| Petitions and applications docketed on November 06, 2026 | |||||||
| type | Caption | Docket No | Court Below | Petitioner's Counsel | Counsel's Address | Recent Filings | QP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| paid | Roy J. Meidinger, Sr.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue |
26-598 | District of Columbia Circuit, No. 22-1239
Judgment: July 08, 2025 |
Roy Meidinger | 14893 American Eagle Court Fort Myers, FL 33912 | NA | |
| paid | National Park Service
v. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States |
26-599 | District of Columbia Circuit, No. 26-5123
Judgment: August 07, 2026 |
D. John Sauer | Solicitor General United States Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001 | [Petition] | NA |
| paid | Arentz Family, LP
v. PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC |
26-600 | Fourth Circuit, No. 25-1730
Judgment: August 06, 2026 |
Aaron Scott Newell | Pacific Legal Foundation 3100 Clarendon Blvd., Suite 1000 Arlington, VA 22201 | [Petition] [Appendix] | Question(s) presentedQUESTION PRESENTEDAn owner’s right to keep others out 1s “universally held to be a fundamental element” of private property. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 1779-80 (1979). A Maryland statute carves out an exception to this longstanding and traditional right to exclude, permitting those who act for the State, or for an entity “having the power of eminent domain,” to enter and occupy private property to conduct studies and surveys to determine if the land is suitable for acquisition for a public use. Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 12-11l(a). Respondent PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC, a private, for-profit developer of high-voltage corridor projects, has not been delegated the power of eminent domain. But claiming to exercise rights under this statute, PSEG sued Petitioners—landowners who had _ declined its demands to enter their properties—and invoked the federal courts’ equitable powers to compel them to step aside. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction requiring Petitioners to allow PSEG to enter their land. The court held that even though PSEG presently lacks the actual authority needed to gain entry, it was nonetheless entitled to do so because it had likely been delegated that power. The Fourth Circuit created a three-way split on whether preliminary injunctions can allow private parties to exercise eminent domain powers prior to final judgment. The question presented: Whether a preliminary injunction may be used to allow a private party to exercise sovereign eminent domain powers before it has been delegated that authority? |
| ifp | Paul M. Poupart
v. Louisiana |
26-6078 | Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit, No. 25-CA-102
Judgment: September 24, 2025 |
Paul Poupart | 357073 6925 Highway 74, Unit 2, Fox 3C-92 St. Gabriel, LA 70776 | NA | |
| ifp | Francisco Balderrama
v. United States |
26-6079 | Fifth Circuit, No. 24-50343
Judgment: July 15, 2026 |
Francisco Balderrama | #27085-180 FCI Yazoo City Medium P.O. Box 5000 Yazoo City, MS 39194 | NA | |
| ifp | Marcus D. Smith
v. Northwest Motorsport, Inc. |
26-6080 | Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2, No. 60047-1-II
Judgment: October 14, 2025 |
Marcus D. Smith | 16825 163rd Place SE Renton, WA 98058 | [Main Document] [Petition] | NA |
| ifp | David Roger Franklin
v. United States |
26-6081 | Ninth Circuit, No. 25-1208
Judgment: May 29, 2026 |
Molly Marie Winston | Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 900 Spokane, WA 99203 | [Main Document] [Petition] [Appendix] | Question(s) presentedQuestion PresentedPending state charges at federal sentencing trigger a nuanced predicament for defendants facing federal prison: challenge the allegations at federal sentencing or retain due process rights at the state trial. This Court deferred to the U.S. Sentencing Commission to rectify a similar issue related to acquitted conduct, but the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s changes were silent as to the extent a district court may consider and make