The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) gives the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) “ex- clusive jurisdiction” to regulate the trading of “swaps” on federally regulated designated contract markets (DCMs). 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). A “swap” is any contract that provides payment “dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential fi- nancial, economic, or commercial consequence.” Id. § 1a(47)(A)(@i). Given that intentionally sweeping breadth, Congress has given the CFTC tools to clarify and refine the term’s reach. First, Congress has en- acted a “special rule” empowering the CFTC to bar trading of certain swaps, including those that “in- volve… gaming.” Id. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)G)(V). Second, Congress has given the CFTC authority to “further de- fine the term|] “swap.” 15 U.S.C. § 8302(d)(1).

The Third Circuit holds that the CEA’s plain text gives the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction, preempting state regulation, over trading on DCMs of “sports- event contracts’—contracts that pay a fixed amount if a sports-related prediction is correct. That’s because sports-event contracts are “swaps” no different from, say, weather swaps. KalshiExX, LLC v. Flaherty, 172 F.4th 220 (8d Cir. 2026). But the Ninth Circuit disa- erees, holding that sports-event contracts aren’t swaps, meaning states are free to regulate, ban, and even criminalize them. See KalshiEX, LLC v. Assad, No. 25-7516, 2026 WL 2548846 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026) (published); App. la-5a.

The question presented is whether the CEA preempts state regulation of sports-event contracts traded on a DCM.

Whether the Due Process Clause permits an American court to give dispositive effect to a disputed foreign-created family status affecting the legal rights of persons or property within the United States solely upon principles of international judicial comity, without independently scrutinizing the legal basis and consequences of the disputed status.

This case presents a longstanding and acknowledged conflict among federal and state courts regarding the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over insurance companies.

Under the Due Process Clause, a state court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if the defendant “purposefully avails” itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State. Petitioner is a German insurance company with no activities in California. Petitioner was nevertheless held by a California state court to be subject to personal jurisdiction in California in an insurance-coverage dispute with the Florida-based affiliate of its Spanish insured. The sole basis for the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction was that, in the insurance policy, petitioner had extended defense and indemnity coverage to the insured on a worldwide basis—which was deemed to constitute purposeful availment by petitioner of the benefits of doing business in California. That holding reflects a split that has been acknowledged for four decades and has divided the federal courts of appeals 2-8 and state courts of last resort 6-5.

The question presented is:

Whether an insurer may constitutionally be subjected to personal jurisdiction in every forum within the geographic scope of a territory-of-coverage provision in an insurance policy, on the theory that a worldwide provision constitutes purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities within any and all jurisdictions.

1. In a _ prosecution under the “fraudulent inducement” theory of fraud—under which it is irrelevant whether victims suffered any financial losses—when, if ever, may the trial court admit evidence indicating whether victims suffered such losses?

2. Does the Kighth Amendment permit a forfeiture or other criminal fine that destroys any future prospect of earning a livelihood?

Whether the territorial limits on state courts’ power embodied in the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause, and principles of federalism prohibit a state-court receiver from controlling the litigation decisions and other internal affairs of an out-of-state corporation when the re- ceiver has not been recognized in the corporation’s place of incorporation.

(I)

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1. Whether probable cause that a person committed a crime supports a warrant for historical cell-site location information for a phone number the government asserts was used by that person, absent facts to support that assertion?

2. Whether consent to a warrantless DNA swab may be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances when police falsely tell a person that he is required to submit?

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Whether the district court properly (1) excluded the admission of sworn deposition statements used to impeach a hearsay declarant, (2) excluded a witness’s prior sworn testimony under Rule 801 when the testimony contained a statement against interest made by another declarant, (3) excluded evidence offered to impeach a government witness because the statement was made during an investigative interview, and (4) admitted evidence of an unrelated domestic incident under Rule 404(b) when the Government failed to identify a permissible non-propensity purpose for the evidence.

A federal regulation prohibits operating water vessels “in a negligent manner, by failing to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable person, under like circumstances, would demonstrate.” 36 C.F.R. § 3.8(b)(8). The Ninth Circuit, deciding the issue for the first time nationwide, interpreted this regulation to encompass a broad range of conduct, including failing to wear a life jacket and utilize a cut-off switch lanyard.

The question presented is: Whether the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 3.8(b)(8) violates basic principles of statutory interpretation as set forth in this Court’s decisions to unjustifiably expand the regulation’s reach.

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