Whether a district court, having found that the evidence does not demonstrate receipt of funds by Ms. Gasarch, erred in imposing joint-and-several disgorgement based solely on “concerted wrongdoing,” notwithstanding the strong presumption against joint- and-several liability and the absence of any of the relevant factors this Court identified in Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71 (2020).

Whether the district court erred in ordering dis- gorgement outside the relevant five-year statutory period where the jury verdict supported only a finding of negligence and not scienter, and thus violated Ms. Gasarch’s jury trial rights under the Seventh Amendment.

(1)

New York conditions the exercise of the Second Amendment right on a government license. In fifty-five of its sixty-two counties, the State assigns the power to srant or deny that license to a judge acting as a designated “licensing officer’; elsewhere, to a police commissioner or sheriff.

In Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 40 (2021), this Court reiterated the principle that “no case or controversy exists between a judge who adjudicates claims under a statute and a litigant who attacks the constitutionality of the statute” (cleaned up) (quoting Pulliam vu. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 538 n.18 (1984)). Drawing in part on its judicial-immunity precedent, the Second Circuit extended that principle to a judicial officer who administers the licensing scheme and personally denied the licenses sought, holding that Article III bars applicants’ § 1983 claims for prospective relief. This Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), in a suit against such an officer. Six of the Second Circuit’s thirteen active judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc.

The question presented 1s:

Whether the rule that a judge who neutrally adjudicates claims under a statute is not adverse under Article III to a litigant who challenges that statute extends to a judicial officer who, in acting on license applications, personally administers the challenged regulatory scheme rather than resolving disputes between adverse parties.

1. Whether a federal court adjudicating a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may grant qualified immunity by relying on an officer’s extrinsic, unsworn knowledge to retroactively cure a facially deficient arrest warrant—a practice permitted by some circuits but expressly forbidden by others under Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).

2. Whether facts known to an affiant showing that an accused used force defensively under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21, may be excluded from a probable cause affidavit on the ground that they relate solely to a potential affirmative defense, where the governing state statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2, explicitly confers absolute immunity from criminal prosecution — a question on which the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits are sharply divided from the Third and Eleventh Circuits and the Supreme Court of Washington.

3. Whether a supervisor who reviews a bare-bones warrant application, recognizes that it establishes no offense, and permits the warrant to stand unexecuted for 353 days is entitled to qualified immunity — an approach that conflicts with the Third and Ninth Circuits, which impose liability for a supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Whether email service providers and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children act as government entities when they conduct hash value searches of private email accounts?

IT.

Whether the private search doctrine applies when email service providers conduct hash value searches of private email accounts, but no human being reviews the alleged contraband located therein?

IIT.

Whether the Good Faith Exception can Apply to Save a Facially Overbroad Search Warrant when the Same Law Enforcement Officer is Both the Affiant and the Executing Officer?

il

Petitioner Garrett Ward, a 25-year-old with no criminal record, woke from a drunken sleep on the side of a street in New Orleans to find a stranger going through his pockets, which prompted him to strike the stranger twice and kick him once. Twelve days later, the man died and Mr. Ward was charged and tried for second- degree murder. Before trial the defense invoked Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 716(B), which requires the State to give notice of any oral statement by the defendant that it intends to offer at trial. Five days before trial, the State provided a response and identified only innocuous statements Mr. Ward made to police officers. On the first day of testimony, the prosecutor asked a witness whom the State had interviewed the day before what Mr. Ward had said during the fight. She claimed that Mr. Ward used a racial epithet. The prosecutor asked the question a second time, and she repeated the slur. No other witness heard this slur, the witness’s own 911 call contained no such reference, and there was no reference to this type of language in any police report. The Louisiana courts denied relief on the erounds that the prosecutor professed not to have known the precise words the witness would use.

The question presented 1s:

To establish their entitlement as nonparties to enforce the release

terms of Petitioner’s private agreement with CIT against him, it

was incumbent on Respondents to provide legally-sufficient evidence to satisfy the burden of proof placed on them under

Texas law. The opinions below do not identify how or with what

evidence and legal predicates that burden was satisfied under

governing Texas law. Question 2 — Whether Rights That had Become Void or Time-Barred Under Texas Law May Nevertheless Be Judicially : Recognized as Enforceable Even if Respondents were entitled to invoke Petitioner’s private agreement with CIT in state court against him in federal court, - the courts below nevertheless authorized foreclosure and collection after effectively holding that Texas law had already rendered the Deed of Trust and power of sale void and collection remedies time-barred. Respondents do not identify any governing

Texas law, doctrine, or legally sufficient evidence establishing the

legal predicates necessary to justify treating those rights as still

enforceable.

The foregoing Questions Presented arise from an irreconcilable tension between rulings issued by the district court in the same decision.

The findings in the first part of the district court’s decision below (the “Core Findings”) are well supported by governing Texas law and

_ i.

Question 1: Whether the Second Amendment permits an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢g)(1) when that challenge is premised on the non-violent and non-dangerous nature of the defendant’s prior convictions.

Question 2: If as-applied challenges can succeed, what is the standard by which courts should evaluate a person’s prior convictions to determine if those convictions Congress to disarm that person under penalty of imprisonment?

1