Whether the government creates the “classic penalty situation” forbidden by Minnesota v. Murphy,

465 U.S. 420 (1984), where it is undisputed that a federal supervisee retains a valid Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to offense conduct, yet restoration of his access : to constitutionally protected expression is conditioned, under threat of revocation, on potentially

incriminating admissions in treatment or polygraph examination.

i

1. The “Bipolar” Record and Judicial Forgery: Whether a Federal District Court commits a felony act of judicial forgery and “Judicial Treason” (18 U.S.C. § 2381) when it knowingly adopts a “Homicide Hoax” into a federal order to provide legal cover for News Defendants, while a parallel federal record (1:25-cv-00536) admits the event was a “medical accident” involving an independent fall.

2. State-Sponsored “Biological Liquidation”: Whether the systematic deprivation of life-saving insulin to a : documented “Eggshell Plaintiff” with a GAD65 Autoantibody level of 18,145 [U/mL—resulting in clinical death, skeletal disintegration, and permanent blindness—constitutes “State-Sanctioned Medical Torture” under 18 U.S.C. § 2340A.

3. The “Lethal Script” and Public Incitement: Whether the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals violates the Fifth and

_ Fourteenth Amendments by upholding a “void judgment” based on forged news scripts, thereby operationalizing a “Public Death Warrant” that incites vigilante violence, vehicular assaults, and “Shoot-on-Sight” responses against a disabled U.S. Citizen.

4. Staging of Mass Casualty Events against the LDS Faith: Whether the Respondents’ coordination of mass shooting threats and the broadcast of forged “rape narratives” directed at a specific place of worship constitutes a state-sponsored campaign of religious persecution and domestic terrorism intended to silence a federal whistleblower.

5. The Misprision of the Missing Daughter: Whether the federal bench’s refusal to restore an unspoliated record facilitates the “Coordinated Kidnapping” and misprision of the Petitioner’s minor daughter, using a child as a tactical pawn to prevent the discovery of a $50 Billion revenue fraud operation.

6. The “Kill Zone” and 911 Non-Response Protocol: Whether a State may constitutionally establish a lawless “Kill Zone” by ordering a total 911 non-response protocol—instructing dispatchers to disconnect from a terminal “Eggshell Plaintiff’ and his church bishop—to facilitate an extrajudicial execution.

7. Inter-Jurisdictional Racketeering (RICO): Whether the collusion between the Colorado Attorney General’s Office, the federal bench, and corporate news syndicates to “starve” the record of exculpatory 911 audio and hospital trauma logs constitutes a criminal enterprise designed to loot the U.S. Treasury and subvert constitutional governanice.

8. The “Demographic Truncation” of Disabled Citizens: Whether the State’s policy of “Demographic Truncation”-——denying basic survival mandates to traditional White Christian disabled persons while subsidizing “preferred demographics” with diverted federal block grants—violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief “with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim” meets certain strict prerequisites. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). If a “claim” is not adjudicated on its merits in the state court proceedings, however, federal review of the claim is de novo. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009).

The question presented 1s:

When the deficient performance prong of a claim of ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), is misconstrued by the state courts and therefore not adjudicated on the merits in the State court proceedings, is the state courts’ determination as to Strickland’s prejudice prong nonetheless entitled to deference under § 2254(d)?

1

The government prosecuted Ms. Morin under a statute with undisputed racist origins. Congress criminalized illegal reentry into the United States in 1929 at the urging of “proud” white supremacists, nativists, and eugenicists to keep the American bloodline “white and purely Caucasian.” It reenacted the provision in 1952 while considering what one senator called, in the Congressional Record, the “Wetback Bill.” 82 Cong. Rec. 791 (1952).

The core focus of the illegal reentry provision has remained substantively the same ever since. Ninety-nine percent of its prosecutions are against Latin- Americans. The circuit courts have upheld the law based on its reenactment in 1952, as well as its non-substantive amendments in the 1980s and 1990s. None has seriously grappled with the law’s “uncomfortable past.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 99 n.44 (2020).

This case poses important questions about the role of appellate courts in applying the framework from Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), to a statute charged in over one- third of all federal criminal prosecutions last year.

The question presented is:

Whether a legislature can cleanse the taint of a racially discriminatory law by silent reenactment and amendment when the law was originally adopted for an impermissible discriminatory purpose.

prefix

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(83)—which permanently prohibits all unlawful users of controlled substances and all drug addicts from possessing firearms, without any pre-deprivation process or individualized finding of dangerousness—is consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and this Court’s historical-tradition test established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, United States v. Rahimi, and United States v. Hemant.

in

Are a trial or appellate court’s analyses of 1) the weight of evidence of guilt and/or 2) the gravity of aggravators proven beyond a reasonable doubt appropriate factors in evaluating the effectiveness of trial or appellate counsel when it comes to Strickland’s application to the process underlying a jurys recommendation following the weighing of ageravating and mitigating factors, – a necessarily moral judgment?

1