1. Did the US District Court lack jurisdiction to compel arbitration under both the FAA and the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act (exclusive jurisdiction)?

This involves an intra- and inter-Circuit Court split regarding the | Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 916-19 (9th Cir. 2020) FAA

section 1 exemption decision. Two US District Courts deemed Rittmann vy. Amazon.com, Inc. was no longer a valid precedent post Southwest Airlines

Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S. 450 (2022). Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc. now

requires reaffirmation as valid precedent by Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock,

608 U.S. ss (5-28-2026), the Supreme Court decision that occurred

after this case was decided in the Sixth Circuit.

2. Where, when and by whom should challenges to the legality of a contract be | addressed, when arbitration is involved, where ‘gateway’ decisions are | assigned to the Court, where severing of illegal clauses is contractually anticipated? The sub-question is ‘Jf misclassifying workers to thwart the FLSA, would be an illegal unenforceable contract’.

1. Whether the one-time sighting of a criminal suspect at a third party’s home justifies a warrant to search that home for evidence of the non-resident suspect’s alleged crime.

2. Whether a court assessing an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢g)(1) may reject the challenge based on facts—such as the challenger’s parole or probation status—that the statute does not make a basis for disarmament.

1. Whether the state court erred in upholding, contrary to U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), and the Excessive Fines Clause, a mandatory fine pursuant to a statute that does not allow any proportionality considerations?

2. Whether the state court erred in affirming, contrary to the holdings of the supreme courts of other states and the Excessive Fines Clause, fines and surcharges imposed under statutes that do not allow consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay?

3. Whether Petitioner was deprived of his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a trial by a 12-person jury?

This is the question presented in Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623, 2026 WL 1718018 (U.S. June 15, 2026) (granting petition).

1

An appeal waiver in a plea agreement may be set aside if the sentencing hearing was conducted without a minimum of civilized procedure or involved a blatant constitutional violation. Petitioner was sentenced based on factual allegations that were not disclosed before the sentencing hearing. The court of appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal based on the appeal waiver in his plea agreement.

The question presented 1s: Whether the failure to provide adequate notice of the factual basis for a sentence constitutes a miscarriage of justice sufficient to set aside an appeal waiver.

1

Since the Court issued its ruling in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), frontline defense lawyers and prosecutors, along with district courts and courts of appeals, have grappled with how the holding applies to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Is the statute facially invalid? Is it subject to as-applied challenge? If so, how does that challenge work? Criminal defense lawyers and prosecutors have spent hours upon hours litigating these issues. District courts and appellate courts have expended massive amounts of time and energy ruling on these issues. Defense lawyers cannot stop raising the issue because this Court has not given us any final answers. Without answers from this Court, defense lawyers cannot tell clients that challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) 1s frivolous, even if the applicable court of appeals has rejected the argument. So, we must keep filing motions and briefs. We are stuck 1n purgatory, or ground hog day, or whatever metaphor strikes your fancy.

Perhaps the Court needed to flesh out Bruen on lesser used subsections of § 922(¢g) before tackling subsection (g)(1). See United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) (§ 922(g)(8)); United States v. Hemani, 146 8. Ct 1677 (2026) (§ 922(¢)(8)). That’s understandable. But the time has come. We need an answer on § 922(g)(1) and we need it now.

The Question Presented 1s:

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a 1