1. Whether the prohibition in Section 230(¢)(1) of the Communications Decency Act on “treat[ing]” an online service provider “as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information con- tent provider” bars claims that would impose liability for editorial decisions about how to publish third-party content.

2. Whether the First Amendment protects edito- rial decisions about how to publish third-party content.

(I)

This Court has held that potential violations of a pretrial detainee’s Due Process Clause rights are to be judged by an objective standard. H.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560-61, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (stating that the constitutionality of restrictions placed on pretrial detainees “depends on whether they are rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive purpose and whether they appear excessive 1n relation to that purpose.”); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397-402, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (holding that a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim should be judged by an objective standard). In the wake of Kingsley, a Circuit split has emerged on whether to apply an objective standard to a pretrial detainee’s Due Process Clause denial of medical care claim.

The Fifth Circuit in this case applied a subjective standard to reject a pretrial detainee’s Due Process Clause denial of medical care claim. Accordingly, the question presented by this petition is: Whether a pretrial detainee’s Due Process Clause denial of medical care claim is governed by a subjective standard, as held by the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, or by an objective standard, as held by the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.

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May a state sanction an attorney for criticizing the government, such as offering opinions in interviews

| with the press, or is such speech constitutionally protected? May a state add additional sanctions to an attorney under the heading of “refusal to accept responsibility” for nothing more than the attorney defending against the allegations, or does such an “aggravating factor” — constitute an unconstitutional “trial penalty.”

1. Whether mandatory Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) loss mitigation regulations (24 C.F.R. §§ 203.604(b). and 203.605) constitute strict conditions precedent that must be satisfied before a mortgage servicer possesses | the legal authority to initiate foreclosure on a federally backed mortgage, and whether a servicer’s failure to satisfy these conditions precedent renders the foreclosure legally void or voidable. |

2. Whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a national mortgage servicer from denying the enforceability or violation of federal housing regulations in one federal circuit after explicitly confessing error and admitting systematic non-

| compliance with those identical regulations in another jurisdiction, and whether |

appellate courts have a duty to address such contradictions when reviewing

| summary judgment. |

• 3. Whether a pro se litigant’s presentation of unrebutted public statistical records demonstrating an institutional pattern of systematic regulatory circumvention— including publicly reported violations, regulatory consent orders, class action litigation, and an unprecedented volume of federal court filings—is sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact to survive summary judgment under | Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a).

4. Whether a mortgage servicer’s deliberate timing of a loan modification to precede the availability of a congressionally authorized federal relief program (the Homeowner Assistance Fund) constitutes a violation of the servicer’s mandatory ©

1. Whether statements that responding officers elicit from bystanders who are never identified, never produced, and never cross-examined, and that are captured on the officers’ body-worn cameras, are testimonial under the Confrontation Clause when the recordings are admitted at trial as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

2. Whether a court may deny a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and credit the untested remainder of a five-paragraph search-warrant affidavit as a basis for probable cause, without ever determining whether the affiant’s challenged statements were false or recklessly made.

3. Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(¢)(1), which permanently disarms every person convicted of a felony, is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.

T

1. Does Congress’s power “[t]o define and punish .. . Felonies committed on the high Seas,” authorize the United States to impose its laws upon foreign nationals for wholly foreign crimes committed in a foreign nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (KEZ)?

2. Is the United States’ prosecution of foreign nationals under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act “MDLEA”) unconstitutional where neither the individual nor his offense bears any nexus to the United States?

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