Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code defines “property of the estate” to include “all legal or equita- ble interests of the debtor in property as of the com- mencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). “Prop- erty interests,” in turn, “are created and defined by state law.” Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). Accordingly, eight courts of appeals to consider the question have held that state law determines whether a creditor’s cause of action against a non- debtor third party is a property interest of the debtor and thus constitutes “property of the estate.”

In this case, the Third Circuit refused to consider state law—and indeed, held that consideration of state law was “not necessary’ —when it concluded that cer- tain creditors’ claims were property of the bankruptcy estate. Pet. App. 39a n.21. The question presented 1s:

Whether a creditor’s claim against a nondebtor third party can be “property of the estate” under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) when, before the bankruptcy, the debtor could not have asserted the claim on its own behalf under governing state law.

(1)

1.Whether the Fifth Amendment and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 permit a court of appeals to suspend an attorney based materially on alleged violations that were not identified in a supple- mental disciplinary charge and the attorney was never afforded an opportunity to defend against them as charges.

2. Whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4’7(b) permits a court of appeals to suspend an attorney for violating a specific requirement—announced in the final disciplinary decision—that an attorney correct- ing inaccurate citations must disclose the citations’ technological source, where that requirement was not previously contained in federal law, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the circuit’s local rules, or an actual-notice order in the case.

Respondents asked a federal court to remake West Virginia’s foster-care system. Their forty-seven all-or- nothing demands encompassed every part of that system: caseload ceilings and _ hiring qualifications for caseworkers; timetables for evaluations, case plans, and permanency plans; a placement-matching process and foster-home recruitment plan; target rates for maltreatment, placement stability, and permanency; an outside entity to run placements; and a monitor above it all. Similarly broad suits are pending across the country—by one count, in thirty-four States.

After certifying two classes covering every child now or ever in the State’s custody, the district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing. It held it could not redress Respondents’ claims without exercising a power it did not have: the power to take total control of the state system.

A divided Fourth Circuit reversed, announcing that a court “not only holds the power, but a duty, to implement, oversee, and administer reform of state institutions’— even when it becomes “a manager or policy planner.” It also refused to review the certification order, holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) barred review even though the order had merged into the final judgment.

The questions presented are:

1. Is a claim redressable when the only relief said to be effective requires a federal court to become the “manager or policy planner” of a state agency?

2. When a class-certification order merges into a final judgment, does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) nonetheless bar an appellate court from reviewing that order on a cross-appeal from the judgment?

(EPA’s) authority to revise a National Ambient Air

Quality Standard (NAAQS). Such revisions reset the

baseline for a legion of regulations that affect virtually

every significant source of the regulated pollutant, and virtually all economic sectors, in the nation. Section 109(d)(1) of the Clean Air Act requires

EPA, every five years, to complete a “thorough review”

of the latest science before revising a NAAQS, and

also allows EPA to act “earlier or more frequently.”

This provision requires a thorough review before any

revision. But here, EPA claimed for the first time that

it can skip that review when it revises a NAAQS between five-year intervals. EPA then confessed error. But the D.C. Circuit upheld the revision—based on a different statutory provision that EPA had not invoked (and even disavowed), and that in any event does not excuse the thorough review.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether EPA may revise a NAAQS without the “thorough review’ required by section 109(d)(1) simply because it acts “earlier or more frequently” than mandated.

2. Whether EPA must consider costs and attainability when exercising discretion to review and revise a NAAQS “earlier or more frequently” than mandated.

Under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), a firearm regulation survives the Second Amendment only if the government proves that it 1s “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Whether a historical law counts toward that showing depends on whether it is “relevantly similar” to the modern one, and what counts as relevantly similar depends on the metric a court selects. Bruen supplied two metrics: how and why a regulation burdens the right. It did not supply a third, because it had no occasion to. New York enacted the law at issue there, and the historical laws to which it was compared were enacted by colonies, States, and territories. The identity of the regulating sovereign was constant across the comparison, and so it dropped out.

It does not drop out in a federal prosecution. Every case under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) pits a federal statute against a historical record made by somebody else. There was no federal civilian firearms prohibition of any kind until the twentieth century, and no federal status-based possession ban until 1968.

The question presented 1s:

Whether the identity of the sovereign that enacted a historical firearm regulation is part of Bruen’s “relevantly similar” inquiry, so that a federal firearm prohibition must be justified by a federal historical tradition rather than by the regulatory history of the colonies, the States, and their political subdivisions.

1

Petitioner Kevin Kirk was the plaintiff in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, and the plaintiff-appellant in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. Respondent National Institute for People with Disabilities of New Jersey was the defendant in the Law Division and defendant-respondent in the Appellate Division. No other parties were parties to the proceeding below.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS | | Kirk v. National Institute for People with Disabilities of New Jersey, Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. BER-L-6279-22. Summary judgment entered in favor of Respondent. | Kirk v. National Institute for People with Disabilities of New Jersey, Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Docket No. A-3732-23. Judgment affirming dismissal entered September 24, 2025. Kirk v. National Institute for People with Disabilities of New Jersey, Supreme Court of New Jersey, Docket No. 091382. Petition for certification denied April 6, 2026.

3

Many federal criminal offenses have a jurisdictional element requiring proof that the alleged crime was committed “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” The question presented, on which the Courts of Appeals are divided, is whether a district or appellate court can take judicial notice of a jurisdictional element, such as territorial jurisdiction, without violating a defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to due process of law and trial by jury? A subsidiary question is whether a court’s mere labelling of a fact, as adjudicative or legislative, can remove a factual determination from a jury without violating the Sixth Amendment?

1

1

Whether Petitioner was deprived of his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a trial by a 12-person jury?

This is the same question presented as Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623, 1n which this Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari on June 15, 2026. Briefing in Kian is in progress. Petitioner requests that this Court hold his case pending resolution of Kian.

1