Petitions and applications docketed on November 18, 2026
type Caption Docket No Court Below Petitioner's Counsel Counsel's Address Recent Filings QP
paid Meta Platforms, Inc., fbda Facebook, Inc.

v.

Washington

26-649 Supreme Court of Washington, No. 103748-1

Judgment: June 18, 2026

Paul D. Clement Clement & Murphy, PLLC 706 Duke Street Alexandria, VA 22314 [Main Document] [Petition] NA
paid Norfolk Southern Railway Company

v.

Scott Sporner

26-650 Court of Appeals of Indiana, No. 25A-CT-1138

Judgment: March 16, 2026

Tobias Samuel Loss-Eaton Sidley Austin LLP 1501 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20005 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTION PRESENTED

The Federal Employers’ Liability Act, passed in 1908, creates a federal cause of action for railroad workers injured through employer negligence. 465 U.S.C. § 51. FELA’s negligence standard, drawn from the common law, requires “ordinary prudence.” WNor- folk S. Ry. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 169 (2007). What constitutes FELA negligence thus varies from case to case and jury to jury.

In 1970, Congress—unsatisfied with the patchwork of existing laws related to railroad safety—passed the Federal Railroad Safety Act. The FRSA directs the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations for “every area of railroad safety.” 49 U.S.C. § 20103(a). These regulations establish a uniform “Federal stand- ard of care” for any “subject matter” they “cover[],” and state law 1s preempted from imposing “an additional or more stringent” standard. Id. § 20106(a)(2), (b)(1)(A). Thus, a railroad cannot be held negligent un- der state law for conduct that complied with on-point FRSA regulations. CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664-65, 675 (1998).

The FRSA also mandates that all “[llaws, regula- tions, and orders related to railroad safety … shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable.” 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(1). The question presented, which has openly divided the lower courts, 1s:

Whether FRSA regulations supply the standard of care for a FELA claim on the same subject, such that a FELA negligence claim is precluded to the same ex- tent that a state negligence claim would be preempted.

(1)

paid Jane Doe, By and Through Conservator, Fleming and Curti PLC

v.

The Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, a Utah Corporation Sole

26-651 Supreme Court of Arizona, No. CV-25-0213-PR

Judgment: July 30, 2026

John J. Trebon John Trebon, P.C. 308 N. WC Riles St. Flagstaff, AZ 86001-0000 [Petition] NA
paid Rahul Chaturvedi

v.

Siddharth Siddharth

26-652 Appeals Court of Massachusetts, No. 24-P-1166

Judgment: March 25, 2026

Rahul Chaturvedi 867 Boylston Street 5th Floor Boston, MA 02116 [Main Document] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented: | Cite as: Pet for Cert. 1 | OC | Petition for a Writ of Certiorari QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1.Whether the Supremacy Clause and the Four- teenth Amendment permit state judicial process to compel disclosure of impounded information asserted | to constitute federally protected trade secrets under | | | | 18 U.S.C. §1839(3), including technical information : . , implicating federal export controls, notwithstanding | documented federal regulatory notification and objec- | tions to unauthorized dissemination, through contin- uing discovery sanctions and coercive enforcement | without adjudicating the applicable federal protec- | tions or providing effective procedures for confidential | examination? | | 2. Whether dismissal of an appeal under Massachu- | setts Rule of Appellate Procedure 16(a) constitutes an | adequate state procedural ground foreclosing review . 7 of federal constitutional and statutory objections to an | alias execution allegedly obtained through materially 7 | _ disputed representations concerning a lost original ex- : | ecution, where the appellate briefs identified those ob- , | jections, governing authorities, and supporting record _ citations, while the challenged execution and ensuing coercive enforcement remained undisturbed without | | : | merits adjudication? | | - 8.Whether the Fourteenth Amendment permits | : continuing coercive enforcement affecting federally | . protected property interests and constitutional rights | , | where the asserted authority for enforcement rests : upon disputed sworn representations concerning the , | existence of an original execution, and the subsequent | judicial record included filings attributed to unauthor- ized or unverified identities, some later struck or |
paid Applications in Internet Time, LLC

v.

Salesforce, Inc.

