American courts have recognized since the Founding that a judgment entered without jurisdiction is void. Then and now, judicial actions performed without jurisdiction are not “simply erroneous, but absolutely void.” Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, 589 U.S. 57, 68-64 (2020) (quoting Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 485, 493 (1880)). Early American courts did not understand jurisdiction as mere rule of procedure but as a requirement rooted in Article III’s limits on judicial power.

A federal jury returned a_ verdict against Petitioners in 2015 when the district court indisputably lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The court of appeals vacated that judgment and directed dismissal in 2016, and this Court denied certiorar1 1n 2018. Congress enacted a statute that created personal jurisdiction based on Petitioners’ conduct during and after 2020. The court of appeals then recalled its mandate and reinstated the original judgment. The question presented is:

Whether a court of appeals’ equitable power to recall a mandate permits it to reinstate a final judgment that was vacated for lack of personal jurisdiction years prior, based on personal jurisdiction arising under a statute that did not create that jurisdiction until long after the original, vacated judgment became “final” and all appeals were finished.

1. Will the Supreme Court of the United | States stop the Ninth Circuit from Assuming Subject-Matter Jurisdiction?

2. Did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “lend its power to assist or protect a fraud” (Kitchen v. Rayburn, 86 U.S. 254, 263 (1873)), by failing to address proof,

_ showing the Government gained an unfair advantage through deceit?

In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), this Court held that where a jury was erroneously instructed on an element of the charged offense, a reviewing court may deem the error harmless if it “concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.” Id. at 17 (emphasis added).

The circuits have developed two conflicting approaches to applying Neder in cases where the element at issue was contested. Some courts, including the divided Second Circuit panel below, weigh the evidence on the disputed element themselves and deem an error harmless if they deem the government’s evidence sufficiently strong. Other courts ask only whether the defendant’s evidence could rationally support acquittal, without weighing it against the government’s evidence. The confusion has led to irreconcilable decisions regarding harmless error, and, as Judge Robinson explained in dissent below, has led to a clear circuit split regarding the harmlessness of jury instructions that violate this Court’s decision in Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450 (2022). The question presented 1s:

Where a jury convicts a defendant after being erroneously instructed on an element of the offense that the defendant plausibly contested, do this Court’s precedents and the Sixth Amendment permit an appellate court to find the error harmless based on the court’s assessment of the strength of the gsovernment’s evidence?

(1)

3. Petitioner believes that he is entitled to the redress he seeks in this case, i.e., reversal of his convictions, because his right to effective assistance of counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment was unconstitutionally abridged.

WHEREFORE, petitioner requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this case.

/S/Peter H. Meyers

Peter H. Meyers, Esquire

2000 G Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20052

PMeyers@law.gwu.edu

(202) 994-7462

Counsel of Record for Petitioner 2

Do Florida trial courts violate the Eighth Amendment of

the United States Constitution when it relies heavily into | the juvenile offenders years of incaceration before Miller

v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 4670 (2012), when that court

declines to modify the juvenile offender’s life sentence

pursuant to Florida Statute 921.1402 after showing their

crimes were not a reflection of a irreparable corruption.

ii

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), this Court held that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to conduct their own defense and that California courts violated Anthony Faretta’s right by denying his voluntary and intelligent request for self-representation made “weeks before trial.”

Although circuit courts agree that Faretta’s holding “clearly established,” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), that a request made “weeks before trial” is timely, the Ninth Circuit ruled 1t was reasonable for the California courts to deny Thomas Walker’s request—made two weeks and one day before trial—as untimely because of the “inherent ambiguity” in Faretta’s “weeks before trial” rule. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that Walker’s case was materially distinguishable from Faretta by comparing the timing of the requests in relation to the date the charges were filed rather than in relation to the trial date. The questions presented here are:

(1) Did the Ninth Circuit err in holding that Faretta did not “clearly establish,” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), that a request for self- representation made two weeks before trial is timely?

(2) Did the Ninth Circuit err in holding that Walker’s case was materially distinguishable from Faretta by comparing the timeliness of the requests in relation to the date the charges were filed instead of in relation to the trial date?

1