1. Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits courts to reject a retaliation claim at summary judgment by discounting sworn testimony as “self-serving”? and demanding documentary corroboration (such as emails or phone records) before a jury may draw reasonable inferences in the employee’s favor.

2. Whether a Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 retaliation claim in a workplace with layered decisionmaking may be defeated by requiring proof that the final signatory personally knew of protected activity, rather than permitting knowledge and causation to be established through the participation or influence of management actors with knowledge and through circumstantial evidence.

3. Whether a court of appeals may affirm summary judgment on a merits-dispositive “waiver” theory based on the placement of record citations, where the appellant supplied the record support required by the court’s local rule and clearly presented the issue, thereby foreclosing merits review in a civil rights case.

ia

Whether Petitioner was deprived of his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a serious felony?

In Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623, the Court has granted certiorari on the identical question. This case should at least be held pending resolution of that case.

1

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(83)—which permanently prohibits all unlawful users of controlled substances and all drug addicts from possessing firearms, without any pre-deprivation process or individualized finding of dangerousness—is consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and this Court’s historical-tradition test established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, United States v. Rahimi, and United States v. Hemant.

in

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on mere firearm possession exceeds the scope of Congress’s power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, both facially and applied to Mr. Celestine and, relatedly, whether this Court should revisit Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977), in light of the Court’s more recent Commerce Clause precedent.

2. Whether § 922(g)(1) 1s unconstitutionally vague, either facially or as applied to Mr. Celestine, and, more fundamentally, whether a statute prohibiting conduct protected by the Second Amendment should be subject to facial or as-applied void-for-vagueness scrutiny.

3. Whether § 922(¢)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to Mr. Celestine.

ia

1. Whether a court of appeals may apply “hybrid representation” principles to restrict review to plain error of a constitutional venue challenge that the district court expressly accepted, incorporated into the case, and adjudicated on the merits before trial.

2. Whether Article III and the Sixth Amendment permit criminal venue in a district where the defendant committed no conduct, based solely on acts of other alleged participants, and how those constitutional guarantees interact with 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and conspiracy principles.

1

If an alien reenters the United States without permission after removal, he faces up to two years 1n prison and one year on supervised release. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). If, however, the alien’s removal followed a felony conviction, that fact raises the maximum punishment to ten years in prison and three years on supervised release. 8 U.S.C. § 1826(b)(1).

Is the existence of a pre-removal felony conviction an element of an enhanced offense that must be alleged in the indictment and either proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted during a defendant’s guilty plea?

ia

The State of Florida is currently engaged in an unprecedented spree of death warrants. There have been 12 executions so far in 2026 alone, including a double execution on July 28, 2026. If executed on August 18, 2026, William Frances Silvia, Jr. (“Silvia”) will be the 13 in eight months. Even before the sudden acceleration of executions 1n 2025, Justice LaBarga of the Florida Supreme Court (“FSC”) raised concerns over the pace of executions occurring in Florida in his dissent in Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 796 (Fla. 2023).

As the majority observes, “post-warrant litigation is arduous,” see

majority op. at 7, and a death warrant by its very nature requires

expedited proceedings. However, these solemn proceedings ultimately

involve carrying out a sentence of death for the most aggravated and

least mitigated of murders and must still ensure due process of law. I

am extremely concerned by the recent pace of death warrants and the

speed with which the parties and involved entities must carry out their

respective duties.

Barwick has raised concerns about the accelerated timetable and argues

that “[t]he death warrant proceedings in [his] case lacked any indicia of

meaningfulness.” While I agree that Barwick’s claims are not entitled to

relief under this Court’s precedent, I nonetheless caution that even in

this final stage of capital proceedings, a meaningful process must be

ensured. For the first time in memory, either through negligence or intentionally, three consecutive death warrants were signed for overlapping executions periods for individuals represented by the very same group of attorneys from the Office of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel — Middle Region, Attorney Ali Shakoor, and co-counsels Debra Bell and Mahham Syed. Due to the severely truncated timeframe created by

lI