findings on pending charges that impact a federal sentencing decision. Mr. Franklin was denied the opportunity to both rebut allegations made against him at his federal sentencing hearing and preserve the rights he should have retained for a jury trial on his state charges. The district court found that Mr. Franklin “most likely” committed the hands-on offenses charged in a pending state case and imposed the statutory maximum for his federal child pornography convictions accordingly. The Ninth Circuit held that due process was satisfied because the untried allegations were “consistent with” the offenses of conviction and therefore supported by a “minimal indicila] of reliability beyond mere allegation.” The question presented is whether due process permits a federal sentencing court to make a finding that a pending charge “most likely” occurred and consider that finding as part of its sentence determination, even when the defendant has neither admitted that conduct nor been able to fairly contest the allegations. -ii- |
| ifp | Joshua DeAnthony Woodson
v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas |
26-6082 | Fifth Circuit, No. 26-20208
Judgment: July 30, 2026 |
Joshua DeAnthony Woodson | 16518 Pentonshire Lane Houston, TX 77090 | [Petition] [Petition] [Appendix] | Question(s) presentedQUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the Fifth Circuit's denial of mandamus—on the ground that Petitioner should first seek relief from the district judge—constitutes a denial of the . constitutional right of access to courts, when the district judge has been barred by a filing injunction from receiving any filings from Petitioner, rendering that remedy structurally impossible and illusory. 2. Whether a magistrate judge's sua sponte imposition of a blanket filing injunction, without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard, violates the procedural due process requirements established by the Fifth Circuit in Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191 (Sth Cir. 1993), and conflicts with the approach of the D.C. Circuit, which has vacated overly broad filing restrictions. 3. Whether the appearance of bias created by the magistrate judge's conduct— including the rejection of twenty of Petitioner's twenty-seven filings before the hearing, the mockery of his sworn evidence as "Whack-A-Mole," the disparate treatment of a compliant pro se litigant versus non-compliant represented parties, and the unequal access to the hearing itself—requires recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), and whether the district judge's failure to act on Petitioner's direct pleas for recusal and intervention for over seven months also requires recusal and reassignment. 4. Whether the court's refusal to produce the native Zoom video and ERO audio recording—when the written transcript is materially incomplete and sanitized— violates Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e)(2) and the right to meaningful appellate review. , 5. Whether the district court's denial of e-filing access and its unexplained labeling of Petitioner as a "security risk"—while represented parties received 24/7 electronic access—constitutes a wealth-based and status-based denial of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. XN 1 |
| ifp | Jesse Dean Beebout
v. Virginia |
26-6083 | Supreme Court of Virginia, No. 250474
Judgment: November 18, 2025 |
Jesse Dean Beebout | #2148558 VADOC Centralized Mail Distribution Ctr. 3521 Woods Way State Farm, VA 23160 | NA | |
| ifp | Ruben Casillas Brito
v. Edward Coday, Warden |
26-6084 | Ninth Circuit, No. 25-5476
Judgment: February 25, 2026 |
Ruben Casillas Brito | #313183 7064 S. Lindy Drive Tucson, AZ 85756 | NA | |
| ifp | Malik K. Marshall
v. United States |
26-6085 | Eighth Circuit, No. 25-3141
Judgment: August 05, 2026 |
James Nelsen | Stowers & Nelsen PLC 650 S. Prairie View Drive, Suite 130 West Des Moines, IA 50266 | [Petition] [Appendix] | Question(s) presentedQUESTIONS PRESENTED
i |
| ifp | Chevon Grant
v. United States |
26-6086 | Second Circuit, No. 25-1699
Judgment: June 29, 2026 |
