Petitions and applications docketed on November 09, 2026
type Caption Docket No Court Below Petitioner's Counsel Counsel's Address Recent Filings QP
paid NP Red Rock LLC, d/b/a Red Rock Casino Resort Spa

v.

National Labor Relations Board

26-601 District of Columbia Circuit, No. 24-1221, 24-1239, 24-1240

Judgment: August 24, 2026

David Richard Dorey Fisher & Phillips LLP 1401 New York Avenue, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 [Main Document] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] [Petition] NA
paid Palanikumar V. Gnanam, et ux.

v.

Nathaniel Chibuzor Keita

26-602 District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, No. 5D2024-2417

Judgment: August 12, 2025

Palanikumar Gnanam 10597 Creston Glen Cir. E. Jacksonville, FL 32256 [Main Document] [Written Request] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented1 _ QUESTIONS PRESENTED | The underlying state court proceedings, including appellate review, took place during the pendency of | Chapter 7 Bankruptcy filing by the Respondent, Na- thaniel Chibuzor Keita, which was concealed from - the Petitioners and the state courts, resulting in the entry and enforcement of a judgment in violation of federal law. 1. Does the Supremacy Clause permit a state court to avoid the self-executing effect of a Fed- eral Bankruptcy Discharge by ruling that federal filings are not "automatically impugned" to state | . proceedings? (Appendix T-2-B, 165a). — 2. Whether a state court violates the Supremacy - Clause and the "no fair ground of doubt" standard established in Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 _. U.S. 554, 561 (2019), by refusing to vacate judg- ments rendered in undisputed violation of the federal automatic stay, and permitting enforce- _ ment of a judgment concealed from the bank- | ruptcy court, based on a determination that fed- eral bankruptcy law is "inapplicable" to state . court proceedings. (Appendices C, 14a; T-1-A, ~ 154a). . 3. Whether the "objective reasonableness" standard for civil contempt established in TJag- gart, 587 U.S. at 561, 1s defeated when a party commits fraud on the court by maintaining con- tradictory evidence across jurisdictions — dis- missed by the trial court as merely saying differ- ent things in different courts — to enforce a judg- ment rendered in undisputed violation of the fed- eral automatic stay. (Appendices I, 63a; T-1-D, 157a; T-1-B, 156a; T-3, 170a).
paid Mark D. Davis

v.

James DiStefano

26-603 Eleventh Circuit, No. 25-11743

Judgment: March 24, 2026

Mark D. Davis 569 County Road 281 Florence, AL 35633 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedh QUESTIONS PRESENTED : : Petitioner was arrested in his home on a warrant | for a misdemeanor. The warrant application was a | form complaint whose only factual content was an in- | | corporated printout from the sheriffs records system, | which the district court found “did not appear sworn, | | | signed, or notarized.” In petitioner’s action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court of appeals sustained the war- _ rant by reviewing the application together with “the | broader pool of information known or available” to the officer, including deposition testimony given years | later and photographs taken the day after the war- : rant issued. It also held that facts the officer knew and : omitted from the application were immaterial because | | _ they related only to petitioner’s “intent and justifica- | | tion.” The questions presented are: | 1. Whether, in a Fourth Amendment action chal- | 7 lenging an arrest made in the home under a warrant, : | a court may sustain the warrant on information the af- | fiant possessed but did not present to the magistrate, | or that did not exist when the warrant issued. : 2. Whether facts known to a warrant affant that | bear on the mental-state element of the charged of- : _ fense may be disregarded as “defenses” in the materi- ality inquiry required by Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). |
paid Daniel Samuel Eta

v.

United States

26-604 Seventh Circuit, No. 25-1891

Judgment: July 06, 2026

Brendan Daniel Duffy Jones Day 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 [Main Document] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented1 QUESTION PRESENTED

In Riley v. California, this Court held that even though no warrant is generally required for searches incident to arrest, police nevertheless must “get a warrant’ before searching the cell phone of a person they arrest. 573 U.S. 3738, 403 (2014). The Court explained that a warrant exception cannot be stretched beyond the reasons it exists, and that allowing the search of an arrested person’s phone would “untether’ the exception “from the justifications underlying’ it. Id. at 386-92.

This case concerns the warrantless search of a cell phone under the “border-search exception.” That exception rests on_ specific historical purposes: enforcing customs laws, intercepting contraband, and regulating border entry. This Court has never decided whether, or when, the exception allows searching a phone without a warrant. The courts of appeals are deeply divided. One circuit allows such searches only to look for contraband. Two require at least a border- related justification. Six require no justification at all, allowing any phone to be searched at the border for any reason or for no reason. Below, the Seventh Circuit confirmed its place in the last group. It upheld a warrantless border search of a phone even though the government conceded it had no justification tied to customs, contraband, or admissibility.

