| 1. Whether, in light of Loper Bright Enterprises uv. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which requires courts to exercise independent judgment on questions of law rather than defer to agency determinations, an appellate court violates the Due Process Clause of the | Fifth Amendment when it applies deferential “sub- | | stantial evidence” review—rather than de novo review— to determine whether an administrative agency complied | with specific legal directives contained in a prior judi-

| cial remand order. 2. Whether de novo review is constitutionally

required when an appellate court reviews a govern- ment agency’s compliance with specific legal findings contained in a prior judicial remand order, such that es applying deferential review effectively nullifies the reviewing court’s prior legal determinations and renders — judicial remand orders unenforceable against govern- | | ment agencies.

Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), this Court has long held that secret ballot elections are the “preferred” method for ascertaining whether employees want union representation. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). When an election is set aside by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) due to unfair labor practices (ULP), a bargaining order is supposed to be an ex- treme remedy, authorized only where the “possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election … by the use of traditional remedies, … is slight.” Id.

This case presents the question whether courts of appeals and the NLRB are required to account for changed circumstances occurring after a union elec- tion — specifically the passage of time and significant turnover — prior to enforcing a Gissel bargaining order instead of a rerun vote. The Ninth Circuit — alone among all twelve circuits that have considered the issue — has held that changed circumstances are “irrelevant” to enforcement of a Gissel bargaining or- der. Every other circuit has interpreted Gissel to re- quire consideration of the passage of time and em- ployee/management turnover when a bargaining or- der is sought. Absent review, the Ninth Circuit’s order in the present case will disenfranchise a majority of Petitioner’s eligible employees, who have had no op- portunity to cast a secret ballot in any union election.

Certiorari should be granted to resolve the ex- traordinary split in the circuits on this important 1s- sue.

1. Whether Petitioner received constitutionally adequate notice of a sentencing enhancement per Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and progeny and this Court’s prior holdings on the due process requirements for adequate notice.

2. Whether the lower courts arbitrarily denied Goldson a certificate of appealability on his violation of Apprendi and constitutionally deficient notice of a sentencing enhancement.

This Court, in Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2018), established the standard of reliability for drug dog cases — focusing on the standard for the dog’s reliability and the establishment thereof by the dog’s training records, but apparently assumed under that case’s facts that an alert had actually occurred. The question presented 1s:

Where a properly trained drug dog, who was handled by a properly qualified trainer, failed to alert to drugs in a dog sniff of a vehicle, but merely engaged in “casting” about and allegedly exhibited untrained behavioral responses short of what the trainer deems to be an alert, did the overruling of a Motion to Suppress and the admission of evidence stemming therefrom violate the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States as fruit of the poisonous tree due to an unreasonable search and seizure.

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A federal grand jury charged petitioner Reginald DeWayne Brown with two cocaine offenses involving five kilograms or more, each carrying a sentence of ten years to life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). In exchange for Brown’s guilty plea and a stipulated sentence of 60 months, the government reduced the charges to remove the ten-year mandatory minimum: it filed a superseding information alleging the same two offenses but with a quantity of “500 grams or more,” each count carrying a sentence of five to forty years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). The parties presented their agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). The district court rejected it, and later rejected a second agreement stipulating to 72 months, because the stipulated sentences varied too far downward from the Sentencing Guidelines range of 130 to 162 months. But that range rested on the 11.58 kilograms of cocaine originally charged and subsequently attributed to Brown as relevant conduct. Brown withdrew his plea, stood trial on the original indictment, and was sentenced to 198 months.

The question presented 1s:

Whether a district court may reject a plea agreement through which the

government has reduced the charges against a defendant on the ground

that the stipulated sentence departs, without adequate justification,

from the Sentencing Guidelines range for conduct that the government

declined to charge.

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