26-653 Federal Circuit, No. 2025-2026

Judgment: March 16, 2026

Charles Wizenfeld Hecht Partners LLP 125 Park Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10017 [Main Document] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented_j- QUESTION PRESENTED

Under 35 U.S.C. § 281, only a “patentee” may sue for patent infringement, and this Court has held that whether a particular plaintiff qualifies to invoke a federal cause of action is ordinarily a question of statutory interpretation, not a component of Article III standing. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 & n.4 (2014). Here, the Federal Circuit held that petitioner lacked Article III standing because it did not hold an exclusionary right in the asserted patents when it filed suit. On that basis the court of appeals held the defect could not be cured through Rule 17(a)(8) ratification or contract reformation.

The question presented is:

Whether a_ patent plaintiff’s lack of an exclusionary right in the asserted patents is a defect in Article III standing that bars Rule 17(a)(8) ratification and contract reformation, or instead a question of statutory entitlement to sue that those mechanisms may address.

ifp In Re Terri Lowe, aka Terri Tucker 26-6172 NA, No. —

Judgment: —

Terri Lowe 1136 Joslin Path Douglasville, GA 30134 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether a federal judge who is named as a party-defendant and served in an operative pleading commits per se, irremediable structural error under 28 U.S.C. § 455 and the Due Process Clause by refusing to recuse, presiding over his own defense, and entering an order dismissing himself from the action. II. Whether a district court acts in total absence of subject-matter jurisdiction when, having expressly acknowledged that a pending appeal divested it of jurisdiction, it nevertheless enters merits summary judgment and a permanent anti-filing injunction under the All-Writs Act without an appellate remand. III. Whether the Eleventh Circuit departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by affirming the dismissal of a superseded complaint, adopting an ex post facto rationale to nullify an operative pleading that the district court never struck, and finding claims “abandoned” where the lower court omitted the 7 preserved record from appellate transmission. IV. Whether an extraordinary writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) must issue to vacate void, ultra vires orders where lower courts employ an invalid filing

| injunction and recharacterize mandatory FRAP 35/40 en banc petitions to insulate structural defects from ordinary review. |

ifp Jonathan Joseph Corbett

v.

Minnesota

26-6173 Court of Appeals of Minnesota, No. A25-2041

Judgment: May 21, 2026

Jonathan Joseph Corbett 970 Pickett St. N. Bayport, MN 55003 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented| QUESTION(S) PRESENTED 1, Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments requile Meoningfvi Ted: cial ingviry into dvror partiality When the fecotd Shows that ao | Juror disClosed a Tomiby Pelachion Shi p connecting her husband to a State witness ond, during deliberations, asked Whether She Could teil the _ Other Jurors obevt that witness's Crnraracters but no evidetiory hearing wes heid. . | .. wicether . Sthaste p° ‘ t+eonvittion Covre May deny AN evidentiary hearing Solely +hrovgh a procedural ‘time bar Where -the petitioner Wlieges thar Trial Counsel fasied -to Challenge +he Juror and op peliate Counsel failed To Pfesent the federal dJuror-bras 195 VE, — Without providing a hearing. at Which the alleged partiality and | Covese failures Can be factvally tested, |
ifp Nikolas James Cook

v.

United States

26-6174 Eleventh Circuit, No. 25-13406

Judgment: July 27, 2026

Nikolas James Cook 900873 Martin County Jail 800 SE Monterey Road Stuart, FL 34994 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTION(S) PRESENTED SD whelhar The Loore oP Amecls for The Slevesnwyny Urwrt AQphrd mre \rresed SVANVIOM Onawry o& SRHARONS You ACCA Wa9 Me MLarts OL ror aopect Lest and Wen Asa ing Yoda” wm eK oo Secldiing aS AQeanl Varta AVA IONEN | OkeA The RR Kowa Gano WAS LMEDUMRL2A Ar ON onr Tre Same Av 7 | 0
ifp Briley Piper

v.

Marty Jackley, Attorney General for South Dakota

26-6175 Eighth Circuit, No. 25-2617

Judgment: May 04, 2026

Loren Dougherty Stewart Federal Defender Office, Capital Habeas Unit 601 Walnut Street, Suite 545-West Philadelphia, PA 19106 [Main Document] [Main Document] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedCAPITAL CASE QUESTIONS PRESENTED
  1. Does 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) violate Article III of the United States Constitution because it requires federal judges to defer to the decisions of non—Article III actors, on federal constitutional questions, that are wrong but not unreasona- ble?

  2. Where a state procedural bar was applied in novel and unforeseeable circum- stances, was the determination that the bar was adequate to bar federal ha- beas review contrary to Cruz v. Arizona, 598 U.S. 17 (2023)?