The question presented 1s:

Whether the Fourth Amendment allows a traveler’s phone to be searched at the border without a warrant or any justification tied to the historical purposes of detecting contraband, enforcing customs laws, or determining admissibility.

paid Wilmore Lee Washington, III

v.

Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury

26-605 Ninth Circuit, No. 23-3693

Judgment: May 12, 2026

Wilmore Washington III Rua Correia Teles, 28A 1350100 Lisbon, Portugal, XX XXXXX [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented| 1 QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether, under Title VII’s cat’s-paw doctrine, | a plaintiff may establish causation where a second- line supervisor with established discriminatory animus initiates or influences a course of performance scrutiny | and adverse evaluations that culminates in an adverse employment action, even though other managers part- icipate in the intermediate employment decisions? 2. Whether, under Title VII, can an employer : may be held liable under the cat’s-paw theory when a second-line supervisor acting with discriminatory or retaliatory animus influenced the adverse employment action but was not the ultimate decisionmaker? : 3. Did the Ninth Circuit err by failing to adhere to its established legal framework, as articulated in Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), and T.W. Electrical Service, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Association, 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1987), by improperly weighing evidence and not viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party at the summary judgment stage, thereby contradicting the principles governing the assessment of genuine issues of material fact?
paid Richard Alan Kucera

v.

United States

26-606 Eighth Circuit, No. 25-3180

Judgment: August 13, 2026

Justin Lee Bell May, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson, LLP PO Box 160 503 S. Pierre St. Pierre, SD 57501 [Petition] NA
paid KC Transport, Inc.

v.

Keith Sonderling, Acting Secretary of Labor

26-607 District of Columbia Circuit, No. 22-1071

Judgment: April 17, 2026

Aditya Dynar Pacific Legal Foundation 3100 Clarendon Blvd. Ste. 1000 Arlington, VA 22201 [Main Document] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented1 QUESTION PRESENTED

KC Transport, Inc., 1s a small-town transport company that hauls gravel, sand, coal, and other materials for businesses around Emmett, West Virginia. In 2019, an inspector of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) showed up, for the first time ever, at KC’s parking lot in Emmett where KC sometimes repairs trucks, some of which occasionally haul coal. He observed two trucks undergoing repairs and concluded that such work violated an MSHA rule, issued under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, requiring equipment to be “blocked against motion” when being repaired. 30 C.F.R. § 77.404. He therefore issued to KC two penalty citations. KC then administratively contested the citations, arguing among other things that neither the Emmett facility nor trucks repaired thereon constitute a “coal or other mine” within the meaning of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1).

Ultimately, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission agreed with KC. MSHA then sought review in the D.C. Circuit, which sided with the agency. The panel majority held—in conflict with the Sixth Circuit and other courts of appeals—that a facility ike KC’s that is not actually located at a coal (or other mineral) extraction, milling, or preparation site can nevertheless qualify as a regulable “mine” so long as the facility 1s, in some vague and undefined way, necessarily connected” with mining.

The question presented is:

Whether a truck-repair facility that is not located at an extraction, milling, or preparation site 1s a “coal or other mine” under 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1).

paid Micah Stubbs

v.

April Stubbs

26-608 Court of Appeal of California, Sixth Appellate District, No. H051518

Judgment: November 14, 2025

Micah Stubbs 440 N. Barranca Ave. #1861 Covina, CA 91723 [Main Document] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTIONS PRESENTED | 1. Whether a State may, consistent with the Four- teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, require by local court rule that every application for pay- ment of court-appointed counsel fees “shall be made ex parte,” with the application then resolved by default on the papers—after an opportunity for written opposition, but without any required case- . specific live hearing—and the resulting fee obliga- tion effective upon entry and payable within 45 days. 2. Whether a State denies procedural due process when, having authorized court-appointed counsel’s fees to be imposed through that mandatory ex parte procedure, its rules then extinguish the only mechanism for redetermining the obligation thirty | days after appointed counsel withdraws—so that | the post-deprivation evidentiary hearing the parent was promised can lapse, and here did lapse, with- out ever being held, while every court holds review | belongs somewhere else. G) |
paid Mothana Maher Hussein

v.

Consolidated Edison, Inc.

