Under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(), a crime is a “violent felony” if it “has as an element the use, at- tempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” In Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), this Court held that the elements clause excludes crimes that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. Jd. at 423 (plurality opinion); see zd. at 446 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Since Borden, however, courts of appeals have split on whether the ACCA’s mens rea requirement is satisfied by crimes that merely require a knowing or intentional act, without any requirement of knowledge or intent regarding injury to “the person of another.”

The Ninth and Tenth Circuits hold that an offense does not meet the elements clause unless it requires a de- fendant to cause physical pain or injury to another person with a mens rea more culpable than recklessness. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, by contrast, hold that the elements clause is satisfied by any act committed with a mens rea more culpable than recklessness—regardless of whether the defendant intended to cause physical pain or injury to another person or knew that such harm would result. The Sixth Circuit adopted the same position in the decision below.

The question presented is:

Whether an offense that requires an intentional act, but no mens rea as to the resulting physical pain or injury, qualifies as a “violent felony” under ACCA’s elements clause.

(I)

42. U.S.C. § 1981 protects the right “to make and en- force contracts” from “impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.” In Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476- 78 (2006), this Court recognized that contractual privity is the “sine qua non of a § 1981 claim,” meaning that only parties with rights under a contract may bring such claims. However, the Court did not decide whether the contractual-privity principles underlying section 1981 also require the defendants to be contracting parties. This open question has divided the circuits.

Independently, the circuits are at odds over how to analyze the clearly established prong of the qualified-im- munity test. Although all courts recognize that the wrongtfulness of an official’s conduct must be clearly es- tablished, the circuits are divided over whether an official’s personal liability must be clearly established at the time too.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a plaintiff may bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 premised on the “impairment” of the right “to make and enforce contracts” against a non-contracting defendant.

2. Whether, to overcome qualified immunity, a plain- tiff must show that the official’s personal liability was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.

(I)

1. Whether a person is “in custody” under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when a state court has imposed a definite jail sentence, stayed execution of that sentence con- ditioned on continued compliance with protective-order restraints, retained enforcement authority through contempt, arrest, and body attachment, and maintained arrest-backed restraints through December 31, 2099.

2. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a conflict- free assignment path in a federal habeas case chal- lenging restraints entered by a county court system led by the federal judge’s spouse, where impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Under Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (“Alzce’), a court asks first whether patent claims are “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea, and second whether the claims’ additional elements supply an “inventive concept.” An issued patent “shall be presumed valid.” 35 U.S.C. § 282. In 35 U.S.C. § 112 Congress prescribed what a patent’s specification must disclose and how claims may be drafted.

In this case the Federal Circuit held the asserted claims ineligible at both steps of that framework, finding the claims do not “describe how” their goal is achieved, while declining to decide whether the district court’s formulation of the abstract idea was an overgeneralization. The specification describes how in prose, in figures containing pseudo-code and C++ source code, and in a program listing appendix; the opinion mentions none of them. The specification also records that, at the time of the invention, “current web conferencing systems are unable to enable participants to asynchronously observe a live meeting.” One asserted claim recites its storage element in means-plus-function form, importing the disclosed structure by construction; no court construed it. The courts below resolved the case on the pleadings, faulting the complaint for lacking factual allegations of unconventionality and denying leave to add them as futile.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a court applying Alice may hold patent claims ineligible at both steps because they do not describe how their result is achieved, so that the identity of the abstract idea has no effect on the outcome, converting 35 U.S.C. § 101 into a disclosure inquiry that belongs to 35 U.S.C. § 112, conducted without evidence, claim construction, or the challenger’s burden of proof.

California funds independent-study programs in which parents teach their children in their homes us- ing curricula and materials the parents select. Char- ter-school employees simply approve parent-directed purchases and periodically review student work for adherence to state academic standards.

The charter schools here denied parents funding and academic credit for curricula and materials even though they satisfied the State’s academic standards, solely because officials deemed them “religious.”

The Ninth Circuit approved this discrimination by holding that parents teaching their children in their own homes using curricula and materials they selected are conducting a “public school program” to which the First Amendment’s prohibition against reli- gious discrimination doesn’t apply.

The question presented is:

Whether a State that chooses to recognize

and fund homeschooling using parents’ cho-

sen curricula may deny recognition and fund-

ing to parents who desire to use faith-based

curricula or materials to teach their children

at home, solely because the State deems those

materials religious?

Fair-market valuations turn on nuanced and record- bound factual determinations. This case involves a quin- tessential example: the rate paid to songwriters, composers, and publishers for public performances of their music at live concerts. Until now, the circuits have uniformly applied deferential, clear-error review to dis- trict courts’ fair-market valuations. In the decision below, however, the Second Circuit parted from its sister circuits and reviewed a fair-market-value determination and the individual components of that determination under an im- properly stringent de novo standard.

As this Court made clear in U.S. Bank National As- sociation ex rel. CWCapital Asset Management LLC v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387 (2018), that ap- proach to reviewing predominantly factual questions is erroneous. Moreover, it splits with the D.C., First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cir- cuits, all of which have appropriately applied deferential standards of review to comparable fair-market-value de- terminations in various contexts.

The question presented is:

Whether a district court’s fair-market-value determi- nation and its component parts, such as the selection of benchmark agreements, should be reviewed de novo or for clear error.

(I)