tion claim when the plaintiff alleges that investigators | withheld exculpatory evidence, ignored readily avail- | able witnesses, and presented a misleading narrative to the prosecutor — conduct that, under this Court’s . decisions in Malley v. Briggs, Kalina v. Fletcher, Buck- | ley v. Fitzsimmons, and Manuel v. City of Joliet, de- | feats the presumption of independent judgment and

_ removes prosecutorial immunity for investigative acts. . 3. Whether a prosecutor’s offer of a reduced mis- | demeanor plea deal in a case charged as a felony may | be considered evidence of a lack of probable cause when evaluating a §1983 claim alleging that the charging decision was tainted by omissions and mis-

| representations. |

Whether, after Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450 (2022), a jury instruction requiring proof that a physician knew the prescribing was unauthorized adequately protects § 8411s subjectivenens rea require- ment when the Government relies on objective profes- sional standards as evidence of knowledge and the district court refuses a requested instruction explaining that malpractice and deviations from the standard of care do not themselves establish criminal knowledge.

1. Whether the Sixth Amendment and clearly established federal law, as determined by this Court, forbids attorneys, during plea negotiations, from misleading and lying to their client about their chances at trial, while simultaneously concealing the true terms and conditions of a favorable plea offer, so their client will reject that favorable plea offer and proceed to trial—all for financial gain?

2. Whether it is a violation of Hvitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Fourteenth Amendment, or clearly established federal law, as determined by this Court—for a lower Court, during a postconviction evidentiary hearing, to ignore material evidence, release material witnesses, refuse to afford a pro se defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly to establish IAC during plea negotiations, in a state postconviction proceeding—after the Court forced that defendant to proceed pro se, without appointing conflict-free postconviction counsel?

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Whether Petitioner was deprived of his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a serious felony?

In Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623, the Court has granted certiorari on the identical question. This case should at least be held pending resolution of that case.

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Under Florida’s capital sentencing law, a judge may impose the death penalty only if the jury first determines that the defendant shall be sentenced to death. Under a 2023 amendment the jury’s decision need not be unanimous, but can be made by a vote of eight (out of twelve) jurors. Only Florida and Alabama (10-2) permit the imposition of the death penalty based on a nonunanimous jury vote. The question presented is whether the recently enacted Florida nonunanimity provision is impermissible under the Sixth Amendment and/or the Eighth Amendment.

There are two other petitions raising the same issue: Michael James Jackson v. State of Florida, No. 26-76; and Michael H. Hunt v. State of Florida, No. 26-78. Review should be granted in Zieler’s case, or in the alternative this case should be held pending resolution of the Jackson and Hunt petitions.

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Petitioner Isaac Tekola pleaded guilty to and was sentenced on four counts of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b), which criminalize possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. The district court applied the U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) sentencing enhancement for “maintain[ing] a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” notwithstanding that the premises in question was Tekola’s residence that he maintained for the purpose of having a place to live. Tekola contends that under the plain language of the enhancement, the enhancement was not applicable to him unless a drug distribution purpose was motivating his decision to “maintain” the home.

The questions presented are:

1. In interpreting a federal Sentencing Guidelines provision, whether a court may eschew any analysis of the plain text of the guidelines provision in favor of “guidance from the enhancement’s history and purpose, the commentary, and decisions from previous courts”?

2. Whether the U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement for maintaining a premises for purposes of drug distribution can be applied to a defendant’s home and only residence absent a finding that drug distribution was a motivating force for keeping possession of the home

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18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) imposes an enhanced sentence on any defendant who has a prior conviction “relating to… the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography].|” “Child pornography” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).

The question presented, on which the circuits are divided, is whether the sentencing enhancement in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) 1s triggered by a prior conviction which sweeps more broadly than the federal definition of child pornography.

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