1

ifp Aakash Dalal

v.

John L. Molinelli

26-6176 Third Circuit, No. 24-2649

Judgment: March 02, 2026

Aakash Dalal 215 Burlington Road South Bridgeton, NJ 08302 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW | |
  1. Whether the sham affidavit doctrine violates the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution by permitting judges to make credibility determinations, and if not, what is the appropriate standard for the application of the doctrine?

  2. Whether courts can apply the sham affidavit doctrine to encompass summary judgment affidavits that contain supplemental or clarifying facts, rather than contradictory facts?

  3. Whether a lower court’s application of the sham affidavit doctrine is an issue of law, subject to de novo appellate review, or an evidentiary issue, subject to review under the abuse of discretion standard?

  4. Whether the Third Circuit’s weighing of evidence and credibility determinations, including its expansion of the sham affidavit doctrine, at the summary judgment stage deprived Petitioner of his Seventh Amendment guaranteed right to a jury trial?

| 11

ifp Harold Bennie Kaeding

v.

United States

26-6177 Eighth Circuit, No. 24-3462

Judgment: March 27, 2026

Karen Mohrlant F. Clayton Tyler, P.A. Suite 230 331 Second Avenue South Minneapolis, MN 55401 [Main Document] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQuestion Presented Whether this Court should adopt a bright-line rule that interrogations which are conducted during the execution of a residential search warrant are custodial and require Wiranda warnings. 1
ifp Basra D. Mohamed

v.

Full Life Care

26-6178 Ninth Circuit, No. 24-6768

Judgment: June 16, 2026

Basra D. Mohamed 7311 38th Ave S. Seattle, WA 98118 NA
ifp James Clark, III

v.

Florida

26-6179 District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, No. 1D2024-1360

Judgment: July 08, 2026

Barbara Jane Busharis Office of the Public Defender 2nd Judicial Circuit 301 S. Monroe St. Ste 401 Tallahassee, FL 32301 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTION PRESENTED
  1. Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require a twelve-person jury to try a criminal defendant accused of a felony offense.

  2. Whether Florida violated Clark’s constitutional rights to confrontation, due process, and effective assistance of counsel when it excluded him from his trial and forced him to appear via video screen.

  3. Whether Florida’s prison releasee reoffender statute violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because requisite sentencing enhancement facts are not required to be charged in a charging document or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

2

ifp Torrence Belcher

v.

Officer Cross

26-6180 Seventh Circuit, No. 25-2252

Judgment: January 15, 2026

Torrence Belcher #244707 Indiana State Prison One Park Row Michigan City, IN 46360 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented| QUESTION(S) According to 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2) CRUEL and UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
  1. Why isn’t Discrimination by a correctional officer not an unreasonable risk of serious harm’??

  2. Why doesn’t discrimination sum up the imminent danger standard??

  3. Why doesn’t retaliation by a correctional officer sum up the imminent danger standard??

  4. How is this any different from a staff member with knowledge that I could be harmed if moved to a certain dorm or cell house and they did so anyhow?? Example: /t was four of us with a problem who could be harmed if left in that situation and I’m the only one who don’t get moved? ?

How isn’t that imminent danger?? Even if nothing did occur. It still is an unreasonable unnecessary risk of serious harm

  1. What else could I, the plaintiff Belcher, be subjected too at the hands of these corrupt officials when unchecked discriminating against an American citizen takes place and nothing is done to ratify the wrong or injury inflicted to one under their authority??

  2. So a government official can discriminate about small things and get away with it?? .

  3. Is all forms of discrimination a wrong or injury summed up as a constitutional violation??

  4. If I cannot afford to purchase a 30.00% sweatshirt then how m ‘I gone pay a 605.003 filing fee??? |

  5. Not having adequate clothes in the winter time deprives a prisoner of what human Need???

10.Should a person be entitled to relief if no existing precedent squarely governed the situation??

  1. What is the standard for civilized measures of life’s necessities??

12.What does it mean to have a right to protection from extreme cold??

13.Why would a government official be entitled to qualified immunity when no existing precedent squarely governed the specific situation?

Page 0

ifp Preston Wayne Walters

v.

Lindsy Kendall, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill

26-6181 Third Circuit, No. 25-3579

Judgment: May 12, 2026

Preston Wayne Walters NX-2444 Fayette SCI 50 Overlook Drive LaBelle, PA 15450 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTION(S) PRESENTED le |. . ' ° -

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ifp Brandon David McCarthy and Rachel Christine McCarthy

v.

