In Section 340B of the Public Health Service Act, Congress used its spending power to create a program that requires drug manufacturers to “offer” to sell their “covered outpatient drugs” to a set of healthcare providers called “covered entities” at a steep discount as a condition of having their drugs covered by Medicare Part B and Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. §§ 256b, 1396r-8(a)(1), (5).

Congress assigned sole responsibility to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to administer this 340B Program “on a_ uniform, nationwide basis.” Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 563 U.S. 110, 120 (2011); see 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(5)(D), (d). The program terms are memorialized in an agreement signed by the HHS Secretary and the participating drug manufacturer. Congress directed HHS to administer a dispute resolution process, which allows covered entities to assert claims that a manufacturer improperly limited their purchases of drugs at the 340B discounted price.

Unlike cooperative federalism programs, Congress assigned states no role. Yet more than twenty states have enacted laws in the last few years mandating that manufacturers who participate in the 340B Program provide 340B-priced drugs on more expansive terms than federal law requires, and face state enforcement actions. Mississippi’s law, H.B. 728, is one of them.

The question presented is:

Whether state laws imposing different and more expansive program terms on drug manufacturers who participate in the federal 340B Program violate the Supremacy Clause?

(i)

In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, the Court held that, where a federal district court has failed to deter- mine whether a party intended to engage in discrimi- nation, federal appellate courts generally may not re- solve that question in the first instance and should in- stead remand. 456 U.S. 273, 291-293 (1982).

The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits hold, consistent with Pullman-Standard, that federal appellate courts may not initially determine whether a peremptory strike was intentionally discriminatory under the third step of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Where a federal district court has failed to make that determination, those circuits therefore hold that “the ultimate Batson issue cannot be resolved without a remand.” United States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2011). The Fifth and Ninth Cir- cuits have taken a different approach. Where a federal district court fails to make an intent determination under step three, they permit the appellate court to “decide de novo” whether the strike was “motivated by purposeful discrimination.” United States v. Alvarez- Ulloa, 784 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 2015).

The question presented is:

May a federal appellate court, after concluding that a federal district court has failed to make neces- sary findings under step three of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), proceed to make those findings in the first instance?

This Court’s decision last Term in Chatrie v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 2193 (2026), reaffirmed that a user does not forfeit his or her Fourth Amendment rights merely by conveying information to a third- party technology company in the ordinary course of using its services: “A cell-phone user is not to be viewed as sharing private information with third par- ties—which then can be freely passed on to the gov- ernment—just by doing the ordinary things cell-phone users do.” Id. at 2214-2215.

The question presented is:

Whether—in light of Chatrie—a user’s agreement to terms of service reserving the service-provider’s right to review a user’s files and disclose them to third parties authorizes a warrantless governmental search of those files.

This case involves the compelled disclosure of a journalist’s confidential source(s) in civil litigation. Most circuits to address the question have held that, in the civil-litigation context, the reporter’s privilege (whether rooted in the First Amendment or Federal Rule of Evidence 501) protects confidential sources from forced disclosure unless a meaningful balancing of the interests favors disclosure. In the decision below, the D.C. Circuit rejected that approach and applied a mechanical, two-factor test under which reporters must always give up their confidential sources to a private civil litigant if (1) the source is central to the litigant’s case and (2) the litigant has exhausted other avenues of discovery. Applying that test, the court ordered Emmy-winning national security reporter Catherine Herridge to provide the name of her confidential counterintelligence source(s) to a former colonel in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in a low-stakes Privacy Act lawsuit against the federal government.

The question presented is:

Whether and in what circumstances civil plaintiffs may compel disclosure of a _ reporter’s confidential sources under the First Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 501.

1. Whether a Government construction contract containing the Differing Site Conditions clause, project-wide subsurface boring logs, drawings depicting construction traffic on the affected bank, and an amended solicitation authorizing barge- based work may be construed to make no representation whatsoever about the physical suitability of the affected bank for the construction operations the project required.

2. Whether the Federal Circuit may reject a Type I differing site condition claim as a matter of contract interpretation by treating the absence of a boring at the precise location of a latent failure as dispositive, notwithstanding evidence that the contract documents, read as a whole, indicated stable conditions suitable for top-of-bank construction operations.

3. Whether, in a Government-drafted construction contract containing ambiguous or incomplete site- condition information, the Government may avoid responsibility under the Differing Site Conditions clause by characterizing its own drawings, traffic designations, and available geotechnical information as nonrepresentative after performance reveals latent subsurface failures.

1

In Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. 568, 146 8. Ct. 926 (2026) (per curiam), this Court left unresolved the constitutional limits on police force against nonviolent civil disobedience. The Second Circuit had held that an officer’s use of significant force against a nonviolent, passively resisting protester violated the Fourth Amendment and that the prohibition was clearly established. This Court reversed without deciding the underlying constitutional question.

