Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code defines “property of the estate” to include “all legal or equita- ble interests of the debtor in property as of the com- mencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). “Prop- erty interests,” in turn, “are created and defined by state law.” Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). Accordingly, eight courts of appeals to consider the question have held that state law determines whether a creditor’s cause of action against a non- debtor third party is a property interest of the debtor and thus constitutes “property of the estate.”

In this case, the Third Circuit refused to consider state law—and indeed, held that consideration of state law was “not necessary’ —when it concluded that cer- tain creditors’ claims were property of the bankruptcy estate. Pet. App. 39a n.21. The question presented 1s:

Whether a creditor’s claim against a nondebtor third party can be “property of the estate” under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) when, before the bankruptcy, the debtor could not have asserted the claim on its own behalf under governing state law.

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The Federal Employees Pay Act (FEPA) contains a provision giving the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) authority to “prescribe regulations … necessary for the administration of this subchapter.” 5 U.S.C. § 5548(a). The en banc Federal Circuit, splitting 7-4, held that this provision required it to adopt OPM’s definitions of terms in the FEPA, even where those definitions were contrary to the longstanding judicial construction of the statute.

The question presented is: Under this Court’s decision in Loper Bright, does the general rulemaking provision in 5 U.S.C. § 5548(a) delegate authority to OPM to authoritatively interpret FEPA, such that courts must adopt OPM’s definitions?

Under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), there is generally no Confrontation Clause violation if a hearsay declarant testifies at trial. But situations may arise where the defendant nonetheless did not have a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Here, the trial court delayed ruling on a motion in limine to exclude testimonial hearsay until after the declarant testified. The court then erroneously admitted the hearsay under the rules of evidence. Thus, at the time of the declarant’s testimony, the defense did not know if the trial court would admit the hearsay and thus could not cross-examine her without introducing inadmissible hearsay.

The Question Presented Is:

Does the erroneous admission of testimonial hearsay under these circumstances deprive the defend- ant of a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination and thus violate the Confrontation Clause?

Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), Congress established a single, unqualified rule: administration of any drug introduced into interstate commerce under an exemption from 21 U.S.C. § 3855(a) must be the product of voluntary, informed consent. This Court has likewise held that a waiver of constitutional rights must never be the product of coercion or presumption. Berghuis uv. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010); Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. 878 (2018). The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act’) extinguishes access to all state courts. Access to the courts for a judicial remedy is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Christopher v. Harbury, 586 U.S. 408, 415 n.12 (2002). The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a local government from mandating that a public employee accept the administration of a drug exempt from approval under 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) — on pain of losing benefits — where the FDCA and the National Research Act, 42 U.S.C. § 289(a), together with their implementing regulations, expressly require such administration be the product of voluntary, informed consent.

2. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a local government from mandating that a public employee accept the administration of a covered countermeasure — on pain of losing benefits — where the PREP Act’s immunity clause, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1), extinguishes the employee’s right to seek judicial redress for any injury’ the countermeasure causes.

This case arises from a state-court civil judgment in which liability was not adjudicated. The trial court entered a default against petitioner as a discovery sanction, deeming the allegations of the complaint admitted. A jury proceeding limited to damages followed, and a judgment of approximately $51.875 million—of which approximately $25.375 million was punitive—was entered against petitioner jointly and severally with other defendants.

A jury’s impartiality is not a courtesy extended to the parties. It is the condition on which the jury’s power to decide rests at all. This case asks what remains of that principle when a juror’s bias is admitted, on the record, and the juror is seated anyway.

The questions presented are: |

| 1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment permits a civil judgment to stand where jurors who acknowledged bias were seated, when the structural guarantee of an impartial tribunal—as distinct from a party’s personal challenge rights—does not depend for its existence on any litigant’s timely objection.

2. Whether the Due Process Clause permits a substantial punitive damages award where the liability predicate for that award was established by discovery-sanction default rather than by adjudication, such that the reprehensibility determination central to BMW of North America, Inc. | v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), rests on a presumption rather than on proof tested by an adversary.

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2. Whether applying Heck after a prisoner’s death extinguishes the only remaining damages remedy and thereby nullifies a state survival statute that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 requires federal courts to apply.

3. Whether a surviving child has standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert a substantive due- process claim for loss of familial association arising from deliberate indifference that caused a parent’s death in custody.

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1. Whether the Seventh Circuit and District Court applied the improper standard for a COA in conflict with this Court’s decisions in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); and Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017)?

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying COA by ruling opposite of other “COA granted” cases that. was under Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972)?

3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying COA by ruling opposite of other “COA granted” cases that was in conflict with this Court’s decision in Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640, Stromberg, 283 U.S. 359, and Yates, 354 U.S. 298?

The questions presented are:

1. Whether Petitioner unambiguously invoked his right to end questioning when, after stating that he was “ready to go’ and attempting to leave, he twice told officers, “If I’m not being detained, I would like to go.”

2. Whether, in determining custody under Miranda, a court may disregard a hospital patient’s confinement because the police did not cause it, rather than consider that restraint with the other objective circumstances.

PARTIES TO THE CASE

Petitioner Terrance Payne Hayes was the defendant in the district court and the appellant in the court of appeals. Respondent United States of America was the plaintiff in the district court and the appellee in the court of appeals.

RELATED CASES United States v. Hayes, No. 5:23-cr-04068, Northern District of lowa Judgment entered on March 26, 2025. United States v. Hayes, No. 25-1649, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion filed May 11, 2026. United States v. Hayes, No. 25-1649, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Order Denying Petition for En Banc Rehearing Order entered on June 8, 2026. 1

The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution holds that every accused has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI (“Confrontation Clause”); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004) (“the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed” was the use of “ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused’). It is thus fundamentally antithetical to the tenets of the United States Constitution to deny a criminal defendant the opportunity to confront his accusers in court. But lower courts have historically disagreed over the extent of the Confrontation Clause’s protections. Indeed, in People v. Fields, 2026 IL App (4th) 4250151-U, the Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court confoundingly concluded that a witness’s accusations, if spoken via excited utterances, do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. This holding undermines both the sanctity of the Constitution’s promises and this Court’s previous understandings of the Confrontation Clause’s reach.

Specifically, in this case, the complaining witness implicated defendant Kevion Mataz Fields in a videotaped statement while police officers took detailed notes. But the complaining witness was not called to testify, and Fields never had the chance to cross-examine her. Her statements were nonetheless admitted and considered substantively as “excited utterances,” and the trial judge’s decision to admit and consider these statements was affirmed on direct appeal, under the rationale that her “excited utterances” were necessarily spoken during the course of an ongoing emergency. People v. Fields, 2026 IL App (4th) 4250151-U, 49/28, 33-35, 38. As such, the multi-fold question brought up by this decision and presented for review here is 1) whether the complaining witness’s excited utterances were

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