This Court held that state law creates and defines property interests in bankruptcy, so that no party receives “a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.” Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). A creditor’s claim must also reflect its right to payment under nonbankruptcy law. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 448, 450 (2007). Only the holder of a right to payment may assert it, and the claimant bears the burden of proof. Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000).

Prepetition, a creditor assigned “all right, title and interest” in a ground lease to a third party, keeping only a right to rent through a date certain. Yet, the creditor filed a proof of claim as “lessor” for rejection damages measured by the remaining 24-year term. The courts below allowed the full § 502(b)(6) cap, holding that 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) accelerated all future rents, including rents that, under the assignment and state law, belonged to the transferee. That holding conflicts with Butner and Travelers and departs from Fourth and Sixth Circuit precedent measuring a lessor’s claim under state law before applying the cap. The question presented is:

Whether 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) determines whether an assignor or assignee of a commercial real-property lease has standing to assert a claim for lease rejection damages, and in what amount under § 502(b)(6), or whether those questions must be determined by state law and the parties’ assignment pursuant to § 502(b)(1), Butner, and Travelers.

petitioner’s sentence has been fully served, an issue this Court has not resolved and on which the courts of appeals are divided.

2.Whether 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a)(4)(A) authorizes the Internal Revenue Service to assess and collect criminal restitution for a tax-related offense under Title 18 as an avenue independent of the sentencing court’s restitution order — and, if so, whether a restitution order calculated without accounting for that independent assessment authority may result in duplicative recovery for the same tax loss, in light of the Seventh Circuit’s intervening decision in Daugerdas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 25-1055 (7th Cir. Mar. 30, 2026), which conflicts with the premise underlying the decision below.

1. Does the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution permit an officer at a homicide crime scene to take control of all substantial evidence (here, including one of the two handguns fired at the scene), or 1s the evidence that may be seized limited to evidence against a person for whom the officer has established probable cause of commission of a crime?

2. Does a person who comes to a closed shooting homicide investigation scene and takes possession of one of the two guns at that scene have a reasonable expectation of privacy barring the investigator from taking that gun?

A claim for relief under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1968), has three components: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it 1s exculpatory or because it 1s impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1999).

The question presented 1s:

Does the precedent set by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court below wrongly limit “favorable” evidence under Brady to that which definitively proves an exculpatory fact?