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Whether the prohibition in Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act on “treat[ing]” an online service provider “as the publisher or speaker of any in- formation provided by another information content provider” bars claims that would impose liability for editorial decisions about how to publish third-party content.

(I)

Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), pros- ecutors must disclose favorable evidence to the de- fense to safeguard the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The State violates Brady when it suppresses evidence that is “material” to guilt or punishment. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995).

This Court has stressed that the materiality inquiry “is not a sufficiency of evidence test.” [d. at 434 (em- phasis added). That is because “the possibility of an acquittal” does not necessarily turn on whether there is “an insufficient evidentiary basis to convict.” Id. at 435. A court thus errs if it rejects a Brady claim be- cause it thinks “the remaining evidence” could “sup- port the jury’s conclusions.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999). A court must instead consider how the suppressed evidence would have affected the case, and ask whether the “suppression ‘undermines confidence’ ” in the verdict. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (ci- tation omitted).

Louisiana state courts nevertheless routinely apply a sufficiency-of-the-evidence test to Brady claims. See, e.g., State ex rel. Robinson v. Vannoy, 397 So. 3d 338, 358 (La. 2024) (asking whether “there was sufficient other evidence upon which defendant’s conviction was based”); State v. Brown, 347 So. 3d 745, 836-838 (La. 2022) (rejecting Brady claim by emphasizing the “overwhelming” and “copious” evidence presented at trial). The question presented is:

Whether the Louisiana courts erred by denying Pe- titioner Juan Matthews’s Brady claim based on the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.

(i)

In addition to warrants issued by a judicial officer, the Military Rules of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.) allow a military commander to authorize searches of persons and property. The commanders granting these search authorizations are not required to have legal training or experience and, instead, receive advice from a prosecutor on whether to approve the search.

The question presented 1s:

Does the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule apply when law enforcement relies on a commander’s probable cause determination if that commander has no legal training or education and received advice from the same prosecutor who advised law enforcement?

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), the National Research Act (“NRA”), the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act”), and the Project BioShield Act of 2004 together form a comprehensive federal framework gvoverning investigational drugs. Together with their implementing regulations and Executive Branch agreements, those Acts require that the administration of such drugs be the product of voluntary, informed consent, a requirement not imposed on drugs approved for their marketing application under 21 U.S.C. § 355 et seg. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State, or its delegated agent, from mandating that an individual accept the administration of a drug that is exempt from 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), under threat of penalty, where federal law conditions that exemption on consent obtained free of coercion, undue influence, and unjustifiable pressure.

2. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State or its delegated agent from mandating that an individual accept the administration of a covered countermeasure, where the PREP Act’s immunity provision, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1), extinguishes the recipient’s right to access the courts for a resulting injury.

I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1) comports with the Second Amendment?

Il. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional?

Ill. Whether at minimum this Court should grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration because of an intervening circuit decision that may invalidate the Commerce Clause precedent on which the panel opinion below relies.

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Whether Petitioner was deprived of his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a serious felony?

In Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623, the Court has granted certiorari on the identical question. This case should at least be held pending resolution of that case.

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1. May the merits panel of a federal appellate court expand a certificate of appealability only if the “opposing party” assents to 1t?

2. If the last state court decision’s reasoning is discernable, is AEDPA deference due to alternative arguments that the state court never considered or adopted?

3. Does a general understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty suffice to establish a constitutionally-valid plea, or must the record evidence a knowing waiver of the three rights identified in Boykin: the right to trial by jury, the right to confront accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination?

Does the Miranda warning adequately advise a defendant about the privilege against self-incrimination at trial, for purposes of a guilty plea?

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