The questions presented are: (a) whether the Immigration and Nationality Act deprives federal courts of jurisdiction in habeas corpus to review the executive’s actions to punish and retaliate against a noncitizen through detention and _ removal proceedings, in circumstances where _ the administrative petition-for-review process could not offer meaningful review of “now or never” claims brought under the First and Fifth Amendments, and if so (b) whether that deprivation of habeas jurisdiction violates the Constitution as applied to Petitioner.

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Whether Petitioner was deprived of his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a trial by a twelve-person jury when he was charged with, and convicted of, serious felony offenses carrying sentences of up to life imprisonment by a jury of six.

This Court has already granted certiorari on the identical question in Kian v. Florida, No. 25-6623 (cert. granted June 15, 2026). This petition should be held pending the disposition of Kian and then disposed of as appropriate in light of that decision.

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Since the Court issued its ruling in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), frontline defense lawyers and prosecutors, along with district courts, and courts of appeals, have grappled with how the holding applies to § 922(¢)(1). Is the statute facially invalid? Is 1t subject to as-applied challenge? If so, how does that challenge work? Criminal defense lawyers and prosecutors have spent hours upon hours litigating these issues. District courts and appellate courts have expended massive amounts of time and energy ruling on these issues. Defense lawyers cannot stop raising the issue because this Court has not given us any final answers. Without answers from this Court, defense lawyers cannot tell clients that challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is frivolous, even if the applicable court of appeals has rejected the argument. So, we must keep filing motions. We are stuck in purgatory, or ground hog day, or whatever metaphor strikes your fancy.

Perhaps the Court needed to flesh out Bruen on lesser used subsections of § 922(¢g) before tackling subsection (g)(1). United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) (§ 922(¢)(8)); United States v. Hemani, 146 8. Ct.1677 (2026) (§ 922(g¢)(8)). That’s understandable. But the time has come. We need an answer on § 922(g)(1) and we need it now.

The Question Presented 1s:

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits

anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year’ from possessing a firearm, violates the

Second Amendment as applied to Petitioner, based solely on a decade

old nonviolent drug distribution conviction.

Whether a sentence appeal waiver provision contained in a plea agreement clearly precludes the defendant from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel on direct appeal?

If so, whether the waiver creates a clear conflict of interest between a defendant and his counsel such that the district court 1s required to inquire into the conflict before accepting the plea agreement?

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