This petition presents a question also raised in the petitions for a writ of certiorari, filed on September 14, 2026, in FedEx Corp., et al. v. Watt, et al., No. 26-360, and Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers Pension Committee, et al. v. Reichert, et al., No. 26-387.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA), requires defined-benefit plans to offer a joint-and-survivor annuity option for married participants that is the “actuarial equivalent” of a_ single-life annuity provided to unmarried participants. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d). That is, the plan participant must have the option of choosing a plan that pays out benefits for his or her retirement and also for the surviving spouse after the participant’s death.

The question presented is whether the statute’s reference to “actuarial equivalence” requires that these two options simply be actuarially equivalent or whether it also demands that the underlying actuarial assumptions used in calculating equivalence be “reasonable,” even though Section 1055(d) does not mention any such constraint.

When a civil appeal becomes moot before review 1s complete, the appellate court must decide whether the unreviewed judgment below should remain in place. In United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950), this Court described vacatur as the “estab- lished practice.” But the courts of appeals disagree about the governing standard when the appellant did not cause mootness. Most treat vacatur as the ord1- nary disposition; three others separately weigh the public interest; and the Sixth Circuit alone requires even a blameless appellant to prove that the unre- viewed judgment would have preclusive effect in later litigation.

This case squarely presents the conflict. Tennessee repealed the challenged laws during the appeal. Alt- hough Petitioner did not cause mootness and Re- spondent did not oppose vacatur, a divided panel left the district court’s judgment in place solely because Petitioner had not shown future preclusive effect.

The question presented 1s:

What standard governs vacatur of an unreviewed

district court judgment when a civil appeal be-

comes moot through no fault of the appellant?

The Court decided McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas”) fifty-three years ago.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the McDonnell Douglas framework “remains a workable and useful evidentiary tool” “for evaluating Title VII claims at summary judgment” as Justice Thomas joined by Justice Gorsuch questioned in Hittle v. City of Stockton, 145 8. Ct. 759, 764 (2025) and in Ames v. Ohio Dept of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 308, 3826 (2025).

2. Whether the district court and the court of appeals abused their discretion by not allowing Petitioner to submit a corrected, complete response to Respondent’s motion for summary judgment with citations to her record evidence, which was timely filed in the district court, when the reason for Petitioner’s inability to submit a complete response by the deadline was due to “good cause” and “excusable neglect,” namely unforeseen, sudden illness.

3. Whether a pro se party or attorney who asserts that she could not file a complete response to a motion for summary judgment by the deadline due to sudden illness does not demonstrate that she acted diligently, per se, because she received three (3) prior “good cause’ extensions (of a total of 18 days).

Courts of appeals broadly recognize that the invited-error doc- trine precludes a party from challenging on appeal an action that he invited the district court to take. Some courts treat the invited error as waiver itself, regardless of whether the party intentionally relinquished a known right. These courts preclude appellate re- view entirely or allow it only in extreme circumstances, such as to avoid manifest injustice. Other courts require the invited error to also be deliberate or a knowing waiver before barring appellate re- view. These courts permit plain error review of a party’s innocent mistakes.

The questions presented are:

1. When a criminal defendant invites the district court to com- mit an error, 1s that error reviewable for plain error if the defendant did not intentionally relinquish a known right when he invited the court’s action?

2. If a criminal defendant mistakenly proposes an incorrect jury instruction, does plain error review apply to the re- quested instruction?

I. Whether district courts have the discretion to permit witnesses to testify even if they have violated an order issued under Federal Rule of Evidence 615?

Il. Which party bears the burden of persuasion to establish prejudice, or lack of prejudice, when a criminal defendant shows a deviation from Federal Rule of Evidence 615?

III. Whether the presumption that juries follow their instructions establishes harmless error in a case involving the erroneous admission of evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 or 404?

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Where an accused’s “will has been overborne” by circumstances of the interrogation, a confession is deemed involuntarily given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973). In determining the voluntariness of a confession, courts examine the totality of the circumstances to determine if an accused’s due process rights are violated, including the characteristics of the accused being interrogated and the interrogation techniques used by police. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 689, 6938 (1998).

When law enforcement officers, investigating a potentially capital murder charge, conduct a lengthy and high-pressure interrogation of an 18- year-old with the mentality of a 15-year-old, who sobs, asks for his mother, and changes his story repeatedly, can a resulting confession be deemed voluntary and reliable under the totality of the circumstances?

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Question 1: Whether the Second Amendment permits an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢g)(1) when that challenge is premised on the non-violent and non-dangerous nature of the defendant’s prior conviction.

Question 2: If as-applied challenges can succeed, what is the standard by which courts should evaluate a person’s prior convictions to determine if those convictions Congress to disarm that person under penalty of imprisonment?

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Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement offered to “prove the truth of the matter asserted.” In Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), this Court held that when an out-of-court statement supports the prosecution’s case only if it is true, it is offered for its truth. Eight courts of appeals ask whether an out- of-court accusation linking the defendant to the crime was needed to explain police conduct before accepting that it was offered only for that purpose. The Eleventh Circuit asks only whether the government stated an investigative purpose and whether Federal Rule of Evidence 408 is satisfied.

The question presented is: Whether, under Rule 801(c), a court may admit an out-of-court accusation linking the defendant to the crime as offered only to explain police conduct, without determining whether the accusation was needed to explain that conduct.

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