Substantive consolidation is a judge-made enhance- ment to powers granted Bankruptcy Courts in Title 11 of the United States Code, done without due process, establishment of in personam jurisdiction, or any harm done by the targets to a debtor or its estate.

This Court has limited powers of Bankruptcy Courts to those specifically delineated in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, November 6, 1978), as amended (hereinafter the “Bank- ruptcy Code’). Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 184 8. Ct. 1188, 188 L. Ed. 2d 146 (2014); Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L. P., 603 U.S. 204, 144 8S. Ct. 2071, 219 L. Ed. 2d 721 (2024); Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 1878. Ct. 973, 197 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2017).

The Bankruptcy Court below stated, “Although the Code itself does not expressly allow for substantive consolidation, a bankruptcy court has the power to substantively consolidate various estates under its general equitable powers contained in § 108(a).” In re No Rust Rebar, Inc., No. 21-12188-PDR, 2023 WL 4497328, at *5 (Bankr. $.D. Fla. July 12, 2023). This extra-judicial power is based upon a fictitious reading of this Court’s decision In re Sampsell v. Imperial Paper Corp., 318 U.S. 215 (1941).

The question presented on which Courts of Appeals are only divided on how a target of substantive consol1- dation should be evaluated for eligibility to be a debtor:

Whether Bankruptcy Courts’ powers are only those expressed in the Bankruptcy Code?

The Department of Veterans Affairs is the agency responsible for administering the benefits Congress has allocated to veterans in exchange for their service to this country. If an initial VA adjudicator denies a veteran’s benefits claim, the veteran may appeal to the agency’s appellate tribunal, the Board of Veter- ans’ Appeals. A veteran may then appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (also called the Veterans Court). It is beyond dispute that, when a veteran appeals to the Veterans Court, the Board loses jurisdiction over the underlying claim.

Petitioner appealed to the Veterans Court from an obviously incorrect Board decision that deemed his intra-agency benefits appeal untimely. But before the Veterans Court acted, the Board purported to reopen Petitioner’s case sua sponte. Solely because of this un- authorized action, a divided en banc Veterans Court dismissed Petitioner’s pending appeal as moot. The Federal Circuit likewise dismissed Petitioner’s fur- ther appeal, holding that there was no live case or controversy because the Board had given Petitioner the reopening he sought—even though the Board lacked the power to take this action, and even though the Board’s unilateral actions placed Petitioner in a worse position.

The question presented 1s:

May an agency defeat the existence of a case or controversy 1n a reviewing court by taking unilateral, ultra vires action after the agency has lost jurisdiction following an appeal to the court?

In 2022, the people of Missouri amended their Constitution to legalize marijuana and command that prior nonviolent marijuana convictions “shall be vacated as legally invalid,” restoring the person “to the status the person occupied prior to such arrest, plea, or conviction and as if such event had never taken place.” Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, state convictions affect sentencing for federal convictions, but not when they have been “expunged.”

The questions presented are:

I. Whether a state conviction that the people of the state have vacated as legally invalid is “expunged” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2()).

IT. Whether Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1998), still correctly states the rule for the deference that courts must give the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines.

In Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98 (2017), the Court held that a North Carolina statute prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing social media websites was unconstitutional. In so holding, the Court recognized that the First Amendment protected the right to access the internet for defendants who had completed their sentences. Over the past decade, the lower courts have divided over whether Packingham is limited to internet restrictions imposed on defendants who have fully completed their sentences, or whether Packingham also governs internet restrictions imposed on defendants as a condition of their post-release supervision.

The question presented is:

Whether this Court’s decision in Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98 (2017) governs internet restrictions imposed as a condition of supervised release.

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