§ 411(b)(1)(A) of the Copyright Act preserves a registration containing inaccurate information unless the applicant included the information “with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” This Court has held that a good-faith mistake of law may excuse an inaccuracy and that willful blindness may establish knowledge. The first question presented 1s:

1. Whether “willful blindness,” when used to establish the statutory knowledge required by § 411(b)(1)(A), retains the two requirements this Court defined in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A; subjective belief in a high probability of the relevant legal inaccuracy and deliberate action to avoid learning 1t.

The Contract Disputes Act requires a contractor to submit a “claim” to a contracting officer, but it neither defines “claim” nor uses the phrase “sum certain.” The Federal Acquisition Regulation adds a “sum certain” requirement; the Federal Circuit treats. that regulatory phrase as a mandatory prerequisite to relief. The second question presented 1s:

2. Whether the Contract Disputes Act authorizes the Federal Acquisition Regulation’s “sum certain” requirement as a mandatory prerequisite to a contractor’s monetary claim.

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I Whether Arizona has ignored the Strickland prejudice prong in defaulting Mr. Clabourne’s sentencing IAC claim by requiring counsel to have filed a PCR petition before the preyudice was evident, during the pendency of Martinez litigation and in the face of a previous dismissal of PCR litigation with prejudice in the trial court.

I Whether Arizona’s inconsistent application of its procedural default rules to successive PCR claims due to their simultaneous litigation in federal courts will render this procedural default inadequate to bar federal habeas review.

III Whether Arizona’s creation of a non-discretionary right of review of IAC claims followed by Arizona’s appointment of inexperienced PCR counsel who provided concededly deficient representation was arbitrary and denied Mr. Clabourne Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection under Douglas v. California.

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1. Does the petitioner have a Sixth aiid Fourteenth Amendment Right to have his client files as he was denied the right to possess discovery as a pro-se defendant before, during and after trial. Under Texas Law a pro-se defendant can only take notes from discovery presented and not possess any discovery for trial.

2. Are the rulings of Crawford,:Brady and Martin in conflict with Texas Code of Criminal Procdure 39.14 (d) and (f£). |

3. FRissisithe case of FIRST IMPRESSOIN as this Court has not rendered any decisions concerning the rights of client files to whom they belong to the attorney/lawyer or the client.

4, Gan the Highest Court of the State ignore the SUPREMACY CLAUSE by only setting fourth rulings of their own decisions which conflict with the United States Supreme Court.:s decisions of precedence.

1. Whether a district court can elicit and record a defendant’s guilty plea before advising him of any constitutional and appellate rights, because the plea cannot therefore be knowing, intelligent and voluntary?

2. Whether a court of appeals may affirm a life-equivalent, within-Guidelines sentence without meaningfully reviewing whether the sentence 1s “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have a jury find, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact that increases the penalty for his crime beyond what is authorized by the jury’s verdict or his own admissions. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013). Restitution ordered under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 is calculated from judge-found facts about a victim’s losses and a defendant’s relative role in causing them, and this Court has now held that restitution under a closely related statute 1s a criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Ellingburg v. United States, 607 U.S. _, 146 S. Ct. 564 (2026).

The question presented is: Whether the Sixth Amendment requires that the facts necessary to support an order of restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 be found by a jury, or admitted by the defendant, rather than found by a judge under a preponderance-of-the- evidence standard.

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1. Whether Shoop v. Twyford, 596 U.S. 811 (2022), precludes developing evidence through an order entered pursuant to the All Writs Act solely to support a motion for equitable tolling and without regard to whether the evidence 1s admissible to support the merits of a claim for habeas relief.

2. Ifthe first question presented 1s answered in the affirmative, whether it is the movant’s burden under the All Writs Act to show that the evidence would be something more than relevant to whether equitable tolling is warranted.

3. Whether the collateral order doctrine applies to allow interlocutory appeals of All Writs Act transport orders whose sole purpose is to develop evidence to establish that equitable tolling is warranted.

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