Whether the Fourteenth Amendment required a state court to afford an unrepresented civil litigant a further opportunity to submit competent expert sup- port before entering summary judgment, where the litigant had notice of evidentiary objections, filed post- hearing custodian affidavits concerning two of the three reports but no affidavit from the third author, the state appellate court found no demonstrated re- quest for additional time to cure, and state law made supplementation discretionary.

This case presents a square and acknowledged conflict over an important question of federal criminal law. Section 3664(n) requires an incarcerated defendant who “receives substantial resources from any source” to apply “the value of such resources” to restitution. 18 U.S.C. §3664(n). The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have held that § 3664(n) does not reach modest funds merely because they accumulate over time. A divided Ninth Circuit held the opposite, allowing the government to aggregate years of modest deposits from family and friends and seize them once the inmate’s account balance becomes substantial.

Four judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. They explained that the case “involves questions of exceptional national importance for prison management, inmates, and the courts,” and that the panel’s decision “creates a circuit split in an area of law which is best applied uniformly nationwide.” Three more judges wrote separately to express that “[a] principled reading of the statute does not support [the panel’s] result.” The panel’s rule follows inmates sentenced in the Ninth Circuit wherever the Bureau of Prisons houses them, subjecting inmates in the same federal prisons to different restitution regimes based solely on where they were sentenced.

The question presented is:

Whether 18 U.S.C. $3664(n), which requires an incarcerated defendant who “receives substantial resources” to apply them to restitution, applies only when the defendant receives resources that are substantial at the time of receipt, or also permits the government to aggregate modest, periodic deposits over time and seize them once the inmate’s trust-account balance becomes substantial.

(i)

California’s litigation privilege protects communications made in judicial proceedings. California’s Supreme Court has also held that the privilege does not bar claims based on independent, antecedent, : noncommunicative wrongful conduct undertaken to gather evidence for litigation. Kimmel v. Goland, 51 Cal. 3d 202 (1990). The same court has explained that the threshold inquiry is the claim’s “gravamen”: if the injury arises from a protected litigation communication, the privilege applies; if an independent noncommunicative wrongful act is the gravamen, it does not. Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048 (2006); Jacob B. v. County of Shasta, 40 Cal. 4th 948 (2007).

Petitioners alleged that restricted law-enforcement database material—including criminal history, warrant-status, mug-shot, and _ jail-record information—was accessed, retrieved, received, possessed, and routed from a sheriff/prosecutor channel | to private civil counsel for an unofficial private civil-litigation purpose, without subpoena, discovery request, court order, or law-enforcement purpose. The

, Ninth Circuit nevertheless held that Petitioners’ privacy claims “all stem” from obtaining and later disclosing those records in a judicial proceeding and affirmed dismissal with prejudice because amendment would be futile under California Civil Code section 47(b).

The question presented 1s:

Whether a federal court, at the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 15 futility stages, may apply California Civil

1

7 1) Whether the Due Process Clause permits a state court

to rely on constructive notice from pre-judgment filings as — notice of a final judgment, where state procedural rules

require notice of a judgment once entered. 2) Whether the Due Process Clause permits a state court to deny relief as untimely under Rule 60(c) from a judgment | alleged to be void for lack of constitutionally sufficient | notice, where the absence of notice caused the delay in

• geeking relief. | . |

3. Whether the Due Process Clause permits an appellate : court to affirm a judgment without addressing a claim that | the judgment is void for lack of Due Process.

Whether, in determining insolvency under 11 U.S. C. §547(b)(8), a court may disregard the value of a disputed liability as established by either (1) a court judgment close in time to the challenged transfers; or (2) a probability-discount approach, and instead may base the valuation of the liability on a post-petition settlement that was reached years after the prepeti- tion transfers.

Louisiana law requires every public school in the state to display the Ten Commandments in every classroom. La. R.S. § 17:2124(B)(1)-(8). The law mandates a specific version of the Biblical text that includes the statements “I AM the Lord thy God,” “Thou shalt have no other gods before me,” “Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain,” and “Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.” According to the Book of Exodus these and the other Commandments are the literal words of God; “written with the finger of God.”

In addition to prescribing the specific Biblical text, Louisiana’s law mandates that God’s words appear on a poster or framed document at least eleven inches by fourteen inches and mandates that they be the central focus of the display in a large, easily readable font. The law also pairs God’s words with a state-written statement titled “The History of the Ten Commandments in American Public Education.”

Petitioner Christopher Dier, Louisiana’s 2020 Teacher of the Year, teaches all of his classes in a single public-school classroom. He strongly objects to the message these state-mandated displays convey—that the State officially endorses a particular religion’s authority and moral teachings—and has sworn that he cannot comply with the law, even at the risk of losing his job. Applying recent, binding en banc circuit precedent, the courts below held his challenge unripe and meritless.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether petitioner’s Establishment Clause challenge to Louisiana’s law is ripe.

2. Whether Louisiana’s law _ violates’ the Establishment Clause.

(i)

This case arises from the fatal police shooting of Joe Frasure during a late-night encounter at a family apartment that Petitioners contend they were lawfully cleaning out after the death of Joe’s grandmother. Officers responded to a report of silhouettes and lights in a building believed to be vacant. The caller did not report an armed suspect, did not report violence, and could not provide a description. The officers did not announce themselves, did not order the occupants out through an open window, and within seconds of approaching the rear of the building, two officers fired into Joe’s van. Joe was shot in the back of the head and died. The questions presented are:

1. Whether, after Barnes v. Felix, courts reviewing Fourth Amendment deadly-force claims may affirm summary judgment by focusing primarily on the seconds immediately before shots were fired while giving little operative weight to earlier facts bearing on the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct, including failure to announce, erosion of suspicion, escalation, and officer-created danger.

2. Whether a court of appeals may affirm qualified immunity at summary judgment by crediting officers’ later testimony about perceived danger

i