occurring after the fact and deciding the question anew as of the time of trial. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(@)(2)(C)@)—-Gy)

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More than fifty years ago, this Court held that the Village of Belle Terre, New York, could prohibit unrelated adults from living together in a single- family home without offending the Constitution. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Subsequent precedents, such as ARoberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 482 (1985), cast significant doubt on Belle Terre’s continuing viability, and several state high courts have rejected its reasoning.

Meanwhile, despite housing shortages, municipalities nationwide place restrictions on unrelated households—forcing bedrooms to remain empty and criminalizing the _ shared-housing arrangements on which many Americans increasingly depend.

The questions presented are:

(1) Whether, contrary to Belle Terre, an ordinance that prohibits people from living together in a home solely on the basis of their family relationship status violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

(2) Whether the government’s desire to maintain the single-family character of neighborhoods is a constitutionally sufficient basis for an ordinance that prohibits unrelated people from sharing a home throughout a city, including in high-density, multi- family zones.

requests that she be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW K. BELCHER

Interim Federal Public Defender

/s/ Howard A. Pincus

HOWARD A. PINCUS

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Counsel of Record for Petitioner

633 17th Street, Suite 1000

Denver, Colorado 80202

(303) 294-7002

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢g)(1) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, facially and as applied to intrastate firearm and ammunition possession?! 1 This Commerce Clause question 1s pending in Storey v. United States, Supreme Court No. 25-7216 (response requested May 26, 2026), and Stewart v. United States, No. 26-5131 (filed July 20, 2026).

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Under the third step of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), a trial court must determine whether one party exercised a peremptory strike with a discriminatory intent. If a trial court legally errs at this step, every court of appeals except the Ninth Circuit remands for the lower correct to reconsider its decision under the correct legal standard. The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, believes it has the discretionary authority to conduct appellate fact-finding and “decide de novo” under a totality of the circumstances whether the strike was motivated by purposeful discrimination. United States v. Alvarez- Ulloa, 784 F.3d 558, 565-66 (9th Cir. 2015). The question presented 1s:

If a trial court legally errs at step three of Batson, may an appellate court resolve the factual question of whether a party acted with discriminatory intent?

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Defendants who have two prior felony convictions for “controlled substance offense[s]” qualify as career offenders under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. In the First, Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, a conviction counts as a “controlled substance offense” only if the conduct involved a substance listed in the federal Controlled Substances Act. In the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, a conviction counts as a “controlled substance offense” even if it involves a state-controlled substance that is legal under federal law. The questions presented are:

I. Is the Seventh Circuit on the wrong side of a circuit split when it construes the term “controlled substance offense” under § 4B1.2(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines to include state convictions, even when those convictions involve substances that are not outlawed by federal law?

II. To the extent that Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991), describes a general rule of abstention from granting certiorari to interpret the Sentencing Guidelines, should Braxton be overruled?