Whether, under the Due Process Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment and Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Kighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), a State may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporate defendants in product-liability and failure-to-warn actions brought by nonresident plaintiffs when the defendants purposefully used the forum State to package, label, market, and distribute the allegedly defective product nationwide, although the plaintiffs were injured outside the forum State.

As in Skilling, McDonnell, Kelly, and Snyder, the government presses an overbroad reading of an anti-cor- ruption statute. Here, the purported crime is merely helping patients access medically necessary treatment without suffering permanent infertility.

The Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) makes it a felony to willfully “solicit[] or receive[] any remuneration (in- cluding any kickback, bribe, or rebate) * * * in return for purchasing” federally insured goods or services or to “offer[| or pay|] any remuneration * * * to induce” such a purchase. In Hansen, this Court held that “induce” in a criminal statute presumptively carries its criminal-law meaning of “criminal solicitation.” Applying Hansen, the Ninth Circuit held that the term “remuneration * * * to induce” reaches only “wrongful” influence, consistent with the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. Here, the D.C. Cir- cuit joined the Second and Fourth Circuits to read “in- duce” to mean mere “influence,” the standard in the AKN’s civil analog, but did not import the civil statute’s exception for promoting access to healthcare. Despite the resulting absurdity, the court of appeals held that petitioners could face criminal liability under the AKS for conduct that Congress shielded from even civil pen- alties.

The question presented is: Whether “remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) * * * to in- duce” in the criminal AKS means the same as “remuner- ation ** * to influence” in its civil analog, but without any exception for programs that promote “access to care,’ criminalizing conduct Congress expressly pro- tected from civil liability.

(I)

I. Whether Stinson v. United States will accurately state the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?

II. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if 1t 1s facially unconstitutional?

III. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment?

1

1. Whether a criminal defendant may raise an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of any felony offense is an unconstitutional infringement of the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment.

ia

sentence for a defendant who was held liable for a co-conspirator’s use of a

firearm under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). The questions

presented are:

I. Whether a defendant may be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c¢) on Pinkerton liability alone, because a co-conspirator used, carried, or possessed a firearm in a way the defendant could reasonably have foreseen, without proof that the defendant himself had the intent and advance knowledge that Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014), requires for accomplice liability under the same statute?

I. Whether a jury instruction that permits conviction under Pinkerton if “at least one conspirator” committed every element of the offense, without requiring unanimity as to which conspirator or which robbery, violates the Sixth Amendment?

-j-

Time and again this Court has rejected noncumulative and sufficiency-of-the- evidence tests of materiality under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), which the court below applied to deny Petitioner Clarance Goode’s newly discovered due process claims. E.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1995); Glossip v. Oklahoma, 145 8. Ct. 612, 626-27 (2025).

The State built its case against Mr. Goode on testimony from: co-defendant Ronald “Bunny” Thompson, whose deal allowed him to avoid the death penalty by pointing the finger at Mr. Goode; disgraced Tulsa Police Officer Jeff Henderson, a convicted felon about whom the Tenth Circuit has said, “There is no doubt that Henderson was a bad cop[]’; and disgraced Owasso Police Officer Michael Denton, who, like Henderson and unbeknownst to Mr. Goode’s trial counsel, the police department had disciplined for misconduct that included participating in a “cover up” either by “losfing], or intentionally misplac[ing] or destroy[ing]” evidence. Also unbeknownst to trial counsel, within 24 hours of the crime, an informant told Denton that Thompson admitted he “was planning to kill” a witness believed to be at the site of the murders “before the evening of the … homicides.” Yet Denton omitted this information (which would have impeached Denton and directly contradicted Thompson’s trial testimony) from his reports. The State also never informed trial counsel that Henderson had been disciplined for misusing his authority as a police officer, was investigated for entering false information into a probable cause affidavit, and that Denton had likewise been disciplined for official misconduct.

Based on this new suppressed evidence, Mr. Goode timely raised Brady/ Napue claims before the court below which refused to consider the evidence related to Denton; failed to cumulate the prejudice stemming from the totality of the suppressed evidence; applied materiality tests trained on the evidence of guilt; and placed the burden on Mr. Goode to prove prejudice under Napue in contravention of Glossip.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause prohibit a

state that opens its collateral review forum to claims under Brady and Napue from refusing to: (Gi) conduct a cumulative prejudice analysis in assessing the materiality of suppressed evidence; (11) applying materiality standards that are more demanding than required under Brady and Napue; and (111) relieving the state of its burden to prove a Napue violation harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. Whether the State of Oklahoma’s Brady and Napue violations entitle Mr.

Goode to a new trial and/or capital sentencing proceeding. 1

1. Whether a general appeal waiver that does not mention the right to challenge the consecutive nature of a sentence bars such a challenge.

2. Whether a “clear and nonharmless” error in calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range may constitute a miscarriage of justice sufficient to Overcome an appeal waiver.

1

The Court applied its decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Chevron Deference”) for forty years before

finally addressing, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024),

whether Chevron Deference was illegal, and holding it was. Similarly, for the past

thirty years, the Court has applied AEDPA’s 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)’s requirement of deference to state court decisions dozens of times without addressing whether

§2254(d)(1) violates Article III of the Constitution and/or the Separation of Powers

Doctrine. The statute strips the federal courts of their independent authority to

declare and apply the law (and to remedy a constitutional violation). As the Court

recently did in the context of Chevron Deference, the Court should finally address whether AEDPA Deference (§2254(d)(1)) is unconstitutional.

Federal habeas comprises a fair portion of the federal court dockets. Since Loper

Bright, litigation over §2254(d)(1)’s unconstitutionality has steadily increased and

will continue to do so until the Court decides the matter. Sanders’s Petition

presents an ideal vehicle through which to resolve the issue. Whether §2254(d)(1) is unconstitutional was fully developed below, with the Department of Justice intervening. That culminated in a 2—1 detailed decision as to whether §2254(d)(1) is unconstitutional. That matters here. The Sixth Circuit majority believed

§2254(d)(1) required disregarding all cases decided after the state court decision

and construed clearly established law so narrowly that it may conflict with Andrew

v. White, 604 U.S. 86 (2025). That led to claims being rejected that very well may

have prevailed without §2254(d)(1). The questions presented are as follows:

I. Does 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) violate either Article III of the United States Constitution or the Separation of Powers Doctrine (or both)?

IT. Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1), do the Court’s holdings that post-date a state court’s adjudication of a constitutional claim constitute “clearly established law,” if that holding does not create new law, as the Court’s previous reliance on such cases implies?

III. Does Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), provide a minimum level of expert assistance an attorney must ensure to provide effective assistance of counsel or is only an indigent defendant entitled to those protections?

IV. Is ajury instruction unconstitutional under Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990), if the jury applied an erroneous instruction or higher standard proof than the law permits, or only if the instruction prevented consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence?