Under the final judgment rule, a judicial or agency decision is final, and thus ripe for appellate review, only once there is nothing left to decide. That longstanding rule ensures clear guidance for litigants, safeguards judicial resources, and avoids needless piecemeal appeals.

Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit below announced a different rule for determinations of the International Trade Commission under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. When the Commission issues a single determination excluding some products from entry but finding no violation for others, the court of appeals held that the decision is final only as to the Commission’s no-violation findings. As the Federal Circuit acknowledged, the rule it announced below not only permits, but indeed compels, piecemeal appeals by a single party from the same administrative decision. In so doing, the Federal Circuit deepened an acknowledged split among the courts of appeals on the standard for finality of agency decisions.

The question presented is:

Whether an agency disposition is final as to some issues, thus triggering deadlines for judicial review, while other issues decided in the same disposition remain subject to further executive or administrative review.

(I)

A prosecutor filed an information charging Waite with unlawful interception of a phone conversation and certified that she had received sworn witness tes- timony. The information did not set out that testi- mony. A circuit court clerk issued a capias for Waite’s arrest under a statute directing its issuance without leave or order of court. A judge signed the bail en- dorsement on the capias after a detective told him the facts of the case. At the suppression hearing, the de- tective’s account identified neither the facts he con- veyed nor an oath supporting his presentation to the judge. The Circuit Court upheld the capias as a war- rant based on sworn probable cause. The District Court of Appeal later reversed the oral interception convictions because the deputies lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the calls. The judgment now under review affirmed denial of postconviction relief from the surviving convictions after the interception counts were dismissed.

The question presented 1s:

Whether the capias procedure used to order Waite from the curtilage of his home and arrest him satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s requirement for a neutral and detached official to independently determine probable cause.

Whether newly discovered evidence can support extraordinary circumstances to reopen a habeas corpus petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) when the newly discovered evidence arises more than one year after the judgment on the underlying habeas corpus petition?

II.

Whether the execution of the Petitioner, who 1s 77 years-old and suffering from corresponding cognitive decline, would be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?

ii

In the Tenth Circuit, prosecutions brought in Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 have a special requirement. The United States must prove, as an element of the offense, that the defendant and alleged victim have differing statuses; one must be an Indian person, and the other must be a non-Indian person. Under Tenth Circuit law, a person is an Indian if two requirements are met. First, they must have some degree of Indian blood. Second, they must be recognized as an Indian by either the federal government or a federally-recognized Indian tribe.

Mr. King was convicted after a jury determined he was a non-Indian person and his alleged victim, M.V., was an Indian person. However, M.V. was not an enrolled member of a tribe at the time of the offense. In concluding that the evidence was sufficient to prove M.V. was recognized as an Indian at the time of the offense, the Tenth Circuit relied upon events that occurred after the conclusion of the conduct serving as the basis of the charge. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit considered the Cherokee Nation’s after-the-fact holding of guardianship proceedings for M.V., her after-the-fact tribal enrollment, and that M.V. held herself out to be an Indian while testifying at trial.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether an element of a crime, which concerns the victim’s status at the time of the offense, may be satisfied by events occurring separately after the charged conduct concluded.

2. Whether the test for Indian status should be resolved solely by determining 1f an individual is an enrolled member of a federally-recognized tribe.

3. Whether a multiplicitous indictment prejudices a defendant, and requires an election of charges, when the multiplicitous nature of the indictment prevents the defendant from raising a defense as to a particular element.

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