The Eighth Circuit decided that question here. It held that an officer acted reasonably in shooting petitioner in the head with pepperballs—resulting in brain injury—because petitioner and his fellow protesters by virtue of their civil disobedience “instigated the need for officer engagement by disobeying officers’ commands.” Pet. App. 6a, 10a. It rested its judgment on the constitutional merits, not qualified immunity.

That holding conflicts with the settled law of other courts of appeals that have held that civil disobedience alone does not justify significant force. The Tenth Circuit recently reaffirmed the opposite rule, holding that it is clearly established that shooting a protester with pepperballs when the protester is committing no crime more serious than a misdemeanor, threatens no one, and is not attempting to flee clearly violates the Fourth Amendment. Epps v. Christian, 173 F.4th 1236, 1242-44 (10th Cir. 2026). This case can resolve the conflict on the merits and give police and protesters the clear constitutional rule that Zorn left unsettled.

The question presented is:

Whether the police may use significant force against a person engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience—who is not suspected of a serious crime, is not threatening anyone, and is neither fleeing nor resisting arrest— because he refuses to obey their commands.

(i)

Since this Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the criminal justice system has struggled with whether a jury must decide the facts needed to order restitution.

In Apprendi, this Court ruled that a jury must decide any fact, other than a prior conviction, necessary to expose a defendant to a punishment beyond that authorized by the guilty verdict alone. This rule applies to financial penalties.

Restitution fits the bill. In Ellingburg v. U.S., 607 U.S. 168 (2026), this Court held that restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act was a criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Arizona’s mandatory restitution scheme carries the same hallmarks as the MVRA.

Yet courts have steadfastly refused to empanel juries for restitution based on two core theories. Under the no-punishment theory, restitution 1s not punishment. Under the no-maximum theory, restitution has no statutory maximum that judicial factfinding can increase. Arizona adopted both.

Neither theory can be squared with this Court’s Sixth Amendment decisions or the history of the Sixth Amendment and restitution.

This petition squarely asks: Does a defendant have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury for restitution decisions?

ia

Whether courts satisfy their obligations under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), Concepcion v. United States, Pepper v. United States, and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5) when they acknowledge decades of rehabilitation, findings that the defendant no

| longer poses a danger to the public, and substantial evidence of a coercive

upbringing and indoctrination involving threats of death, yet continue to treat decades-old offense conduct and offense-era circumstances as controlling. | Barlow v. United States — Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 1 of 38

Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §4B1.1 (Career Offender), a defendant receives an enhanced sentencing range if he “has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” The Guidelines define “controlled substance offense” as “an offense under federal or state law … that—(1) prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” U.S.8.G. §4B1.2(b) (emphasis added). The Guidelines, however, do not define “controlled substance.”

When a federal defendant is subject to this Sentencing (Guidelines enhancement, does the term “controlled substance” refer to substances controlled under federal law, or does it also include substances controlled only under state law?

1

Question 1: Whether the Second Amendment permits an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢g)(1) when that challenge is premised on the non-violent and non-dangerous nature of the defendant’s prior convictions.

Question 2: If as-applied challenges can succeed, what is the standard by which courts should evaluate a person’s prior convictions to determine if those convictions allow Congress to disarm that person under penalty of imprisonment?

1

Jamaal Howard’s prior federal habeas counsel pleaded a claim that he is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for execution under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and then withdrew it before any court adjudicated it, because under the clinical framework then in force her experts could not attribute the adaptive deficits they found to intellectual disability rather than to Howard’s co-occurring mental illness. After Howard’s initial federal habeas proceeding ended, that framework changed. The Fifth Circuit denied Howard authorization to present the claim in a successive petition. The questions presented are:

1. Whether this Court should exercise its original habeas jurisdiction and transfer this petition to the district court for hearing and determination under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b), where Howard makes a substantial showing that he is categorically ineligible for execution.

2. Whether an Atkins claim that was withdrawn by an amended pleading before any court adjudicated it, and that rests on a clinical framework that did not exist when it was withdrawn, was “presented in a prior application” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).

i

For a conviction in a true threats case, the First Amendment requires that the speaker had some subjective understanding that the statement could be interpreted as threatening violence. Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 69 (2023).

Title 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) © prohibits ““threaten[ing] to assault, kidnap, or murder” a qualifying federal official “with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official… or with intent to retaliate against such official… on account of the performance of official duties[.]”

The question presented 1s:

Does a jury finding that a speaker made an objectively threatening statement with the specific intent to impede, intimidate, interfere with, or retaliate against a federal official mean that the jury did not need to also find that the speaker had some subjective understanding that the statement could be understood to threaten violence’?

1