| federal due-process claims effectively unreviewed through an unexplained per curiam affirmance | after those claims were squarely presented as grounds for reversal.

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Whether the State of Washington’s harassment statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.20(1)(a)G), which criminalizes threatening speech without defining a culpable mental state, 1s unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment as interpreted by this Court in Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023).

1. Whether a state court violates the Supremacy Clause and Due Process when it disregards a federal district court’s stay-and-remand order, requiring merits review of postconviction claims, and instead dismisses those claims as procedurally barred;

2. Whether structural error occurs when a state court permits conflicted postconviction counsel to represent a defendant, where counsel admits withholding the case file, investigative materials, and exculpatory evidence from the defendant:

3. Whether a state court violates Due Process when it re-characterizes filings such as a made pursuant to Rule 60(b) and a Request for Administrative Hearing as successive postconviction motions in order to dismiss them without merits review;

4, Whether a state court may deny a Motion for New Trial, made pursuant to Rule 33, solely

| on timing grounds without considering newly discovered evidence demonstrating actual innocence;

5. Whether a state court violates Due Process by refusing to allow a defendant to file a memorandum and appendix supporting postconviction claims, and then dismissing the filing as procedurally barred;

6. Whether a state court violates federal law by applying the wrong federal precedent to a | motion for correction of illegal sentence, made pursuant to Rule 35(a), involving a new substantive retroactive rule announced by the United States Supreme Court and the Third Circuit; and

7. Whether repeated summary dismissals of postconviction filings — without individualized analysis — violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of meaningful judicial review.

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The Court recently granted certiorarl in Guerrero v. Johnson, No. 25-1008, to address in the successive habeas petition context, “[w]hether a claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable when the habeas petitioner could have asserted a claim based on the rule in a prior federal habeas petition” but would have then lost under the existing law. Simply, the Court will address whether a second habeas petition can proceed if the claim’s basis existed beforehand but adverse law meant that without a change in law, the claim would have failed. The instant Petition presents a companion issue regarding whether a second-in- time habeas petition is permissible when information a court deems necessary to make a claim viable, and thus to have any possibility of prevailing, becomes available after the conclusion of the first habeas proceeding.

Rather than apply the Court’s long-standing, workable abuse-of-the-writ doctrine that recognizes a claim is not successive where there is a legitimate excuse for the failure to raise the claim within the first petition, see Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504 (2020) & McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), the Sixth Circuit applied its own standard. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit held that a claim is successive unless one of three exclusive situations exist — regardless of the existence of a legitimate reason for not raising the claim earlier. Whether the court could deviate from the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine in this way and whether the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with the Court’s long-standing abuse-of-the-writ doctrine are significant questions warranting review and that give rise to these questions presented:

1. Is a second-in-time habeas petition claim not successive if there is a legitimate excuse for the failure to raise the claim within the first petition, under the Court’s long-standing abuse-of-the-writ doctrine (McCleskey uv. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), reaffirmed post-AEDPA in Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504 (2020)); or, 1s a non-successive second-in-time habeas petition limited to where a claim: a) challenges a new state-court judgment; b) was unripe when the first petition was filed; or c) was unexhausted and not decided, although raised, within the first petition?

2. Does “factual predicate,” and thus ripeness, when determining whether a federal habeas claim is not successive, mean a fact necessary to overcome summary dismissal of an underlying constitutional claim or does the “factual predicate” exist, and thus the claim is ripe, solely because the claim relates to conduct (or lack of conduct) at an early stage of proceedings, even though the fact necessary to overcome summary dismissal did not then exist?

An Assistant Field Office Director within Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ordered Jorge Avalos removed from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b). He was not appointed by a “Head|[] of Department|],” as the Appointments Clause normally requires for “inferior Officers.” U.S. Const., art. IT, § 2, cl. 2.

The questions presented are:

(1) Whether a bureaucrat lacks a “continuing position established by law” merely because the disputed acts are part of his full-time job, as the Ninth Circuit held here, contrary to the conclusions of the Second and D.C. Circuits as well as the Office of Legal Counsel; and

(2) Whether a bureaucrat’s last-word authority over whether a noncitizen 1s removed from the United States constitutes significant authority under the Appointments Clause.

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Whether, when a death warrant is signed for an individual’s execution, a 35 day time period between the signing of the death warrant and the scheduled execution 1s unreasonably short and in violation of the individual’s Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights as applied in the instant case?

II.

Whether the Florida Constitution’s “conformity clause,” which the Florida Supreme Court found acted to bar the court from considering an Eighth Amendment claim of the Petitioner, 1s unconstitutional because it prohibits the Florida Supreme Court from considering any Eighth Amendment claim that this Court has not specifically addressed?

III.

Whether the execution of the Petitioner would violate the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments when the jury failed to make any unanimous findings in its sentencing verdict?

IV.

Whether Florida’s death warrant selection and signing protocol, which provides the Governor with unfettered discretion to choose any condemned inmate for execution at will, for any reason or for no reason at all, results in the arbitrary and capricious implementation of the death penalty in violation of the proscription

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