1. Whether, under the Fourth Amendment, a school official may search the digital contents of a student’s cellular phone without a warrant, probable cause, or consent.

2. Whether a school and police may, through a school resource officer partnership, conduct routine criminal investigations of students — searching and interrogating them — under the relaxed standards governing school discipline, rather than the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment safeguards that would apply if law enforcement acted directly.

3. Whether a court assessing the voluntariness of a thirteen-year-old’s statements must account for the child’s age under J.D.B. v. North Carolina and this Court’s related juvenile precedents.

4. Whether the voluntariness of a confession, and the disputed historical facts underlying it, may be resolved at summary judgment, or must be submitted to a jury under the Seventh Amendment when those facts are genuinely disputed.

5. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in requiring a § 1983 litigant to prove civil conspiracy by (1) direct proof of an express unlawful agreement and (2) “nefarious motive” of defendants.

6. Whether a court of appeals departs from its adjudicative role, and the principle of party

Federal courts’ authority to grant habeas relief is judgment-based. Federal courts may “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 1n custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a), (b)(1)(A); see Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). When a petitioner who succeeds 1n obtaining federal habeas relief 1s re- tried or resentenced, that petitioner recelves a new state-court judgment. See Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 341-438 (2010). Any challenge to that new judgment requires a trip back to the state court to ex- haust the remedies available there. See 28 U.S.C. §2241(C)(38). Federal courts thus may not continue to supervise state-court proceedings. See Pitchess v. Da- vis, 421 U.S. 482, 490 (1975) (per curiam).

After obtaining federal habeas relief, David Smith was retried and resentenced in state court. He did not file a state-court appeal. Nor did he file a second pe- tition for a writ of habeas corpus. Instead, he sought and received additional relief in federal court on his original petition, alleging that the state-court pro- ceedings failed to comply with the federal court’s ha- beas writ and were marred by the same constitutional error that justified the federal court’s original writ.

The Question Presented asks:

Do federal courts have jurisdiction to grant addi- tional habeas relief even after a successful habeas pe- titloner was retried, reconvicted, and resentenced in state court—and is therefore in custody pursuant toa new state-court judgment?

• to be frivolous, unlawful, or otherwise outside constitutional protection.

3. Whether the Second Amendment, as interpreted in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, permits the continued burdening of the ght to keep and bear arms where the dangerousness determination rests upon a methodology that aggregates lawful, non-threatening conduct rather than an objectively sufficient present predicate demonstrating a credible threat of physical harm. |

This Court has long recognized that individuals can have property or liberty interest, protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, that is created by statute. For example, although there is no inherent due process right to early release from prison, the procedural component of the Due Process Clauses protects prisoners’ statutory rights to good-time credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). To determine whether a statute creates a protected liberty interest, this Court asks whether the law “contain|[s] language mandating release under certain circumstances.” Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 372 (1987). In this case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, although the First Step Act contains mandatory language requiring the earning of time credits for qualifying individuals, federal prisoners do not have had statutorily created protected liberty interest in those time credits because they are “contingent” upon “conditions.” The question presented is:

Whether the First Step Act creates a legitimate right or

expectation in earning time credits for qualifying federal

prisoners that can give rise to a liberty interest protected by

the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause?

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(1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1) is consistent with the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in all cases, or rather is susceptible to as-applied challenges under the Second Amendment; and

(2) Whether the Second Amendment prohibits the conviction of, and judgment against, Petitioner for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1) given the nonviolent character of his prior predicate conviction.

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1. Whether the issuance of custody and property orders by a visiting United States district judge assigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§294 and 371 and presiding in state family court proceedings constitutes ultra vires action that violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of

| the Fourteenth Amendment where the judge (1) bypassed mandatory state mediation requirements (Rule 3.a.), (2) deprived the petitioner of her home and awarded her only $1,000 without evidentiary support, and (3) placed the child with the father and required public schooling contrary to the child’s expressed preference to live with his mother and to be homeschooled — particularly where those actions followed an international relocation from Argentina and an admitted prior attempt by the father to remove the infant at the airport (as established at trial), resulting in long-term parental separation, economic deprivation, and denial of meaningful access to justice for two Argentine jus soli nationals?

2. Whether the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S.C. §§9001 et seq., prohibits the retention in the United States of a child wrongfully removed or retained from a _ Contracting State (Argentina) through false pretenses regarding the migratory purpose of the relocation; and whether a child born abroad to an Argentine mother, naturalized as a United States citizen by his father via a Consular Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA) issued at a United States embassy (not on U.S. soil and not seen by the mother), is entitled to the full protections of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, including the requirement that the person be “subject to the jurisdiction thereof?”

3. Whether one spouse’s exclusive control and expenditure of community property to retain multiple counsel, while deliberately depriving the other spouse of access to those marital resources and forcing her to litigate pro se ina complex jury-trial divorce and custody proceeding,