26-609 Second Circuit, No. 25-1996

Judgment: May 07, 2026

Mothana Maher Hussein 2562 Hylan Blvd. Suite 61413 Staten Island, NY 10306 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTION PRESENTED The Equal Credit Opportunity Act separately pro- hibits discrimination and requires notice of qualify- ing adverse credit action. After the district court | invited a futility response, petitioner alleged that re- spondent imposed a deposit condition without an | ECOA-compliant statement of reasons. The courts below rejected further amendment through an analy- sis of prohibited discrimination. The question pre- sented is: Whether a court may deny further leave to amend | as futile based on the absence of prohibited discrim1- nation without separately evaluating an expressly | presented claim that a creditor failed to provide the adverse-action notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d) and 12 C.F.R. § 1002.9, where the proposed notice claim concerns utility deposit conditions and must be assessed under Regulation B’s definitions and exclu- sions.
paid Daniel L. Pohle

v.

John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States

26-610 District of Columbia Circuit, No. 25-5377

Judgment: March 10, 2026

Daniel L. Pohle 1280N CR500E Butlerville, IN 47223 NA
paid Saadia Shapiro

v.

Mark Barron

26-611 Second Circuit, No. 25-77

Judgment: January 30, 2026

Saadia Shapiro 445 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601 [Main Document] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented1 QUESTIONS PRESENTED

{. Whether judicial estoppel may be used to convert a pre-arbitration assertion that a category of claims . is arbitrable into a permanent submission of a fraud claim that was never pleaded for decision in the arbitration itself, particularly in light of this Court’s intervening decision in Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Con- struction, Inc. and the limits on arbitral authority im- | posed by 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). |

IJ. Whether an arbitration is fundamentally fair un- | der 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(8) where fraud was expressly dis- avowed during the arbitration, was introduced only in a supplemental post-hearing submission, and the arbi- trator closed the proceeding the next day, leaving no meaningful opportunity to defend—yet the reviewing court treated the absence of a pre-award request to re- |

| open as waiver. | III. Whether the extraordinary deference afforded | | arbitral awards permits confirmation where the award materially omits dispositive contract language, substi- tutes a contractual standard the parties did not adopt, disregards express force-majeure provisions, and uses | _ those altered contractual premises to impose personal

fraud lability. a -

paid Kenosha County, Wisconsin

v.

Aleksy Ruderman

26-612 Seventh Circuit, No. 24-2939

Judgment: June 08, 2026

Remzy D. Bitar Municipal Law & Litigation Group, S.C. 730 N. Grand Avenue Waukesha, WI 53186 [Main Document] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTION PRESENTED

The Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act of 2000 criminalizes forced labor: “[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person” by means of (1) force, physical restraint, or threats of force or physical restraint; (2) serious harm or threats of serious harm; (8) abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a).

The Seventh Circuit recently held county jails violate the forced labor statute when detainees, including non-U.S. nationals lawfully detained by the federal government pending their removal proceedings, clean their cells and common areas without pay and under threat of discipline. This unprecedented expansion of Section 1589, upending established constitutional norms permitting such routine chores as part of jail management, follows several lower courts using fundamentally different methodologies when reading the text.

The question presented 1s:

Whether the forced labor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1589, can be interpreted not to reach ordinary conditions of confinement in county jails that require basic housekeeping and to avoid the difficult question whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied.

1

app Juan Pablo Chavez

v.

Sergeant William Finney

26A662 Second Circuit, No. 26-951

Judgment: —

Juan Pablo Chavez 735 E. 81st St. Los Angeles, CA 90001 [Main Document] NA
app Guale Yamassee Tanasi Tribal Government

v.

Lawrence Peter Rhea, III

26A663 Sixth Circuit, No. 26-5379

Judgment: —

Guale Yamassee Tanasi Tribal Government 13 S. Prescott St. P.O. Box 111608 Memphis, TN 38111 [Main Document] NA
app Emmanuel Adeyinka

v.

Ayden Hendrie, Individually and as Portland Police Bureau Police Officer

26A664 Ninth Circuit, No. 26-154

Judgment: —

Emmanuel Adewale Adeyinka P.O. Box 2261 Portland, OR 97208 [Main Document] NA
app Emmanuel Adeyinka

v.

Urban Alchemy

26A665 Ninth Circuit, No. 26-1073

Judgment: —

Emmanuel Adewale Adeyinka P.O. Box 2261 Portland, OR 97208 [Main Document] NA
app Allen R. Auten

v.

Gavin Newsom, Governor of California

26A666 Ninth Circuit, No. 23-3704

Judgment: —

Allen Auten CIM Alpha - Four P.O. Box 3100 Chino, CA 91708 [Main Document] NA