Section 502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement In- come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) allows a plan participant to bring an action “for appropriate relief’ under ERISA § 409. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). Section 409, in turn, provides that a plan fiduciary who breaches a duty is “liable to make good to such plan any losses” resulting from that breach. Id. § 1109(a).

In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 184, 144 (1985), the Court held, in the context of defined-benefit plans (which promise fixed income), that “recovery for a violation of § 409” goes to “the plan as a whole,” so § 502(a)(2) authorizes relief only “for the plan itself.” In LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008), the Court held, in the context of defined-contribution plans (which promise the value of individual accounts, which may fluctuate), that § 502(a)(2) authorizes “re- covery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s individual account.”

since LaRue, the courts of appeals have split on the scope of “appropriate relief” for defined-contribu- tion-plan-participant plaintiffs. In the Fourth Circuit, those plaintiffs can seek monetary recovery to only their “individual retirement account[s].” Trauernicht v. Genworth Financial Inc., 169. F.4th 459, 468-69 (4th Cir. 2026) (Niemeyer, J.). But seven circuits, 1n- cluding the Ninth Circuit here, hold that § 502(a)(2) doesn’t “limit” plaintiffs “to recovering losses suffered only by their individual accounts.” App. 21a.

The question presented is whether “appropriate relief’ for a defined-contribution-plan participant un- der ERISA § 502(a)(2) includes monetary recovery to other participants’ individual retirement accounts.

In constitutional terms, this is a “broken window” case. It presents a repeated structural failure in constitutional review. Illinois imposed discipline without adjudicating preserved predicates of jurisdiction, charging authority, access, and attribution. Oklahoma then gave that judgment summary reciprocal effect, rejected Selling review, and supplied the missing jurisdictional premise through ex post jurisdiction by status. The combined result is a constitutional exception zone in which federal rights exist in doctrine but no tribunal accepts responsibility for adjudicating them.

I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a receiving State may impose summary reciprocal discipline when the originating State never adjudicated preserved challenges to jurisdiction, charging authority, due process, Title II access, and attribution, and the receiving State declines independent constitutional review under Selling v. Radford.

2. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment permits ex post jurisdiction by status (historic admission in one state with continuing licensure in another), where no adjudicated jurisdictional nexus connected the originating State to a retired attorney’s post-retirement, out-of-state conduct, and the receiving State thereafter sustained the originating State’s authority based upon historical admission and continuing licensure in another State.

O. Whether Titles I] and V of the Americans with Disabilities Act permit a State to deny a disabled attorney direct access by treating private counsel as the

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