The Bail Reform Act of 1984 authorizes the deten- tion of a person charged with a criminal offense pend- ing trial if a “judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person” for trial “and the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1), @).

If the detainee or the government disagrees with the district court’s judgment on that issue, they may “ap- peal from a release or detention order,” and ask the court of appeals to review that decision. Id. § 3145(c). But “[t]he circuits have long been split on just how searching that review is.” United States v. Wilks, 15 F 4th 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2021). “Some courts” apply de novo review, others apply “the clearly erroneous or other highly deferential standard,” and still others oc- cupy a middle ground, conducting “independent re- view” tempered by “deference” to the district court. United States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810, 812-814 (1st Cir. 1990).

The question presented is:

Whether an appellate court should review a district court’s order granting or denying pretrial release de novo—as the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Elev- enth Circuits have held—or whether the appellate court owes some deference to the district court’s deter- mination, as the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and D.C. Circuits have held?

(i)

To prevail on a Section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, the accused must show that the criminal charge terminated in his favor and was brought with- out probable cause. Under Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022), the favorable-termination element is satisfied if the prosecution “ended without a convic- tion,” id. at 49, and under Chiaverini v. City of Napo- leon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024), malicious-prosecution suits must be evaluated “charge by charge,” id. at 562.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a criminal charge that was dismissed with prejudice in connection with a plea deal termi- nated in favor of the accused.

2. Whether the existence of probable cause for one criminal charge categorically bars a claim of malicious prosecution based on a different charge.

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1. Whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals unreasonably disregarded clearly established Batson precedent and this Court’s recent emphatic clarification of the law in Pitchford by refusing merits review of a subsequent state habeas application alleging a constitutional violation that would have precluded any rational juror from imposing a death sentence.

2. Whether the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals unreasonably refused to review Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims where trial counsel failed to investigate and present readily available and substantial mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of Petitioner’s capital murder trial.

ia

1. Should the district court be allowed to consider plaintiff/appellant Joshua Collett’s notable indigency ($1,140/mo. — income), medical condition and physical disability (double amputee) as well as the considerable wealth of the prevailing parties in deciding whether to relieve Mr. Collett of court costs under the broad grant of discretion in Rule 54(d)(1)?

2. Is it proper for the circuit court to preemptively exclude broad categories of reasons to relieve losing parties of court costs, thereby restricting the discretion of the district court granted by Rule 54(d)(1)?

3. Where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals conflicts with most other circuit courts on the availability of indigency as a basis to relieve the losing party of costs under Rule 54(d)(1), should this Court resolve that conflict?

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A federal statute prohibits an “alien” who is “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” from possessing any firearm or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). The Petitioner is an undocumented Mexican citizen who came to the United States as a child and has lived in Maine for over a decade. During a traffic stop for speeding, police discovered a firearm and ammunition in the vehicle he was driving. The question presented is whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) may be enforced against Petitioner consistent with the Second Amendment.

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