Robert J. Sullivan | Law Offices of Robert Sullivan 2220 Park Avenue Bridgeport, CT 06604 | [Petition] | NA |
| ifp | Darrell L. Whitman
v. United States District Court for the District of Colorado |
26-6087 | Tenth Circuit, No. 26-1094
Judgment: April 06, 2026 |
Darrell L. Whitman | 320 S. 70th Street Unit 25 Mesa, AZ 85208 | NA | |
| ifp | O. C. Rawls
v. United States |
26-6088 | Eighth Circuit, No. 25-3332
Judgment: April 22, 2026 |
O. C. Rawls | #23632-009 FCI Yazoo PO Box 5000 Yazoo City, MS 39194 | NA | |
| ifp | Missouri, ex rel. Zachary A. Smith
v. Kelly Morriss, Warden |
26-6089 | Supreme Court of Missouri, No. SC101662
Judgment: July 07, 2026 |
Zachary A. Smith | #521163 Jefferson City Correctional Center 8200 No More Victims Road Jefferson City, MO 65101 | NA | |
| ifp | Kevin Deon Brazier
v. Cynthia Rojas, Acting Warden |
26-6090 | Ninth Circuit, No. 25-4885
Judgment: January 30, 2026 |
Kevin Brazier | #G61461 CTF - Soledad P.O. Box 705 Soledad, CA 93960 | NA | |
| ifp | John Matthew Chapman
v. United States |
26-6091 | Ninth Circuit, No. 24-4939
Judgment: August 05, 2026 |
Jeremy Charles Baron | Federal Public Defender, District of Nevada 411 E. Bonneville Ave. Suite 250 Las Vegas, NV 89104 | [Petition] [Appendix] | Question(s) presentedQuestion PresentedThe federal kidnapping statute has two primary elements. First, the defendant must use an identified “means” to conduct the kidnapping. This element is satisfied when a person “seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away avictim. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). Two of those “means’—inveiglement and decoy—signify the use of deception to induce a victim’s movement. Second, the defendant must separately “hold[]” the victim, id., by applying “an unlawful physical or mental restraint,” Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460 (1946). The circuit courts of appeals are deeply divided about how these elements interact in an inveiglement case—specifically, whether and when deception may amount to holding—and have formed a 1-2-2 split over the issue. The question presented 1s: In a kidnapping case involving inveiglement, may the government prove the holding element merely by establishing the defendant used deception to induce the victim’s movement? 1 |
| ifp | In Re Michael McAfee | 26-6092 | NA, No. —
Judgment: — |
Michael McAfee | SECC HU6B216 300 E. Pedro Simmons Dr. Charleston, MO 63834 | NA | |
| app | Andrew Lamont Brown
v. Chance Andes, Warden |
26A654 | Ninth Circuit, No. 21-99001
Judgment: — |
Nicole Jeong | Office of the Federal Public Defender - CDCA 321 East 2nd Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 | [Main Document] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] | NA |
| app | M. P.
v. Arizona Department of Child Safety |
26A655 | Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division Two, No. 2 CA-JV 2024-0093, 2 CA-JV 2024-0094
Judgment: — |
Abigail Frisch Vice | Ashurst Perkins Coie US LLP 700 13th Street, N.W. Suite 800 Washington, DC 20006 | [Main Document] | NA |
| app | Melchor Magdaleno-Garcia
v. Texas |
26A656 | Court of Appeals of Texas, Seventh District, No. 07-24-00166-CR
Judgment: — |
Melchor M. Garcia | #02504573 Texas Department of Criminal Justice 3899 Hwy 98 New Boston, TX 75570 | NA | |
| app | Paul Schultz
v. Kevin McCarthy |
26A657 | Fourth Circuit, No. 26-2406
Judgment: — |
Paul David Schultz | 18436 Kapalua Terrace Leesburg, VA 20176 | [Main Document] | NA |
| app | Paul Schultz
v. H. Jason Gold |
26A658 | United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 10th Circuit, No. 26-2404
Judgment: — |
Paul David Schultz | 18436 Kapalua Terrace Leesburg, VA 20176 | [Main Document] | NA |
| app | Kevin Duden
v. Washington |
26A659 | Ninth Circuit, No. 25-724
Judgment: — |
Kevin Duden | 1025 Greencreek Rd Greencreek, ID 83533 | [Main Document] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] | NA |
| app | Jonathan D. Carr
v. Kansas |
26A660 | Supreme Court of Kansas, No. 127,774
Judgment: — |
Mark Henricksen | Henricksen & Henricksen 2915 N. Classen Boulevard Suite 215 Oklahoma City, OK 73106 | [Main Document] [Main Document] [Main Document] | NA |