Petitions and applications docketed on November 06, 2026
type Caption Docket No Court Below Petitioner's Counsel Counsel's Address Recent Filings QP
paid Roy J. Meidinger, Sr.

v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

26-598 District of Columbia Circuit, No. 22-1239

Judgment: July 08, 2025

Roy Meidinger 14893 American Eagle Court Fort Myers, FL 33912 NA
paid National Park Service

v.

National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States

26-599 District of Columbia Circuit, No. 26-5123

Judgment: August 07, 2026

D. John Sauer Solicitor General United States Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001 [Petition] NA
paid Arentz Family, LP

v.

PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC

26-600 Fourth Circuit, No. 25-1730

Judgment: August 06, 2026

Aaron Scott Newell Pacific Legal Foundation 3100 Clarendon Blvd., Suite 1000 Arlington, VA 22201 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTION PRESENTED

An owner’s right to keep others out 1s “universally held to be a fundamental element” of private property. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 1779-80 (1979). A Maryland statute carves out an exception to this longstanding and traditional right to exclude, permitting those who act for the State, or for an entity “having the power of eminent domain,” to enter and occupy private property to conduct studies and surveys to determine if the land is suitable for acquisition for a public use. Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 12-11l(a). Respondent PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC, a private, for-profit developer of high-voltage corridor projects, has not been delegated the power of eminent domain. But claiming to exercise rights under this statute, PSEG sued Petitioners—landowners who had _ declined its demands to enter their properties—and invoked the federal courts’ equitable powers to compel them to step aside. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction requiring Petitioners to allow PSEG to enter their land. The court held that even though PSEG presently lacks the actual authority needed to gain entry, it was nonetheless entitled to do so because it had likely been delegated that power. The Fourth Circuit created a three-way split on whether preliminary injunctions can allow private parties to exercise eminent domain powers prior to final judgment. The question presented:

Whether a preliminary injunction may be used to allow a private party to exercise sovereign eminent domain powers before it has been delegated that authority?

ifp Paul M. Poupart

v.

Louisiana

26-6078 Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit, No. 25-CA-102

Judgment: September 24, 2025

Paul Poupart 357073 6925 Highway 74, Unit 2, Fox 3C-92 St. Gabriel, LA 70776 NA
ifp Francisco Balderrama

v.

United States

26-6079 Fifth Circuit, No. 24-50343

Judgment: July 15, 2026

Francisco Balderrama #27085-180 FCI Yazoo City Medium P.O. Box 5000 Yazoo City, MS 39194 NA
ifp Marcus D. Smith

v.

Northwest Motorsport, Inc.

26-6080 Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2, No. 60047-1-II

Judgment: October 14, 2025

Marcus D. Smith 16825 163rd Place SE Renton, WA 98058 [Main Document] [Petition] NA
ifp David Roger Franklin

v.

United States

26-6081 Ninth Circuit, No. 25-1208

Judgment: May 29, 2026

Molly Marie Winston Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 900 Spokane, WA 99203 [Main Document] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQuestion Presented

Pending state charges at federal sentencing trigger a nuanced predicament for defendants facing federal prison: challenge the allegations at federal sentencing or retain due process rights at the state trial. This Court deferred to the U.S. Sentencing Commission to rectify a similar issue related to acquitted conduct, but the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s changes were silent as to the extent a district court may consider and make findings on pending charges that impact a federal sentencing decision.

Mr. Franklin was denied the opportunity to both rebut allegations made against him at his federal sentencing hearing and preserve the rights he should have retained for a jury trial on his state charges. The district court found that Mr. Franklin “most likely” committed the hands-on offenses charged in a pending state case and imposed the statutory maximum for his federal child pornography convictions accordingly. The Ninth Circuit held that due process was satisfied because the untried allegations were “consistent with” the offenses of conviction and therefore supported by a “minimal indicila] of reliability beyond mere allegation.”

The question presented is whether due process permits a federal sentencing court to make a finding that a pending charge “most likely” occurred and consider that finding as part of its sentence determination, even when the defendant has neither admitted that conduct nor been able to fairly contest the allegations.

-ii-

ifp Joshua DeAnthony Woodson

v.

United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

26-6082 Fifth Circuit, No. 26-20208

Judgment: July 30, 2026

Joshua DeAnthony Woodson 16518 Pentonshire Lane Houston, TX 77090 [Petition] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the Fifth Circuit's denial of mandamus—on the ground that Petitioner should first seek relief from the district judge—constitutes a denial of the . constitutional right of access to courts, when the district judge has been barred by a filing injunction from receiving any filings from Petitioner, rendering that remedy structurally impossible and illusory. 2. Whether a magistrate judge's sua sponte imposition of a blanket filing injunction, without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard, violates the procedural due process requirements established by the Fifth Circuit in Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191 (Sth Cir. 1993), and conflicts with the approach of the D.C. Circuit, which has vacated overly broad filing restrictions. 3. Whether the appearance of bias created by the magistrate judge's conduct— including the rejection of twenty of Petitioner's twenty-seven filings before the hearing, the mockery of his sworn evidence as "Whack-A-Mole," the disparate treatment of a compliant pro se litigant versus non-compliant represented parties, and the unequal access to the hearing itself—requires recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), and whether the district judge's failure to act on Petitioner's direct pleas for recusal and intervention for over seven months also requires recusal and reassignment. 4. Whether the court's refusal to produce the native Zoom video and ERO audio recording—when the written transcript is materially incomplete and sanitized— violates Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e)(2) and the right to meaningful appellate review. , 5. Whether the district court's denial of e-filing access and its unexplained labeling of Petitioner as a "security risk"—while represented parties received 24/7 electronic access—constitutes a wealth-based and status-based denial of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. XN 1
ifp Jesse Dean Beebout

v.

