1. Whether Presidential Elector Candidates suffer a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to establish Article HI standing when state officials remove them from the general election ballot after determining that their Pledged Presidential Candidate is constitutionally ineligible.

2. Whether a State may deny ballot access to qualified Presidential Elector Candidates by adjudicating the constitutional eligibility of their | Pledged Presidential Candidate where state law identifies the Presidential Electors, not the presidential nominee as the relevant ballot candidates.

3. Whether the decision below conflicts with this Court’s precedents recognizing that exclusion from the ballot and burdens on _ political participation constitute judicially cognizable injuries under Article III.

4. Whether allowing individual States to determine presidential eligibility in a manner that excludes _ otherwise qualified Presidential Elector Candidates creates the very state-by-state inconsistency that this Court cautioned against in Trump v. Anderson.

(i) |

In Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954), this Court held that “any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during trial about the matter pending before the jury’ 1s presumptively prejudicial. Subsequently, in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-17 (1982), the Court recognized that due process requires a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, with the trial judge “ever watchful” to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. As stated in Smith, this Court “has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Id. at 215.

Yet the circuits are split on what a defendant is required to show before a trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing so that a defendant has a mean- ineful opportunity to show the wrongful conduct and prejudice. In this case the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing even though he pre- sented credible evidence that during the trial jurors consulted an outside source to look up the definition of murder. That is at odds with Remmer and Smith. Thus, the question presented 1s:

Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution require a trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing when presented with credible evidence that a jury was exposed to improper extraneous information, or whether the court may refuse to conduct any inquiry and summarily reject the claim for lack of demonstrated prejudice.

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause permits a _ state court to retroactively extinguish an established property interest by applying an unforeseeable and _ unexpected interpretation of a state statute that changes the legal consequences of a completed transfer of personal property.

LIST OF PARTIES

TREVOR JOHNSON #191593, LUTHER LUCKETT CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX, 1612 DAWKINS ROAD, P.O. BOX 6, LAGRANGE, KENTUCKY 40031; WARDEN SHANNON BUTRUM, 1612 DAWKINS ROAD, P:O. BOX 6, LAGRANGE, KENTUCKY 40031; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY, RUSSELL COLEMAN, STATE CAPITOL 700 CAPITAL AVENUE, SUITE 118, FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY 60601; UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT, KELLY L. STEPHENS, CLERK (CIRCUIT JUDGE HERMANDORFER), 100 E. FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540, CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202-3988.

1. Whether a known beneficiary of a trust, holding a present interest that |

state law expressly entitles him to protect through pre-judgment notice and

intervention, is deprived of property without due process of law when a -

judgment is entered against the trust corpus without any notice to him, solely

because the trustee participated in the litigation. 7

2. Whether, consistent with Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S.

80 (1988), and Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), a State may deny

relief from such a judgment because the person who received no notice has

not shown a meritorious defense to the underlying claims. :

| i

This case arises from the involuntary civil commitment of a voluntarily admitted psychiatric patient, and from the subsequent, and total, foreclosure of any judicial

| forum — state or federal — in which he could test the lawfulness of that commitment. The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed Petitioner’s petition for appeal without reaching the merits, on the ground that he had not filed a separate notice of appeal with the clerk of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, even though he timely filed his petition for appeal with the Supreme Court of Virginia itself and the intermediate court’s order never advised him — a prose litigant — that a separate | filing was required. The questions presented are:

1. Whether a state supreme court’s dismissal of a prose litigant’s petition for appeal, for failure to make a second, distinct filing with a different clerk’s office of which he was never notified by any court or rule communicated to him, rests on a state procedural ground that is “adequate” within the meaning of this Court’s independent-and-adequate-state-ground doctrine, or whether the unforeseeable and unannounced nature of the requirement, as applied, renders the ground inadequate to bar this Court’s review of the federal question presented below.
2. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated when a State (a) permits a hospital to continue the confinement of a voluntarily admitted psychiatric patient through a temporary detention order obtained on the sworn

Since the Court issued its ruling in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), frontline defense lawyers and prosecutors, along with district courts, and courts of appeals, have grappled with how the holding applies to § 922(g¢)(1). Is the statute facially invalid? Is 1t subject to as-applied challenge? If so, how does that challenge work? Criminal defense lawyers and prosecutors have spent hours upon hours litigating these issues. District courts and appellate courts have expended massive amounts of time and energy ruling on these issues. Defense lawyers cannot stop raising the issue because this Court has not given us any final answers. Without answers from this Court, defense lawyers cannot tell clients that challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) 1s frivolous, even if the applicable court of appeals has rejected the argument. So, we must keep filing motions. We are stuck in purgatory, or ground hog day, or whatever metaphor strikes your fancy.

Perhaps the Court needed to flesh out Bruen on lesser used subsections of § 922(¢) before tackling subsection (g)(1). United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) (§ 922(¢)(8)); United States v. Hemani, 146 8. Ct 1677 (2026) (§ 922(¢)(8)). That’s understandable. But the time has come. We need an answer on § 922(g)(1) and we need it now.

The Question Presented 1s:

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits

anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the

Second Amendment as applied to Petitioner, based solely on a decade

old nonviolent drug distribution conviction.

1

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment as applied to the Petitioner.

2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits the possession of any firearm that has, at some point, travelled in interstate commerce, exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

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