United States

26-6182 Tenth Circuit, No. 25-5026

Judgment: May 06, 2026

Leah D. Yaffe Office of the Federal Public Defender 633 17th Street, Suite 1000 Denver, CO 80202 [Main Document] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTIONS PRESENTED

The McCarthys were charged with drug crimes related to their alleged online business of selling poppy seeds, which are naturally coated in opium latex when harvested. The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) specifically excludes poppy seeds from the relevant definitions of controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 802(19)-(20), meaning that it does not regulate the possession or distribution of raw poppy seeds, even to persons seeking to consume the seeds for their opioid qualities.

The overarching issue in this case is whether the CSA’s precursor statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(6)-(7), nonetheless criminalizes the possession or distribution of poppy seeds when the defendants know that the recipients plan to wash off the seeds’ natural coating of opium latex with water and drink that water as “poppy-seed tea.” The district court said no and dismissed the indictment, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed.

The specific questions presented are:

  1. Whether the CSA’s precursor statute, 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6)-(7), unambiguously reaches the knowing possession or distribution of poppy seeds—an item Congress specifically exempted from the Act’s definitions of controlled substances—to recipients who will consume the seeds via poppy-seed tea.

  2. Whether, at a minimum, the precursor statute is sufficiently ambiguous, with respect to poppy seeds that will be consumed via poppy-seed tea, that the rule of lenity requires the ambiguity to be resolved in Petitioners’ favor.

  3. Whether the precursor statute, as construed by the Tenth Circuit, is unconstitutionally vague as applied.

1

ifp David P. Webster

v.

Bill Swain, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center

26-6183 Ninth Circuit, No. 25-4065

Judgment: November 17, 2025

David Webster 862925 Washington Correctional Center P.O. Box 900 Shelton, WA 98584 NA
ifp In Re Teena Colebrook 26-6184 NA, No. —

Judgment: —

Teena Colebrook 6135 Alta Mira Lane San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented| QUESTIONS PRESENTED | 1. Whether mandamus is warranted where a pro se creditor's fraud-based nondischargeability complaint was dismissed at screening on limitations grounds without discovery and without a meaningful opportunity to amend, despite allegations of continuing promises, acknowledgments, partial payments, concealment, reliance, delayed discovery, tolling, and revival.

__ 2. Whether the lower courts gave meaningful effect to the rule that pro se pleadings are liberally construed when Petitioner’s complex fraud and nondischargeability allegations were effectively | required to be pleaded with lawyer-like precision before factual development could occur.

  1. Whether the record presents exceptional circumstances where Petitioner contemporaneously raised concerns about the treatment of her pro se status, the Bankruptcy Court itself confirmed that it | conducted an in-depth substantive screening of the complaint, and the appellate process ended without the factual development Petitioner contends was necessary to resolve disputed limitations | and fraud issues.

4, Whether a writ should issue in aid of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction where the Sixth Circuit has | entered judgment and issued its mandate, no lower court can provide the specific relief sought from that completed appellate disposition, and Petitioner seeks remand for meaningful amendment, appropriate discovery, and adjudication on a developed record.

ifp Antonia Blackwell

v.

The Pearl

26-6185 Court of Appeals of Utah, No. 20250324-CA

Judgment: May 05, 2026

Antonia Blackwell X X, WI 00000 NA
ifp Lezlie A. Day

v.

Gregory E. Day

26-6186 Supreme Court of Virginia, No. 260125

Judgment: June 30, 2026

Lezlie A. Day 1646 Montmorency Dr. Vienna, VA 22182 [Main Document] NA
app Joachim E. Dressler

v.

Wisconsin

26A712 Supreme Court of Wisconsin, No. 2024AP746

Judgment: —

Joachim E. Dressler

230174

Waupun Correctional Institution P.O. Box 351 Waupun, WI 53963-0351

[Main Document] NA
app Jacob Julick

v.

Scott Jordan

26A713 Sixth Circuit, No. 25-5667

Judgment: —

James Patrick Davy All Rise Trial & Appellate P.O. Box 15216 Philadelphia, PA 19125 [Main Document] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] NA
app Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security

v.

National TPS Alliance

26A714 Ninth Circuit, No. 25-5724

Judgment: —

D. John Sauer Solicitor General United States Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001 [Main Document] NA