Virginia

26-6083 Supreme Court of Virginia, No. 250474

Judgment: November 18, 2025

Jesse Dean Beebout #2148558 VADOC Centralized Mail Distribution Ctr. 3521 Woods Way State Farm, VA 23160 NA
ifp Ruben Casillas Brito

v.

Edward Coday, Warden

26-6084 Ninth Circuit, No. 25-5476

Judgment: February 25, 2026

Ruben Casillas Brito #313183 7064 S. Lindy Drive Tucson, AZ 85756 NA
ifp Malik K. Marshall

v.

United States

26-6085 Eighth Circuit, No. 25-3141

Judgment: August 05, 2026

James Nelsen Stowers & Nelsen PLC 650 S. Prairie View Drive, Suite 130 West Des Moines, IA 50266 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTIONS PRESENTED
  1. Whether Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) still correctly states the rule for the deference that courts must give the commentary in the Sentencing Guidelines.

  2. Whether under the version of USSG §2B1.1(b)(1) effective at the time of the offense conduct in this matter and before November 1, 2024, the term “loss” means only actual loss or includes intended loss.

i

ifp Chevon Grant

v.

United States

26-6086 Second Circuit, No. 25-1699

Judgment: June 29, 2026

Robert J. Sullivan Law Offices of Robert Sullivan 2220 Park Avenue Bridgeport, CT 06604 [Petition] NA
ifp Darrell L. Whitman

v.

United States District Court for the District of Colorado

26-6087 Tenth Circuit, No. 26-1094

Judgment: April 06, 2026

Darrell L. Whitman 320 S. 70th Street Unit 25 Mesa, AZ 85208 NA
ifp O. C. Rawls

v.

United States

26-6088 Eighth Circuit, No. 25-3332

Judgment: April 22, 2026

O. C. Rawls #23632-009 FCI Yazoo PO Box 5000 Yazoo City, MS 39194 NA
ifp Missouri, ex rel. Zachary A. Smith

v.

Kelly Morriss, Warden

26-6089 Supreme Court of Missouri, No. SC101662

Judgment: July 07, 2026

Zachary A. Smith #521163 Jefferson City Correctional Center 8200 No More Victims Road Jefferson City, MO 65101 NA
ifp Kevin Deon Brazier

v.

Cynthia Rojas, Acting Warden

26-6090 Ninth Circuit, No. 25-4885

Judgment: January 30, 2026

Kevin Brazier #G61461 CTF - Soledad P.O. Box 705 Soledad, CA 93960 NA
ifp John Matthew Chapman

v.

United States

26-6091 Ninth Circuit, No. 24-4939

Judgment: August 05, 2026

Jeremy Charles Baron Federal Public Defender, District of Nevada 411 E. Bonneville Ave. Suite 250 Las Vegas, NV 89104 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQuestion Presented

The federal kidnapping statute has two primary elements. First, the defendant must use an identified “means” to conduct the kidnapping. This element is satisfied when a person “seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away avictim. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). Two of those “means’—inveiglement and decoy—signify the use of deception to induce a victim’s movement. Second, the defendant must separately “hold[]” the victim, id., by applying “an unlawful physical or mental restraint,” Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460 (1946). The circuit courts of appeals are deeply divided about how these elements interact in an inveiglement case—specifically, whether and when deception may amount to holding—and have formed a 1-2-2 split over the issue.

The question presented 1s:

In a kidnapping case involving inveiglement, may the government prove the holding element merely by establishing the defendant used deception to induce the victim’s movement?

1

ifp In Re Michael McAfee 26-6092 NA, No. —

Judgment: —

Michael McAfee SECC HU6B216 300 E. Pedro Simmons Dr. Charleston, MO 63834 NA
app Andrew Lamont Brown

v.

Chance Andes, Warden

26A654 Ninth Circuit, No. 21-99001

Judgment: —

Nicole Jeong Office of the Federal Public Defender - CDCA 321 East 2nd Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 [Main Document] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] NA
app M. P.

v.

Arizona Department of Child Safety

26A655 Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division Two, No. 2 CA-JV 2024-0093, 2 CA-JV 2024-0094

Judgment: —

Abigail Frisch Vice Ashurst Perkins Coie US LLP 700 13th Street, N.W. Suite 800 Washington, DC 20006 [Main Document] NA
app Melchor Magdaleno-Garcia

v.

Texas

26A656 Court of Appeals of Texas, Seventh District, No. 07-24-00166-CR

Judgment: —

Melchor M. Garcia #02504573 Texas Department of Criminal Justice 3899 Hwy 98 New Boston, TX 75570 NA
app Paul Schultz

v.

Kevin McCarthy

26A657 Fourth Circuit, No. 26-2406

Judgment: —

Paul David Schultz 18436 Kapalua Terrace Leesburg, VA 20176 [Main Document] NA
app Paul Schultz

v.

H. Jason Gold

26A658 United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 10th Circuit, No. 26-2404

Judgment: —

Paul David Schultz 18436 Kapalua Terrace Leesburg, VA 20176 [Main Document] NA
app Kevin Duden

v.

Washington

26A659 Ninth Circuit, No. 25-724

Judgment: —

Kevin Duden 1025 Greencreek Rd Greencreek, ID 83533 [Main Document] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] NA
app Jonathan D. Carr

v.

Kansas

26A660 Supreme Court of Kansas, No. 127,774

Judgment: —

Mark Henricksen Henricksen & Henricksen 2915 N. Classen Boulevard Suite 215 Oklahoma City, OK 73106 [Main Document] [Main Document] [Main Document] NA